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Abstract 
 
American author and journalist Jonah Lehrer declared in 2012 that Pixar 
Animation Studios was ‘the one exception’ to the oft-cited maxim that, in 
Hollywood, ‘nobody knows anything.’ Patrick Goldstein of the Los Angeles Times 
spoke in similar terms in 2008, writing that, ‘critics and audiences are in agreement 
on one key thing: Nobody makes better movies than Pixar.’ Thirteen consecutive 
global box office successes and scores of industry awards would seem to suggest 
that Lehrer and Goldstein are correct. Yet it is important to recognise that such 
statements invariably refer to something intangible, something beyond a particular 
Pixar film or selection of films. There exists, in other words, a widely held set of 
meanings and associations about what the studio represents, and to whom.  
This thesis argues that this set of meanings and associations – Pixar’s brand 
identity – is far from the fixed and unambiguous entity it is often seen to be. If the 
studio has come to be seen as guarantee of quality family entertainment, when did 
this notion become widespread? Have the parameters for ‘quality’ and ‘success’ 
remained constant throughout its history? I demonstrate for instance that Pixar 
benefited considerably from Disney’s wavering reputation from the late-1990s 
onwards. I approach branding as a discursive process, and one that brand producers 
sometimes have little control over, contrary to the implicit claims of most marketing 
literature. 
Broadly chronological in structure, the thesis traces the development of the 
studio’s reputation by drawing on Barbara Klinger’s approach to historical reception 
studies. Individual chapters focus on how Pixar was discussed by critics and 
journalists at specific moments or in specific contexts, as it evolved from a 
computer graphics company to become the most celebrated film studio of all time. 
Ultimately, this is a case study of the cultural work involved in the making of a 
brand or an auteur, and how these meanings can shift over time. 
2 
Contents 
 
1  Abstract 
 
3 Acknowledgements 
 
 
4 Introduction 
Locating Pixar: Developing a Discursive Approach Towards Brand Analysis 
 
27 Chapter One 
Booting Up: The Many Faces of Early Pixar 
 
61 Chapter Two 
You Got A Brand In Me?: Layered Reputations and the Consumption of 
Toy Story 
 
96 Chapter Three 
  A Mouse Divided: Disney, Pixar, and the Reception of Industrial Conflict 
 
111 Chapter Four 
Almost Pixarian: Genre, Rivalry, and Emerging Discourses of Quality 
 
134 Chapter Five 
Whistle While You Work: Pixar’s ‘Behind the Scenes’ Narratives 
 
151 Chapter Six 
Imagined Consensus: Review Aggregation and Post-Takeover Pixar 
 
180 Conclusion 
 Beyond Infinity, Beyond Animation?: The Future of the Pixar Brand 
 
 
193 Appendix 
 
195  Pixar Filmography 
 
198 Filmography 
 
202 Teleography 
 
203 Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Acknowledgements 
 
Completing this thesis has been the most challenging project I have ever 
undertaken, and I am forever indebted to everyone who has helped me along the 
way. I would like to thank the University of East Anglia, School of Film and 
Television Studies, for generously funding my research, and to the entire school’s 
faculty and postgraduate community for their ongoing suggestions at various stages.  
I am particularly grateful to my co-supervisors, Rayna Denison and Keith 
M. Johnston. Their patience, guidance, feedback and advice throughout the last 
three years have been invaluable. Somehow, they consistently managed to say 
exactly the right thing at exactly the right time, and I always came out of our 
supervisory meetings with a renewed sense of buoyancy about my work. I could not 
have asked for a better team, either on a professional or a personal level. I am also 
eternally grateful (yes, yes, like the Toy Story aliens) to Peter Krämer, whose 
infectious enthusiasm for film studies inspired me to pursue a career in academia. It 
was also Peter who first encouraged me to focus my research on Pixar, and his 
assistance with the PhD application process will not be forgotten. 
Special praise goes to my closest friends and colleagues in Norwich, a.k.a. 
Team TAMSONH: Hannah Ellison, Melanie Kennedy, Tom Phillips, Liz Powell, 
Rhys Thomas, and Helen Warner. I feel genuinely honoured to have gone through 
this process with them, and thanks to their friendship, never once felt as though I 
was ‘on my own like Tarzan boy’. It would be impossible for me to name everyone 
else who has assisted me during the writing of this thesis, but for going the extra 
distance when I needed it, I am also especially thankful for the contributions of folk 
superstar Oliver Gruner, and Gavin ‘Give it to Holt’ McArt. 
 My family, and especially my parents, Anne and John, have always provided 
unwavering support whenever it was called for. This thesis is dedicated to them, for 
bringing me into the world, fostering my love of film through an extensive home 
video library, taking me to Disney World, and of course for buying my ticket to see 
Toy Story all those years ago. My dog, Henry, has also played his part, and even 
though he is illiterate and deaf, so will never read this or hear me say it, I feel he 
deserves a mention here too. Good boy. 
Finally, huge thanks to my wonderful girlfriend, Caroline, who always 
continued to believe in me, even in the moments when I stopped believing in 
myself. I could not have done this without her support, companionship and terrible 
impressions. She means everything to me.  
 
Richard McCulloch 
May 2013 
 
4 
INTRODUCTION 
 
-Locating Pixar- 
Developing A Discursive Approach Towards Brand 
Analysis 
 
 
Nobody in Hollywood knows anything. Pixar seems to know everything. 
 
- Jonah Lehrer, Wired1 
 
In June 2012, within days of Disney-Pixar’s animated fairytale Brave 
(Mark Andrews and Brenda Chapman, 2012) being released in American 
cinemas, movie website Slashfilm published a lengthy article detailing ‘the 15 
reasons [it] doesn’t feel like a “Pixar” film.’2 Laremy Legel explained that ‘Brave 
isn’t a bad movie on merit, it’s merely an average one … But within the greater 
context of Pixar’s previous work, [it] does come up short’.3 Kenneth Turan of the 
Los Angeles Times made a similar point, opening his review by stating, ‘If the 
Walt Disney Studios logo were the only one on Brave, this film’s impeccable 
visuals and valiant heroine would be enough to call it a success. But Brave is also 
a Pixar Animation Studios film, and that means it has to answer to a higher 
standard.’4 Even Variety’s Peter Debruge, whose response was far more positive 
than either Legel’s or Turan’s, agreed that ‘Brave feels quite different from earlier 
Pixar films’.5 For critics, then, attaching the Pixar name to an animated film 
fundamentally changes the way(s) in which we interpret or otherwise assign value 

1 Jonah Lehrer, ‘Animating a Blockbuster: How Pixar Built “Toy Story 3”’, Wired, 24th May 2010 
<http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/05/process_pixar/>, Accessed 24th July 2012. Original 
emphasis. 
2 Laremy Legel, ‘The 15 Reasons “Brave” Doesn’t Feel Like A “Pixar” Film’, Slashfilm, 25th June 
2012 <http://www.slashfilm.com/15-reasons-brave-doesnt-feel-like-pixar-film/>, Accessed 13th 
August 2012. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Kenneth Turan, ‘Not A Bull’s-Eye’, Los Angeles Times, 22nd June 2012, p.D1. 
5 Peter Debruge, ‘“Brave”’, Variety, 10th June 2012 
<http://www.variety.com/review/VE1117947728/>, Accessed 13th August 2012. 
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to it, ushering in a complex series of (largely positive) meanings and assumptions 
about the people and processes behind the production.  
But what are these meanings and assumptions? The idea that Brave 
somehow felt different to Pixar’s previous output was a recurring theme across 
reviews in the American press, yet few critics saw the need to clarify what this 
might actually mean. That the studio must ‘answer to a higher standard’ implies 
that this is at least partly a question of ‘quality’, but what does quality mean in this 
context? Legel’s article is particularly illuminating here, eschewing any kind of 
formal analysis of Brave, and couching his assessment almost entirely in terms of 
what he felt was absent from it. Chief among his lamentations are the following 
arguments: the film ‘doesn’t ever fully pull at the heart strings (or the head 
strings)’; it lacks ‘dramatic tension’; the dialogue is ‘neither quippy nor dramatic’; 
it suffers from ‘a serious lack of whimsy, [or] moments of pure silliness’; and it 
demonstrates too little ambition (i.e. a desire to explore ‘new’ and ‘creative’ story 
ideas).6 Both implicitly and explicitly, he describes these features as being typical 
of all Pixar’s films, suggesting that the studio has developed a reputation among 
critics for routinely striking powerful emotional and artistic chords with 
audiences. As Turan goes on to say in his review, ‘It’s hard not to be affected by 
the emotional ending of Brave, but the magic that is Pixar’s birthright – a sense 
of unending enchantment … is inescapably absent more often than not.’7 
Tellingly, these are all abstract, highly subjective qualities. Pixar is 
positioned within these reviews as a director usually would be – the authorial 
presence credited with stamping its personality onto the film.8 What the above 

6 Legel, ’The 15 Reasons Why “Brave” Doesn’t Feel Like A “Pixar” Film’. 
7 Turan, ‘Not A Bull’s-Eye’. 
8 While the director has historically been the figure most closely associated with film authorship, 
there are of  course numerous exceptions, from writers and stars through to producers and whole 
studios. See, for example, Barry Keith Grant, ed., Auteurs and Authorship: A Film Reader (Maldwell, 
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examples demonstrate, however, is that the critical parameters for evaluating 
Brave were not grounded in the film’s formal qualities (e.g. mise-en-scène, 
cinematography, repetition of narrative themes), nor were they comprised of 
ideological critiques.9 Rather, the primary evaluative nexus point was the 
reputation of the studio that had made it. But how did the Pixar brand come to 
be defined in such a way? When was it that critics’ perception of this company 
ceased to be about specific moments in specific films (if indeed it was ever about 
that), and moved into the less tangible territory of ‘whimsy’ or ‘enchantment’?  
Over the course of this thesis, I unpack the various ways in which this 
reputation has developed and shifted since the company’s origins in the late-
1970s. In some respects, it is an attempt to provide some historical context to a 
brand that has been written about by hundreds of journalists, but criticised by 
very few. My critical approach to studying Pixar is by no means an attempt to 
question or denigrate the subjective merits of its output, nor is it a polemic 
against popular culture or mainstream Hollywood filmmaking more generally.10 
Instead, my aim is to highlight the specificities of the studio’s cultural history with 
a view to opening up bigger questions about the nature of branding and 
reputation. In particular, I argue that the Pixar brand has always relied heavily on 
the contrasting reputations of external agents, including studios, filmmakers, 
companies, industries, and marketplaces, as well as broader cultural trends. 

MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). For an account of  the various industrial, economic and cultural 
processes that impact upon notions of  artistic creativity, see David Hesmondhalgh, The Cultural 
Industries, 2nd Edition (London: Sage, 2007). Alternatively, Caldwell sees authorship as an industrial 
process, the result of  a complex series of  interactions and negotiations between various members of  
the creative and executive personnel. John Thornton Caldwell, Production Cultures: Industrial 
reflexivitiy and critical practice in film and television (London: Duke University Press, 2008). See in 
particular, pp.232-9. 
9 Janet Staiger describes formalism, and then later, ideological critique, as the two primary approaches 
to film (and auteur) criticism and film analysis employed by the writers at Cahiers du Cinéma. See 
Janet Staiger, ‘The Politics Of  Film Canons’, Cinema Journal, 24.3 (Spring 1985), pp.4-23. 
10 Note that I do, in fact, identify as a Pixar fan. While I do occasionally use my own experiences with 
Pixar and its films as a jumping off  point for my analysis, the relationship between brand and fan is 
regrettably beyond the scope of  this thesis.  
7 
Existing branding scholarship tends to downplay this process of interaction, 
preferring to see brands as unique sets of values that can be talked about in an 
isolated fashion.11 The research presented here suggests that this is something of 
a fallacy, not only in Pixar’s case, but for all brands. 
 
Pixar as Benchmark 
 
In December 2009, shortly after I began the initial research for this thesis, 
Richard Corliss of Time magazine named WALL-E (Andrew Stanton, 2008) as the 
best film of the entire decade.12 In doing so, he even went as far as saying that 
‘Andrew Stanton’s masterpiece here represents the decade’s full Pixar oeuvre, [and] 
also stands in for all the glories of animation, whether CGI, traditional or stop-
motion, that provided the greatest measure of joy in the new cinematic 
millennium.’13 While Corliss stopped short of giving Pixar sole credit, he 
nevertheless described WALL-E in metonymic terms – an example of animation 
that is, for him, so accomplished that it should be seen to ‘stand in’ for all other 
animation.  
Such praise may be hyperbolic, but the sentiment behind it is far from 
unusual, as Pixar had become increasingly accustomed to critical acclaim from the 
turn of the new millennium. By the end of the decade, the studio and its body of 
work had emerged as a clear benchmark for American journalists; a set of reference 
points against which the respective merits of all Hollywood animated features 

11 See, for example, UEABrandleadership, ‘What is Branding?’, YouTube, 21st September 2011 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CaT_aGNLqLo>, Accessed 25th September 2012. 
12 Richard Corliss, ‘Best Movies, TV, Books and Theater of  the Decade – “WALL-E”’, Time, 29th 
December 2009 
<http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1949837_1949237_1949161,00.htm
l>, Accessed 1st May 2010. 
13 Ibid. 
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should be measured.14 In many ways, this perception of Pixar as a guarantor of 
quality should not come as much of a surprise, since, in the words of Bill Capodagli 
and Lynn Jackson, ‘the preponderance of evidence attesting to their success is 
unquestionable’.15 However, the very notion of ‘success’ is by no means objective. 
For instance, are we talking about commercial success, artistic achievements, 
industrial or technological advances, or something else? Since the late-1980s, the 
studio has received more than two hundred awards from various festivals and 
institutions, including twenty-three Academy Awards, five Golden Globes, five 
BAFTAs, and two Grammys.16 Its financial success is even more impressive, having 
released thirteen consecutive hit films between 1995 and 2012 inclusive.17 Together, 
those movies have accrued more than $3.2 billion at the domestic box office, and 
over $7.4 billion worldwide.18 Accordingly, entire books and numerous articles have 
been written on the multitude of positive lessons the studio can teach us, with Pixar 
repeatedly held aloft as a master of storytelling,19 a textbook example of how to 

14 For the sake of  consistency, this thesis focuses primarily on the studio’s American critical 
reputation, but it is worth noting that Pixar serves as a reference point/benchmark in many other 
countries as well, particularly in the UK. 
15 Bill Capodagli and Lynn Jackson, Innovate The Pixar Way: Business Lessons From The World’s 
Most Creative Corporate Playground (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), p.x. 
16 Figures correct as of  20th September 2012. For a full breakdown of  these awards, see ‘List of  Pixar 
awards and nominations (feature films)’, Wikipedia 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Pixar_awards_and_nominations_(feature_films)>, Accessed 
25th July 2012. For a similar list for the studio’s short films, see ‘List of  Pixar awards and nominations 
(short films)’, Wikipedia, 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Pixar_awards_and_nominations_(short_films)>, Accessed 
25th July 2012. 
17 Of  course, defining what constitutes a ‘hit’ film at the box office is also a task that is far more 
complex than it might first appear. Are we talking about gross receipts, net receipts, or looking for 
the biggest return on investment? Do we insist that all ‘hits’ must appear in the annual domestic box 
office Top 10, or Top 20? If  so, does drawing a line somewhere not make the distinction between 
‘hit’ and ‘flop’ all the more difficult to discern? 
18 Neither figure has been adjusted for inflation. See ‘Franchises: Pixar’, Box Office Mojo, no date, 
<http://www.boxofficemojo.com/franchises/chart/?id=pixar.htm>, Accessed 24th July 2012. Also 
note that each Pixar feature to date has reached number one at the domestic box office, and all but 
one placed among the annual ten highest grossing films for the year of  their release. The one 
exception was Ratatouille (Brad Bird, 2007), which, having placed eleventh and grossed more than 
$200 million, would still not be easily categorised as a failure. 
19 Pixar directors and employees are frequently invited to speak on this subject at animation schools 
across the United States, but particularly in California. See, for example, Jen Yamato, ‘Pixar 
Storytelling 101: 22 Rules Hollywood Should Learn’, Movieline, 13th June 2012 
<http://movieline.com/2012/06/13/pixar-storytelling-101-22-rules-hollywood-should-learn>, 
9 
succeed in business,20 and even as a kind of moral guardian whose films can help us 
to be more virtuous.21 
As David Hesmondhalgh has demonstrated, uncertainty is one of the 
defining features of the cultural industries, as producers of texts (or ‘symbol 
creators’) struggle for consistency due to the ‘highly volatile and unpredictable’ 
behaviour of audiences.22 It was this unpredictability, specifically in relation to the 
American box office, that famously prompted screenwriter William Goldman to 
declare, ‘the single most important fact of the entire movie industry [is that] 
NOBODY KNOWS ANYTHING.’23 The success of Toy Story 3 in 2010, 
however, prompted Jonah Lehrer of Wired magazine to amend Goldman’s maxim 
so that it read, ‘nobody in Hollywood knows anything. Pixar seems to know 
everything.’24 One of the most distinctive features of Pixar’s critical reputation is its 
perceived reliability, which had been explicitly expressed in national media as early 
as 2003, with British magazine The Business wrote that ‘Pixar is as close to a sure 

Accessed 15th August 2012; Andrew Stanton, ‘Andrew Stanton: The Clues To A Great Story’, TED, 
February 2012 <http://www.ted.com/talks/andrew_stanton_the_clues_to_a_great_story.html>, 
Accessed 15th August 2012. 
20 The most obvious example of  this is Bill Capodagli and Lynn Jackson, Innovate The Pixar Way: 
Business Lessons From The World’s Most Creative Corporate Playground (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2010). Also see: Brent Schlender, ‘Pixar’s Magic Man’, Fortune, 17th May 2006 
<http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/15/magazines/fortune/pixar_futureof_fortune_052906/index.h
tm>, Retrieved 15th August 2012; Brent Schlender, ‘Incredible: The Man Who Built Pixar’s 
Innovation Machine’, Fortune, 15th November 2004 
<http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/11/15/8191082/index.htm>, 
Accessed 15th August 2012; Jonah Lehrer, Imagine: How Creativity Works (Edinburgh: Canongate, 
2012), pp.139-74. 
21 Robert Velarde, The Wisdom Of  Pixar: An Animated Look At Virtue (Downer’s Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2010); Todd Brewer and David Zahl, eds., The Gospel According to Pixar 
(Mockinbird Ministries, 2010). Note that the thematic and narrative analyses in these two books 
come from an explicitly Christian perspective. For a similar book written about the Christian 
teachings of  Disney films, see Mark I. Pinksy, The Gospel According to Disney: Faith, Trust and 
Pixie Dust (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004). For a broader reflection on the 
ideological function of  some of  Pixar’s films, see M. Keith Booker, Disney, Pixar, And The Hidden 
Messages Of  Children’s Films (Oxford: Praeger, 2010).  
22 David Hesmondhalgh, The Cultural Industries, 2nd Edition (London: Sage, 2007), pp.18-20. 
23 Jonah Lehrer, Imagine: How Creativity Works (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2012), p.144. Original 
capitalisation. 
24 Lehrer, ‘Animating a Blockbuster’. Original emphasis. 
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thing as exists in the unpredictable movie business’.25 Roger Ebert agreed, writing in 
2004 that Pixar ‘cannot seem to take a wrong step’,26 while more recently, Los 
Angeles Times journalist Patrick Goldstein pointedly declared, ‘critics and audiences 
are in agreement on one key thing: Nobody makes better movies than Pixar.’27 
Goldstein’s comment is especially telling, since he not only claims to be 
speaking on behalf of all other film critics, but audiences too, asserting as fact 
something for which he offers no evidence. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 6, 
notions of consensus have become increasingly important in contemporary film 
criticism, with review aggregation websites such as Rotten Tomatoes providing film 
audiences with a heightened (but problematic) perception of what critics think 
about a given release. The idea that we can speak on behalf of audiences without 
having conducted any empirical research is even more problematic, as Martin 
Barker capably demonstrates in his work on the perceived failure of the Iraq War 
movie genre: 
 
Judgements about success and failure are essentially rhetorical, but [these] 
rhetorics are part of the very arena we need to explore. And certainly, box 
office failure cannot be equated with simple rejection of a film’s narrative 
and argument. People go to see, or stay away from, films for an 
indeterminately long list of reasons – and among those can be their 
awareness of the very debates about whether they will go or not.28  
 
Barker’s point here is that box office figures tell us only about the number of 
people who pay to see a particular film, and nothing at all about their opinion of it. 
Time and again, however, critics and journalists remind their readers that ‘everyone’ 

25 Anon., ‘Coy Story: Will Steve Jobs Jilt Disney?’, The Business, 12th October 2003. Retrieved via 
Nexis UK. 
26 Roger Ebert, ‘“The Incredibles”’, Chicago Sun-Times, 5th November 2004 
<http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20041104/REVIEWS/41006004>, 
Accessed 5th May 2010. 
27 Patrick Goldstein, ‘Why Pixar’s top of  the line’, Los Angeles Times, 1st July 2008 
<http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/01/entertainment/et-goldstein1>, Accessed 1st May 2010. 
28 Martin Barker, A “Toxic Genre”: The Iraq War Films (London: Pluto Press, 2011), p.74. 
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loves Pixar. As with the Iraq War movies, the ‘truth’ of this situation – for example, 
the extent to which audiences trust the Pixar brand, or what values they see as being 
most integral to it – is largely unknown, and therefore less significant than the fact 
that this rhetoric is repeated so often. The more a particular narrative of success or 
failure is alluded to, the easier it becomes to share in that belief; the prophecy is 
essentially self-fulfilling. If film critics and brand strategists alike both rely on 
imagined audiences/consumers to different degrees, it would be prudent to turn 
now to a discussion of what it means to talk about a brand. 
 
Defining the Brand 
Branding has existed in some form since the mid-seventeenth-century, when 
it was used on cattle as a stamp of ownership, before later being used to indicate 
reliable production sources and quality for products such as wine.29 Precise 
definitions are difficult to come by, but branding scholarship and marketing 
literature generally agree that a number of shifts occurred in the function of brands 
over the course of the twentieth century. Celia Lury places particular importance on 
the impact of broad changes to the retail industry, arguing that the burgeoning 
legitimacy of marketing science and consumer research led to a post-war integration 
between marketing and production.30 This, combined with the rise of ‘self-service’ 
retail (e.g. supermarkets) meant that brands were now required to speak directly to 
the customer, performing the role of ‘silent salesmen’.31 It became clear to 
marketers that they could add value to their products by defining them as having a 
‘character’ that transcended functional properties alone. This idea continues to be of 
fundamental importance to brands, which are regularly given valuations that far 

29 UEABrandleadership, ‘What is Branding?’, YouTube, 21st September 2011 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CaT_aGNLqLo>, Accessed 25th September 2012. 
30 Celia Lury, Brands: The Logos of  the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 2004), p.22-3. 
31 Ibid, p.22. 
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exceed the combined total of its assets and revenues. Robert Goldman and Stephen 
Papson point towards the divide between brands and the products they represent, 
writing that Nike for instance has established ‘its sign, its slogan, its style, to the 
degree that the shoe as either a material object or a commodity is absent.’32 Coca-
Cola is currently seen as the world’s most valuable brand, with reports in October 
2012 quoting an astonishing value of $77.8 billion.33 
It is worth pointing out that, as observed by Jeff Swystun, the very notion of 
a brand means different things to different people: ‘from a marketing or consumer 
perspective it is the promise and delivery of an experience; from a business 
perspective it is the security of future earnings; from a legal perspective it is a 
separate piece of intellectual property.’34 He is correct to make these distinctions, 
and indeed none of these perspectives should be completely ignored when 
considering a brand, but the fact that he uses the phrase ‘marketing or consumer 
perspective’ is illustrative of a major problem with existing branding scholarship. 
Jonathan Schroeder and Miriam Salzer-Mörling have noted that most detailed 
studies of the subject are aimed at business and marketing audiences, and therefore 
adopt ‘a practical, checklist approach’ to branding.35 The focus on creating and 
sustaining a brand invariably means that when acknowledged, the consumer tends 
to be reduced to an abstract and non-existent figure. Those who fall within 
arbitrarily delineated socio-demographic categories are consequently all expected to 

32 Robert Goldman and Stephen Papson, Nike Culture: The sign of  the swoosh (London: SAGE, 
1998), p.79. 
33 Elliot, Stuart, ‘List of  Global Brands Keeps Coke on Top, and Apple Jumps Up’, New York 
Times, 1st October 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/business/media/best-global-
brands-report-has-coca-cola-on-top-and-apple-climbing.html>, Accessed 2nd October 2012. 
34 Jeff  Swystun, ed., The Brand Glossary (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.14. For a far 
more comprehensive and scholarly expression of  these ideas – a summary of  the numerous ways in 
which brands have been defined in academic literature – see Leslie De Chernatony and Francesca 
Dall’Olmo Riley, ‘Defining A “Brand”: Beyond The Literature With Experts’ Interpretations’, 
Journal of Marketing Management, 14 (1998), pp.417-43. 
35 Jonathan E. Schroeder and Miriam Salzer-Mörling, eds., Brand Culture (London: Routledge, 2006), 
p.3. 
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respond in a similar way to branding materials, an assumption which is problematic 
at best.  
It is somewhat curious then that the oft-cited Jean-Nöel Kapferer 
(borrowing from Kevin Lane Keller) refers to ‘the now classic definition of a brand’ 
as ‘a set of mental associations, held by the consumer, which add to the perceived 
value of a product or service.’36 Therein lies the problem: despite most brand 
theorists and analysts agreeing that brands consist of sets of meanings and 
associations in the minds of their consumers (or potential consumers), such studies 
nonetheless ignore most (if not all) of the factors that actually impact upon meaning 
after the brand producer has done its part. Kapferer does note that there is a 
process of ‘decoding’, and acknowledges the impact of extraneous factors that 
‘speak in the brand’s name and thus produce meaning, no matter how disconnected 
they may actually be from it.’37 Short of enigmatically referring to them as ‘noise’ 
however, he surprisingly fails to explain exactly what these ‘extraneous factors’ are, 
despite in his view being contributors towards how consumers interpret brands. His 
implicit suggestion is also that consumers all ‘decode’ in the same way. 
This view is understandable within such literature, in the sense that 
marketers’ interests will inevitably lean towards knowing what they themselves can 
do for their brand(s).38 Building on work by Adam Arvidsson, Paul Grainge points 
out that this view is typical within brand management theory, which invariably 
assumes that ‘branding relies on the participation of consumers but on terms that 
have been forethought.’39 He later adds that despite ‘the concentration of signifying 

36 Jean-Nöel Kapferer, The New Strategic Brand Management: Creating and Sustaining Brand Equity 
Long Term (London: Kogan Page, 2004), p.10. Kapferer takes the definition itself  from Kevin Lane 
Keller, Strategic Brand Management (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998). 
37 Kapferer, p.10. 
38 See for example, Simon Middleton, How to Build a Brand in 30 Days (Chichester: Capstone, 
2011). 
39 Paul Grainge, Brand Hollywood: Selling entertainment in a global media age (Abingdon: 
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power that accrues to corporate brands, [the marketing of entertainment] remains 
an uncertain process where companies are never fully able to fix the meaning of 
signs or capture consumers who move between media in increasingly fleeting 
ways.’40  
Some studies have emerged which concentrate on measuring consumer 
responses to brands,41 but even these remain focused on the practical applications 
of the research (so that a company can measure the value of its own brand[s] for 
instance), and as such there are huge gaps in our understanding of how brands 
actually operate. What is needed then is a way of analysing a brand that manages to 
straddle the dynamic between producer and consumer, thus elucidating the process 
of mediation that takes place between the two. If a brand consists of a set of 
meanings and associations that is reliant upon both parties, we cannot ignore either 
end of this dynamic. Thus, in order to understand a brand, it is necessary to build 
up a detailed picture of the mediated discourses that sit between its producer and its 
consumer. Grainge in fact sees branding as a discourse, arguing that from this 
perspective, ‘branding is less significant for what it might reveal about the 
“condition” of a given social moment, than for how organisations of meaning 
coalesce in particular ways’.42  
Johan Fornäs has advanced similar theoretical ideas, arguing that ‘culture is 
about the interaction between subjects, texts and contexts’, and that the ‘meaning of 
a text and the identity of a subject are [neither] objectively given in advance, [nor] 
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Routledge, 2008), p.29. 
40 Ibid, p.43. 
41 See for example, Jennifer L. Aaker, 'Dimensions of Brand Personality', Journal of Marketing 
Research, 34.3 (August 1997), pp.347-56. 
42 Grainge, p.24. 
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are they individually or arbitrarily variable illusions.’43 Jonathan Gray takes a similar 
stance, arguing that media texts,  
 
by [themselves] and studied in a vacuum, cannot truly help us, for “the text 
itself” is an abstract, yet ultimately non-existent entity, wished into creation 
by analysts. [They] can only ever exist through, inside, and across other 
texts, and through [their] readers.44  
 
But how do we capture these theoretical ideas? While brand meanings to 
some extent do operate independently of a particular product, this view ignores the 
simple fact that, as Jean-Noël Kapferer points out, a brand cannot exist ‘without 
products or services to carry them.’45 I extend this line of thinking to the Pixar 
brand, any analysis of which would be lacking without reference to the films the 
company has become known for. The films are however just one contributor to the 
Pixar brand (albeit the most economically central and widely visible one), and it is 
important not to see them as functioning independently of other relevant factors, 
from accompanying promotion and DVD features, to the Luxo lamp logo/ident, 
reviews and media interviews, merchandise, and tie-in deals (e.g. McDonalds or 
Burger King toys).  
It is for these reasons that I contend an analysis of Pixar’s discursive 
surround is the most effective way of thinking about the way the brand has 
developed. A reception study of the ways in which the company has been talked 
about affords us a more holistic view of the brand than any other approach, 
preventing the urge to privilege either Pixar’s own attempts at branding itself, or the 
diverse range of individual consumer responses. For the purposes of this thesis, 

43 Johan Fornäs, ‘The Crucial in Between: The Centrality of  Mediation in Cultural Studies’, European 
Journal of  Cultural Studies, 3.1 (2000), pp.58-9. 
44 Jonathan Gray, Watching with “The Simpsons”: Television, parody and intertextuality (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006), p.3. 
45 Kapferer, p.10. 
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then, brands are texts (both generic and proprietary) that have not only been 
produced and consumed in different ways over time, but in different ways during 
the same period. In my first chapter for instance, I argue that the way in which Pixar 
was written about during their formative years (i.e. prior to their involvement with 
Disney in the late-1980s) suggests that the company were at that time so intent on 
selling the versatility of their computer hardware and software that there was little 
sign of any coherent brand, let alone early signs of metonymy. The Pixar name 
clearly meant very different things to different groups of consumers, and this 
uncertainty is reflected in the way they were written about.  
As Kevin Sandler has argued in relation to Warner Bros. animation, ‘conflict 
and unpredictability [are] the banes of metonymy, [and] have to be eliminated’ for 
cultural consumption.46 It follows then that Richard Corliss and other film critics 
would be unable to discuss Pixar in metonymic terms in the absence of a consensus 
about the quality of its output, what the studio stands for, and who its films appeal 
to. The more that writers refer to this consensus, the more it is taken for granted, 
making it a self-reinforcing set of discourses that have gradually coalesced into the 
set of meanings that comprise the Pixar brand. 
What happens when a company shifts from one industry to another, as 
Pixar did? How is it that a company that at one point was seen by observers as a 
forerunner of computer graphics products has since become a critical darling, and 
the benchmark for all animated movies made in Hollywood? Clearly this discursive 
shift did not happen overnight, so at what point did the assumptions of the 
consensus begin to manifest themselves? Pixar has become increasingly eager to 
retrospectively tell ‘the story’ of its past, but to what extent is its own historical 

46 Kevin S. Sandler, ‘Looney Tunes and Merry Metonyms’ in Kevin S. Sandler, ed., Reading the 
Rabbit: Explorations in Warner Bros. Animation (London: Rutgers University Press, 1998), p.9. 
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narrative contradicted by the ways that the company and its work were actually 
talked about at the time?  
The word ‘Pixar’ itself – a fake Spanish verb meaning ‘to make pictures’ – 
was coined by a group of Lucasfilm employees in the early 1980s to be used as the 
name for the graphical imaging computer they were developing for George Lucas.47 
The word would later become the name for the company that sold the computer 
(and related imaging software) to a variety of (largely technical and scientific) 
industries, and Pixar was not explicitly referred to as a ‘studio’ until December 
1994.48 Since then, the meanings associated with the Pixar name have continued to 
evolve (even to the point that the word ‘Pixarian’ has emerged),49 and over the 
course of my thesis I hope to trace these discursive associations and address gaps in 
the studio’s account of its own historical narrative. I am in other words seeking to 
investigate not only what Pixar means at a given point in time, but how this meaning 
has developed, and to whom it applies. 
My research and analysis will therefore in a sense be historical in nature. I 
will be seeking to open up the abovementioned critical consensus, and 
demonstrate that the terms in which Pixar are currently discussed work to re-
imagine the company’s past – a narrative that is far more complicated than has 
previously been acknowledged. However, the ultimate goal of this project is to 

47 David A. Price, The Pixar Touch: The making of  a company (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 
p.63. Rather less fortunately, ‘Pixar’ does exist as a verb in Catalan, translating into English as ‘to 
piss’. Note that, in Catalan, the letter ‘x’ is pronounced in the same way as the ‘ch’ sound in English, 
but one suspects that this potentially negative connotation may still linger for some Catalonians. 
Unfortunately, this is something that I only discovered immediately prior to submitting this thesis, 
and I have not had time to fully explore its implications. 
48 This is at least the earliest example I have managed to find. Anon., ‘Computers come to 
Tinseltown’, The Economist, 24 December 1994, p.87. 
49 The use of  this word was until recently reserved to refer to an employee of  the studio, particularly 
prominent figures like John Lasseter, Ed Catmull, Pete Docter and Andrew Stanton. In a recent 
review of  the Dreamworks animated film How to Train Your Dragon (Dean DeBlois and Chris 
Sanders, 2010) however, Richard Corliss used ‘Pixarian’ as an adjective: ‘In it’s loftier moments, it 
might almost be called Pixarian.’ Richard Corliss, ‘Dreaming up “How to Train Your Dragon”’, 
Time, 5 April 2010 <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1975321-2,00.html>, 
Accessed 1 May 2010. The implications of  this are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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use Pixar as a lens through which I can examine the role media discourses play in 
the formation of a brand – an intervention that will prove to be of interest 
beyond the specificities of Pixar and other film studios. Since the early 2000s, 
there has been some exemplary research in the field of branding that has given 
more attention to the industrial and economic processes that impact upon 
meaning.50 Lury, for instance, describes branding’s progression from the implicit 
one-way communication of ‘stimulus-response’ (that is, from the product to the 
consumer), before it increasingly became conceptualised as an exchange.51 
However, the ideas contained within this thesis should be seen as an attempt 
to provide a cultural model of brand analysis. This approach follows on from 
Douglas Holt’s work on cultural branding, which he sees as being reliant upon 
‘brand stories’: 
 
A brand emerges as various ‘authors’ tell stories that involve the brand. … 
The relative influence of these authors varies considerably across product 
categories. Brand stories have plots and characters, and they rely heavily on 
metaphor to communicate and to spur our imaginations. As these stories 
collide in everyday social life, conventions eventually form. Sometimes a 
single common story emerges as consensus view. Most often, though, 
several different stories circulate widely in society. A brand emerges when 
these collective understandings become firmly established.52 
 
In Pixar’s case, what I find is that some disagreement over the studio’s 
branded reputation does occur, even after their critical reputation had been firmly 
established. Yet most of the time these anomalous discourses are subsumed by the 
broader studio narrative, which purports to guarantee quality and innovation at 
every turn. These narratives of reputation are thus central to the ways in which 
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50 See the aforementioned works by Lury, 2004; Grainge, 2008; Johnson, 2012. Also see Adam 
Arvidsson, Brands: Meaning and Value in Media Culture (London: Routledge, 2006). 
51 Lury, p.24. 
52 Douglas B. Holt, How Brands Become Icons: The Principles of  Cultural Branding (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 2004), p.3. 
19 
brands are able to grow and change, playing a key role in their cultural legitimation. 
Mark Harris of New York Magazine presents a fascinating demonstration of this in 
relation to the Academy Awards, noting that, ‘a good Oscar narrative makes voters 
feel that, by writing a name on a ballot, they’re completing a satisfying plotline’.53 He 
goes on to cite Oscar-winning fare such as Little Miss Sunshine (2006) and Precious 
(2009), whose respective wins offered a pleasing resolution to an indie underdog 
narrative and a Cinderella story (in relation to its first-time star, Gabourey Sidibe).54 
Reception studies will enable me to pinpoint some of these stories in a meaningful 
way, and I borrow my method specifically from the work of Barbara Klinger. 
 
Method 
In her essay ‘Film history, terminable and interminable’, Klinger outlines a 
number of possible ways of undertaking a historical reception study, and argues in 
favour of a totalised approach to film history. Although she acknowledges that 
exhaustiveness in historical research is impossible in practice, Klinger maintains that 
it is nonetheless ‘necessary as an ideal goal’, so that we can get a sense ‘not of the 
ideology the text had in historical context, but its many ideologies.’55 This ‘totalised’ 
approach enables the researcher to pinpoint the ‘historical prospects [available] for 
viewing at a given time by illuminating the meanings made available within that 
moment.’56 Klinger thus draws on as wide a spread of materials as possible for each 
topic, but retains her focus by tying her research to specific moments in time 
and/or contexts of consumption. By applying a similar approach to Pixar’s 
reception, determining not only where journalists agree but also where they 
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53 Mark Harris, ‘The Red Carpet Campaign: Inside the singular hysteria of  the Academy Awards 
race’, New York Magazine <http://nymag.com/movies/features/63661/>, Accessed 29th July 2012. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Barbara Klinger, ‘Film history, terminable and interminable: Recovering the past in reception 
studies’, Screen, 38.2 (Summer 1997), pp.108, 110. Original emphasis. 
56 Ibid, p.114. 
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disagree, I should be able to grasp the diverse set of meanings that were associated 
with the Pixar company name at any particular time. In short, it is an approach that 
allows us to simultaneously consolidate notions of text, context and subject.  
Klinger refers to the uncovering of these ‘contradictory modes of [a film’s] 
social inscription’ as a synchronic approach – the attempt to understand the context 
for a film’s reception at one specific point in time. Yet, she also stresses the 
importance of thinking diachronically – acknowledging the ‘serial reinscriptions’ of 
the text and the ways in which meaning can change over time.57 In terms of the 
structure of this thesis, I employ both approaches, but in a way that should enable 
me to maintain a coherent focus throughout. I borrow from the structure employed 
by Klinger in her monograph, Melodrama and Meaning: History, culture, and the 
films of Douglas Sirk, in which each individual chapter is ‘devoted to a specific 
institutional context or discourse’ relating to Sirk’s films.58 Each of my chapters will 
accordingly consist of a synchronic analysis of the meaning(s) associated with the 
Pixar name at a given point in time or in relation to specific debates, as observed 
through print and online media. The juxtaposition of each of these chapters, 
however, will mean that the thesis as a whole will comprise a diachronic study of the 
broad discursive shifts that have taken place in the way media publications talk 
about Pixar, and ultimately how the current critical consensus has come to take the 
shape that it currently has. 
 Following on from Robert Allen and Douglas Gomery, Klinger argues that 
film reviews are of great value to reception studies researchers in the sense that they 
are ‘types of social discourse’ that have an ‘agenda-setting’ function; they have ‘not 
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57 Ibid, p.107. 
58 Barbara Klinger, Melodrama and Meaning: History, culture, and the films of  Douglas Sirk 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), xvii. 
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told audiences what to think so much as … what to think about.’59 Klinger goes on 
to argue that as a ‘primary public tastemaker, the critic operates to [distinguish] 
legitimate from illegitimate art and proper from improper modes of aesthetic 
appropriation.’60 Her method for evaluating the extent to which the critic does this 
is to consider the terms of reference that are being used. If, for example, the film 
appears in a critics’ annual top ten list or is nominated for an award, what are the 
other films that are nominated or appear on the list, and on what grounds are the 
comparisons or references drawn? Are the critics making any evaluative 
assumptions about the film’s intended target audience, and if so, how have they 
made this distinction? These are the kinds of questions I will be asking at each step 
of the way, and in doing so I will gradually build up a picture of the way a brand 
evolves from a company name into a complex and constantly evolving set of 
meanings.  
It is worth pointing out that my work also relates in a number of ways to 
methodological approaches outside of reception studies, and particularly to genre 
studies by Jason Mittell and Rick Altman. Mittell for instance argues that genres are 
‘cultural categories that surpass the boundaries of media texts and operate within 
industry, audience, and cultural practices as well.’61 He uses the example of the re-
scheduling of animation that took place across the American television networks in 
the 1960s, which had the effect of changing how people thought about animation as 
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59 Ibid, p.69. While there is evidence to support this theory, the actual links between film reviews and 
box office receipts or audience interpretation have proven notoriously difficult to pin down. See 
Robert O. Wyatt and David P. Badger, ‘Effects of Information and Evaluation in Film Criticism’, 
Journalism Quarterly, 67.2 (Summer 1990), pp.359-68; Wyatt and Badger ‘To Toast, Pan or Waffle: 
How Film Reviews Affect Reader Interest And Credibility Perception’, Newspaper Research Journal 
8.4 (1987), pp.19-30; Jehoshua Eliashberg and Steven M. Shugan, ‘Film Critics: Influencers or 
Predictors?’, Journal of Marketing, 61 (April 1997), pp.68-78; Suman Basuroy, Subimal Chatterjee, 
and S. Abraham Ravid, ‘How Critical Are Critical Reviews?: The Box Office Effects of Film Critics, 
Star Power, and Budgets,’ Journal of Marketing, 67.4 (2003), pp.103-17. 
60 Klinger, Melodrama and Meaning, p.70. 
61 Jason Mittell, ‘A Cultural Approach to Television Genre Theory’, Cinema Journal, 40.3 (Spring 
2001), p.3.  
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a genre – turning previously all-inclusive texts into ‘kids only’ fare.62 By comparing 
the judgements and language observed in reviews and synopses of relevant TV 
shows, before and after the change in scheduling, he ascertains their perceived 
target audiences and the pleasures offered by them.  
For Mittell then, genres are, like brands, malleable and amorphous 
categories, operating on a level beyond the specific products they are used to sell (or 
are otherwise associated with). The two areas differ however in that brands consist 
of proprietary as well as generic elements. Rick Altman has noted that, by definition, 
the latter can never be fully controlled by a single studio, whereas the former can 
be,63 but Gray and Fornäs’ work would suggest that it is in fact impossible to fully 
control either element. If neither the studio nor the audience has full control over 
the meanings associated with a text, then our interest should be in examining their 
causes and/or implications, rather than attempting to reach a concrete definition of 
what the Pixar brand meant at a specific moment in time. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that I have also found Sarah Churchwell’s 
study of Marilyn Monroe to be extremely useful in thinking about my approach to 
Pixar. In The Many Lives of Marilyn Monroe, Churchwell essentially undertakes a 
meta-biography of the eponymous film star – an attempt to understand the ways in 
which Monroe has been written about in biographical and journalistic accounts of 
her life. As she notes in a foreword, ‘this book seeks to understand the myriad 
stories in circulation about Marilyn Monroe, to read the public myth. It does not 
promise (or indeed endeavour) to reveal the “private woman”.’64 The problem 
Churchwell has with the conflicting discourses surrounding Monroe’s life however 
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62 Jason Mittell, ‘The Great Saturday Morning Exile: Scheduling cartoons on television’s periphery in 
the 1960s’ in Carol A. Stabile and Mark Harrison, eds. Prime Time Animation: Television animation 
and American culture (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.33-54. 
63 Rick Altman, Film/Genre (London: BFI, 1999), p.115. 
64 Sarah Churchwell, The Many Lives of  Marilyn Monroe (London: Granta Books, 2004), vii. 
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are comparable to the ways in which Pixar are often talked about by film critics, 
journalists and authors:  
 
Each of Marilyn’s many lives asserts as proven fact what another calls a total 
lie, and presents conjecture as if it were certain knowledge … Biographies 
then promise to clear up these confusions, reveal the secrets, reclaim the lost 
soul. But these many lives help to create the confusion in the first place.65 
 
As argued above, the problem with Pixar’s discursive surround is more that 
critics seem far too eager to agree with each other as opposed to disagree. Like 
Churchwell however, I am seeking to question how this ‘certain knowledge’ came 
about, to ‘understand the story that is produced by, and for, our culture’,66 and 
identify strands of discourse that have been lost, fought over, or re-worked over 
time. To this end, I will follow her lead in restricting myself to publicly available 
stories and articles about Pixar, for it is these materials that will ultimately provide 
the basis for any consumer’s interpretation of the brand. 
Although I do not wish to suggest that stars and brands operate in exactly 
the same way (certainly they perform different functions within the film industry, 
and are consumed in very different ways by audiences), there are a number of 
noteworthy similarities between the two. It is perhaps easier to conceive of a 
distinction between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ lives of a star than it is for a brand, but 
both are ultimately very real entities (i.e. a person and a company/product/service, 
respectively), wrapped up in a complex web of media discourses relating to, feeding 
off, and impacting upon the way(s) they are understood by the world. Just as many a 
biography of Marilyn Monroe has attempted to uncover the ‘real’ Marilyn, so too 
have a number of investigative articles sought to find out the ‘secret’ of Pixar’s 
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65 Ibid, p.7. 
66 Ibid, vii. 
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success.67 Following on from Gray and Fornäs’ work however, despite the implicit 
claims of many a business or marketing textbook, brands mean nothing in the 
absence of consumers and context: there is no singular or ‘pure’ meaning waiting to 
be discovered by a skilled analyst.68 Klinger’s method of analysing the different ways 
in which films can and have been interpreted will thus be the most appropriate 
method of conducting my research, but Churchwell’s method of organising her 
material is worth taking on board. 
In order to focus her research and analysis in the face of the overwhelming 
quantity of writing about Monroe, Churchwell divides up her chapters into specific 
‘truths’ about the star’s life. For instance, there are sections on the disputes over her 
birth name, her first marriage, her alleged molestation as a child, and individual 
sections on various theories surrounding her death in 1962. Within each section, 
Churchwell summarises the range of narratives that have prevailed, explaining 
where reports have agreed, where they have disagreed, and the lines along which 
opinion has been split. Klinger divides up her work into different industrial 
practices and/or contexts, but I deviate slightly from her approach in that, like 
Churchwell, analyses will be separated into specific moments in the history of Pixar 
and then deconstructed in relation to related texts. I generally stop short of drawing 
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67 See for example, Lehrer, ‘Animating a Blockbuster’; Chloe Veltman, ‘Fun Factory’, The Daily 
Telegraph, 31 December 2001 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/4727218/Fun-factory.html>, 
Accessed 20 April 2010; Guy Adams, ‘Pixar: The real toon army’, The Independent, 23 September 
2009 <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/features/pixar-the-real-toon-army-
1791624.html>, Accessed 20 April 2010; Jessi Hempel, ‘Pixar University: Thinking outside the 
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68 A number of scholars have in fact described stars as ‘human brands’. See, for example, Markus 
Wohlfeil, ‘Life as a Jena Malone Fan: An Introspective Study of a Consumer’s Fan Relationship with 
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70.3 (July 2006), pp.104-19. Finola Kerrigan, Film Marketing (Oxford: Elsevier Butterworth-
Heinemann, 2010); Steven Albert, ‘Movie Stars and the Distribution of Financially Successful Films 
in the Motion Picture Industry’, Journal of Cultural Economics, 22.2 (1998), pp.249-70; Douglas C. 
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from both contemporaneous accounts of the stories and those written years or even 
decades after they occurred.69 To do so risks ignoring the context for the stories 
being written, and as I aim to demonstrate over the course of my thesis, context is a 
huge determinant on the shifting ways in which brands work. 
Pixar’s history has been far less disputed than the life of Marilyn Monroe 
ever was, but the critical consensus around the studio invites similar questions to 
Churchwell’s subject, as she writes, ‘Put together, these texts create and circulate the 
myth of Marilyn Monroe. But that myth is more often referred to than it is 
explained, as if we all know what it is. The myth … derives from the peculiarities of 
these accounts.’70 By accumulating as many articles as possible relating to individual 
moments in Pixar’s past then (for example, the purchase by Steve Jobs; the release 
of Toy Story; the takeover by Disney, etc.), I will be able to observe anomalous 
narratives that may have been lost over time, and determine the expectations and 
judgements of critics and journalists that write about the company and its output.  
 
As Paul Grainge argues, ‘Hollywood is now, more than ever, a brand 
industry’,71 and yet branding remains largely absent from film scholarship. Existing 
work on branding invariably takes a practical approach to the subject, privileging the 
role of the producer over the consumer in the construction of meaning. Borrowing 
the methodological approach to historical reception studies used by Barbara Klinger 
in her study of Douglas Sirk, over the course of my thesis I aim to challenge the 
innumerable assumptions made about the studio in media discourses. I will 
demonstrate that not only have the meanings of the Pixar name shifted dramatically 
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69 Although this is a technique I do use on a number of  occasions, I only do so in order to illustrate 
the extent to which particular narratives or discourses have shifted and/or developed in the interim 
years. 
70 Churchwell, p.13. 
71 Grainge, p.178. 
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over the past twenty five years, but that the brand is never a fixed, agreed upon 
concept, and frequently consists of different and even completely contradictory 
ideas at the same time. By taking as wide a sample of reviews and articles relating to 
a particular moment as is possible, it will become apparent that certain narratives 
have been able to flourish in the public sphere, while others have been forgotten or 
re-worked. I am not seeking to uncover the ‘true’ meaning(s) of Pixar, but I believe 
that this study will shed light on the role played by media discourses in the 
construction of a brand, and the mechanisms that allow this to happen. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
-Booting Up- 
The Many Faces of Early Pixar 
 
 
A lot of people think that since we have produced, over the years, some of 
these fairly dramatic examples of computer animation for major motion 
pictures, that that is what our business is. It is not that at all. 
 
- Alvy Ray Smith, February 198972 
 
‘Over 100 years ago, artists brought a line to motion. Through their magic, 
we would enter realms yet unseen.’ So read the intertitles that begin Leslie Iwerks’ 
2007 documentary, The Pixar Story.73 The camera pulls back to reveal a zoetrope, 
which immediately starts to spin before segueing into a montage of iconic animation 
from throughout the twentieth century. What follows is a film that traces the history 
of Pixar animation studios and those responsible for its rise to prominence, 
concluding with a shot of the same zoetrope we saw at the beginning. Although the 
title of the documentary promises a relatively objective historical narrative (indeed, 
The Pixar story), the intertitles, animation montage and zoetrope all work to frame 
this version of the story in a very particular way.  
Given the studio’s critical and commercial success since the mid-1990s, it is 
not at all surprising that Pixar and its brand has come to be associated with popular 
animated feature films. There is, after all, a clearly observable correlation between 
the studio’s success at the American box office and the resurgence of animation as a 
mainstream filmmaking medium, with the number of animated features appearing in 

72 John Durham, ‘Computer Guardian: Really dotty - A breakthrough in realistic computer 
animation’, The Guardian, 17 February 1989. 
73 The Pixar Story (Leslie Iwerks, 2007) premiered before final completion at San Diego Comic-Con 
on 26 July 2007, before being shown at a handful of  other small film festivals and receiving a limited 
theatrical release (in fourteen cities) on October 23rd 2007. It was then shown on Starz (American 
pay cable television channel) on April 22nd 2008 before being released internationally as a DVD extra 
with the 2-Disc version of  WALL-E (Andrew Stanton, 2008) in November 2008. Peter Sciretta, ‘The 
Pixar Story movie trailer’, SlashFilm, 16 April 2008 <http://www.slashfilm.com/2008/04/16/the-
pixar-story-movie-trailer/>, Retrieved 5 March 2010. 
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the yearly Top 20 at the American box office increasing dramatically after the 
success of Toy Story in 1995. Even taking into consideration Disney animation’s 
resurgent success in the early 1990s, the decade preceding Toy Story saw only six 
animated features make it into the domestic Top 20, compared with twenty in the 
decade that followed, and a further sixteen in the four years between 2006 and 2009 
inclusive.74  
Accordingly, the story being told in Iwerks’ documentary is one of art, 
magic, fantasy, animation, and on a grander level, the history of cinema. As I will 
demonstrate in later chapters, the presentation of this particular narrative is 
illustrative of the ways in which Pixar has come to be understood since being taken 
over by Disney. I argue, however, that such a representation is at best misleading, 
since it ignores or plays down the significance of the work that Pixar was doing 
prior for much of the 1980s. This chapter will therefore analyse the variety of ways 
in which the company was written about in its formative years, from its early days as 
part of Lucasfilm, through to independence, but prior to the production deal with 
Disney and work beginning on Toy Story (John Lasseter, 1995). 
Far from simply being a scaled-down version of the Hollywood animation 
studio it has since become, the Pixar brand was seen to represent very different 
things to different groups of people during the 1980s – simultaneously a computer 
hardware manufacturer, a rendering company, an animation house, and a medical 
imaging company to name but a few. Animation was certainly important, but 
represented only a very small amount of what the company actually did at the time, 
more appropriately thought of as a part of the burgeoning computer industry than a 
part of Hollywood. I will begin with a discussion of the company’s special effects 
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74 The only non-Disney (fully) animated film to make the Top 20 in the decade preceding Toy Story 
was Universal’s An American Tail (Don Bluth, 1988). Anon., ‘Movie Box Office results by year’, Box 
Office Mojo <http://boxofficemojo.com/yearly/>, Retrieved 2 March 2010.  
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work, which was perhaps its most widely visible output during the early years, and 
opens up a number of issues that are central to understanding the origins of the 
Pixar brand.  
 
The Genesis Sequence: The Lucasfilm Graphics Group and Hollywood 
Special Effects 
 
While evidence from box office figures and more recent journalism may 
suggest that it is appropriate to do as Iwerks’ documentary does and contextualise 
Pixar’s history with references to animation, this view has resulted in many 
journalists falling victim to historical determinism. If we begin by thinking about 
Pixar as a behemoth of twenty first-century popular animation, we are in danger of 
seeing prior events as being causally linked to what would come later: post hoc, ergo 
propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this). Projecting forwards to what was at 
the time an unknown future may well be a convenient way of linking events 
together, but as Robert Allen and Douglas Gomery have argued, ‘the qualities that 
make for a good story are not necessarily those that make for good history.’75 
Wired journalist Austin Bunn provides an example of problematic 
historicisation in his 2004 article on Pixar, in which he describes a special effects 
shot produced for Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (Nicholas Meyer, 1982). The 
shot had been created by people like Alvy Ray Smith, Ed Catmull and Loren 
Carpenter, who would later go on to found Pixar: 
 
A comet streaks through space and collides with a planet. On impact, it 
kicks up an atmosphere, then water, then mountains, and eventually life. It’s 
a spectacular 20-second swoop, and, as a digital special effect, it’s still 
gripping after 22 years. Cinematic wonder has a notoriously short half-life - 
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75 Robert C. Allen and Douglas Gomery, Film History: Theory and Practice (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1985), p.44. Cf. Capodagli and Jackson, p.28 – ‘The hand appeared so realistic and the 
movement so natural that is was used in the 1976 science-fiction movie Futureworld, the very first 
film to utilize three-dimensional computer graphics. And the rest is history’. 
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the gleaming hull of the “Titanic”, that whole “Matrix” wire-fu moment. 
But watch those 20 seconds of the Genesis Effect from Star Trek II: The 
Wrath of Khan, and there’s only one conclusion: You are looking at the 
birth of Pixar.76 
 
This passage raises a number of issues, and serves as a useful example of the 
discourses that have enabled the Pixar brand to develop in the way that it has. 
Bunn’s closing sentence is particularly telling, illustrating the narrow scope of 
journalistic accounts of the studio’s origins. For him, there is ‘only one’ way of 
interpreting the sequence from Khan, and that interpretation lies clearly within the 
boundaries of landmarks in the recent history of Hollywood special effects. 
Moreover, Bunn appears to be suggesting that one can infer that it represents ‘the 
birth of Pixar’ merely by watching the sequence – a self-reflexive Genesis Effect, 
perhaps. Beyond describing what happens on-screen though, he offers little 
explanation as to what exactly it is about the sequence that makes it recognisable as 
a product of Pixar, or what was soon to become Pixar. The implication is that its 
‘spectacular’ and ‘gripping’ qualities are enough to deduce its authorial origins, since 
presumably he considered nobody else capable of producing such an accomplished 
effect at that time. 
This is not representative of how such sequences were talked about when 
the film was released however. As the relevant technology began to catch up to the 
demands of filmmakers, by the middle of the 1980s computer graphics were being 
used with greater frequency in Hollywood movies. Sherry McKenna, then executive 
producer and vice president of Digital Productions, suggested the benefits of the 
technology in an interview with the San Diego Union-Tribune in August 1986, in 
which she rhetorically asks, ‘Isn't it stupid to blow up an airplane when you can do 
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76 Austin Bunn, ‘Welcome to Planet Pixar’, Wired, 12.6 (June 2004) 
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.06/pixar.html?pg=2&topic=pixar&topic_set=>, 
Retrieved 21 May 2010. 
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it realistically with a computer?’77 In other words, computers could certainly help to 
produce shots more easily, more cheaply, or more quickly than simply filming the 
same thing, but ultimately the application of the technology to filmmaking, at least 
as far as McKenna was concerned, went no further than the creation of special 
effects shots.  
As perhaps the most notable example of all the work produced by the 
Lucasfilm Graphics Group (i.e. the one that received the greatest audience 
exposure), the computer-generated sequence used in Khan is an appropriate point 
to begin thinking about Pixar’s early history and the origins of the company brand. 
Generally positive responses from critics were further reinforced by a respectable 
box office performance, with the film achieving what was then the highest opening 
weekend gross of all time,78 and eventually finishing with the sixth-highest domestic 
gross of the year for 1982.79  
The Genesis Effect sequence is an example of a shot that would have been 
extremely difficult to achieve using conventional filming techniques, particularly 
with regards to the complex sweeping and panning movement of the ‘camera’. A 
key narrative device in the film, the Genesis Effect also plays an important role in 
its theatrical trailer, which devotes roughly one quarter of its running time to 
showcasing it – the last thirty seconds out of a possible two minutes. Keith 
Johnston has argued that the role that special effects were playing in film trailers had 
actually been in decline since the late-1970s, meaning that the use of this sequence 
in the film’s trailer conflicts with marketing conventions of the early-1980s.80 The 
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77 Peter Rowe, ‘Computers give animation more byte’, San Diego Union-Tribune, 30 August 1986, 
p.D1. 
78 Stephen Farber, ‘The Director who made 1982’s film bonanza’, The New York Times, 27 June 
1982, p.B1. 
79 Anon., ‘Yearly Box Office – 1982 Domestic Grosses’, Box Office Mojo, 
<http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?yr=1982&p=.htm>, Retrieved 1 February 2010. 
80 Keith M. Johnston, Coming Soon: Film Trailers and the Selling of  Hollywood Technology 
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Genesis sequence thus is something of an anomaly, standing as ‘a curious 
technological and spectacular coda to a trailer narrative otherwise unconcerned with 
technology or visual spectacle.’81 Despite the movie’s only sequence created by the 
Graphics Group being granted such a privileged position in the film’s marketing 
however, reviews saw the sequence get absorbed into far more general analyses of 
Khan’s special effects.  
Khan was mentioned in at least two articles regarding the increasingly 
prevalent use of special effects in Hollywood films at that time – one in the New 
York Times82 and the other in the Globe and Mail – with Salem Alaton arguing in 
the latter that ‘without special effects, the [American film] industry would be eating 
baloney sandwiches (and drinking sterno).’ 83  Alaton was by no means the only 
observer to credit rising box office revenues in Hollywood to an increase in the use 
of visual effects, but most reviews of Khan actually played down their impact on the 
film as a whole.  
Stephen Godfrey in the Globe and Mail for example pointed out that the 
film ‘doesn’t linger over its modest special effects’,84 while Janet Maslin of the New 
York Times described the visual effects as ‘so good they don’t call undue attention 
to themselves.’85 Roger Ebert issued similar praise, using the previous Star Trek film 
as a point of comparison: 
 
Although I liked the special effects in the first movie [Star Trek: The Motion 
Picture (Robert Wise, 1979)], they were probably not the point; fans of the 
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(London: McFarland & Company, 2009), pp.112-4. 
81 Ibid, p.114. 
82 John Culhane, ‘Special effects are revolutionizing film’, The New York Times, 4 July 1982, p.B1. 
83 Salem Alaton, ‘Tron set to ride video wave’, The Globe and Mail, 9 July 1982. 
84 Stephen Godfrey, ‘Domestic dramas on the USS Enterprise a homey trek into space’, The Globe 
and Mail, 5 June 1982. 
85 Janet Maslin, ‘New “Star Trek” full of  gadgets and fun’, The New York Times, 4 June 1982, p.C12. 
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TV series wanted to see their favorite characters again, and Trek II 
understood that desire and acted on it.86 
 
For all of the advanced technology that went into making Khan then, 
ultimately the positive reviews it received owed far more to the quality of 
storytelling and character development than its more spectacular elements. Where 
these elements were acknowledged, the consensus was clearly that the more 
successfully they had been deployed, the less one should notice them whilst 
watching the movie. Perhaps surprisingly, this idea is also confirmed by the negative 
review written by Washington Post’s Gary Arnold, given that he makes no reference 
whatsoever to Khan’s visual effects, instead focusing all of his criticism on the story 
and characters.87 We cannot know exactly what Arnold thought of the effects, but 
either way he deemed them undeserving of comment. Director Nicholas Meyer 
actually gave several interviews around the time of the film’s release in which he 
argued along similar lines to Arnold, extolling the virtues of good storytelling, and 
even describing films and television shows that privileged visual style over narrative 
substance as ‘a new form of pornography.’88  
Retrospective references to the Genesis sequence produced by the 
Lucasfilm Graphics Group – many of which have been discussed in relation to the 
history of Pixar – have been conflictingly enthusiastic. Loren Carpenter for instance 
recalled in 2009 that the ‘reaction was – stunned … It was like people had just seen 
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86 Roger Ebert, ‘Star Trek II: The Wrath of  Khan’, Chicago Sun-Times, 1 January 1982 
<http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19820101/REVIEWS/201010345>, 
Retrieved 1 February 2010. 
87 Gary Arnold, ‘Cashing in on the Spock market; “Star Trek II” shows little Enterprise’, Washington 
Post, 4 June 1982, p.D1. 
88 Culhane, op. cit. Interestingly, Meyer used an almost identical phrase in a very different article 
discussing the potentially harmful effects of  on-screen violence, which by extension implies that he 
not only sees special effects as pointless, but somehow morally suspect as well: ‘Lots of  movies are 
gratuitously violent. They pander to audiences, certainly, it’s a form of  pornography.’ This article 
appeared just four days before Culhane’s article, and in the same newspaper. Glenn Collins, ‘Is the 
violence in “Blade Runner” a socially destructive element?’, The New York Times, 30 June 1982, 
p.C19.  
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ten years into the future and had it dumped in their laps.’89 He, along with the rest 
of the men who would go on to found Pixar, had undoubtedly produced a piece of 
work that had been seen by huge numbers of people. But contemporaneous reviews 
of Khan only ever acknowledged the film’s special effects as a whole, and not once 
in my research did I come across an article that singled out the Genesis sequence, 
whether for praise, criticism, or even passing indifference. On the rare occasions 
that credit for the visuals was given to anybody, it was to Industrial Light and Magic 
(ILM), of which the Graphics Group was but one small subdivision. The evidence 
suggests that while computer-generated special effects were certainly being used 
more and more frequently (and seamlessly) as filmmaking tools, reviews rarely 
differentiated between those effects produced using computers and those produced 
using more conventional methods such as scale models, mechanised scenery or 
pyrotechnics.  
1985 saw the release of Young Sherlock Holmes (Barry Levinson, 1985), 
produced by Steven Spielberg, written by Chris Columbus, and featuring another 
noteworthy visual effects sequence produced by the Lucasfilm Graphics Group – a 
hallucination scene in which a stained-glass knight jumps down from a church 
window and chases a priest out of the building. Ironically, given that director Barry 
Levinson allegedly did not want the film to be an ‘effects movie’, Sherlock fared 
much better than Khan in terms of being recognised for its effects, although not 
always in a positive sense.  
Variety saw the effects as having overpowered the relationship between the 
eponymous detective and his sidekick: ‘Spielberg’s team - this time led by director 
Barry Levinson – isn’t really as interested in [its characters] as it is in fooling around 
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89 Karen Paik, To Infinity and Beyond: The Story of  Pixar Animation Studios (London: Virgin 
Books, 2007), p.24. 
35 
with the visual effects possibilities conjured by George Lucas’ Industrial Light & 
Magic shop.’90 Salem Alaton in the Globe and Mail was similarly damning, criticising 
what he saw as the elevation of the effects to the position of ‘intended high points 
of the film’, and arguing that they ‘bleed “Young Sherlock Holmes” of anything like 
charm.’ 91  Both reviews effectively agree with Nicholas Meyer’s abovementioned 
comments on special effects – that they should never be as important to a film as 
characters and storyline. Alaton would actually go on to accuse the special effects of 
being ‘rehashed’ from films like Eraserhead (David Lynch, 1977), Tron (Steven 
Lisberger, 1982) and Gremlins (Joe Dante, 1984),92 thus suggesting that they were 
highly derivative in addition to intruding on the plot. 
Paul Attanasio of the Washington Post was far more positive about the 
visual effects and the film as a whole, writing that: 
 
[The] hallucinations in “Young Sherlock Holmes” are spectacularly staged, 
[and] the special effects (by George Lucas’ Industrial Light and Magic, with 
a nod to Ray Harryhausen) are ingeniously frightening and appropriately 
low-tech – a roasted capon, for example, that sprouts a viciously pecking 
head, or a bloody crusader who springs to life from his stained-glass 
window.93 
 
It is particularly interesting that he praises the special effects while at the 
same time describing them as ‘low-tech’. Certainly, the rest of the film does feature 
a number of effects created using puppets and models – far more conventional 
methods of achieving such shots. As such it would be easy to imagine that 
Attanasio’s ‘low-tech’ remark was referring to the film as a whole, had he not made 
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90 Anon., ‘Young Sherlock Holmes’, 1 January 1985 
<http://www.variety.com/review/VE1117796563.html?categoryid=31&cs=1>, Retrieved 1 
February 2010. 
91 Salem Alaton, ‘Young Sherlock receives familiar Spielberg treatment’, Globe and Mail, 4 December 
1985. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Paul Attanasio, ‘The Elementary Sherlock; Portrait of  the super sleuth as a young hound’, 
Washington Post, 4 December 1985, p.C1. 
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a point of specifically mentioning the stained-glass knight sequence here. He may be 
praising what Alaton is speaking out against – the special effects as the high points 
of the film – but ultimately the lines along which they are making the comments are 
similar: for critics at least, whatever technology was used to create the movie’s 
effects, the end result was generally not seen to represent the breaking of new 
ground in cinema.  
This is further illustrated by an interview with director Barry Levinson in the 
Christian Science Monitor, in which David Steritt describes Young Sherlock 
Holmes as a ‘natural’ project for Spielberg and Columbus to undertake, following 
on from the ‘youngsters, fast action, and high-tech visual effects’ seen in The 
Goonies (Richard Donner, 1985) and Gremlins.94 Although there may have been 
some disagreement among critics as to exactly how ‘high-tech’ or ‘low-tech’ the 
film’s special effects really were, the biggest brand name evidenced by reviews is 
very clearly that of Steven Spielberg. Several critics appear to have been taken in by 
the tagline ‘Steven Spielberg presents’ (appearing above the film’s title in all of its 
print marketing materials), giving a disproportionate amount of authorial credit to 
him in relation to the rest of the crew. Spielberg received only an executive 
producer credit, yet Roger Ebert sums up the way in which many critics wrote 
about Young Sherlock Holmes when he declares that there is ‘a lot in this movie 
that can be traced directly to the work of Steven Spielberg.’95 While reviews do not 
provide concrete evidence for gauging actual viewer responses to films, the fact that 
these comparisons were made so frequently suggests that audiences were strongly 
encouraged to read Sherlock’s special effects as a small part of the overarching 
Spielberg brand. 
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95 Roger Ebert, ‘Young Sherlock Holmes’, Chicago Sun-Times, 4 December 1985 
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Unlike the Genesis Sequence in Khan however, the Graphics Group’s 
contribution to Sherlock did not pass by unnoticed, with several prominent 
reviewers besides just Attanasio singling the stained glass knight sequence out for 
praise. The knight was for example the only evidence provided by Vincent Canby 
for what he saw as ‘very special’ visual effects.96 Roger Ebert followed suit, both in 
print97 and in his television review show with Gene Siskel, At the Movies (Tribune 
Entertainment, 1982-90).98 In both reviews, Ebert praised the movie as a whole but 
especially the sequence created by Dennis Muren, Bill Reeves, John Lasseter, Dave 
Carson and others at Lucasfilm. Even Gene Siskel’s considerably less positive 
review eventually involved him conceding that the knight represented the ‘one good 
special effect’ in the whole movie.99 But just as reviewers had done with The Wrath 
of Khan’s Genesis sequence, all the reviews that gave any credit for the stained glass 
knight attributed the effect not to Pixar, but to Industrial Light and Magic. 
This brings us onto another issue raised by Austin Bunn’s response to the 
Genesis sequence: he is retroactively crediting Pixar with work that, generally 
speaking, it was not known to have been responsible for until well after it had 
become a successful animation studio. This is not particularly problematic in terms 
of thinking about what Pixar’s employees were doing before making feature films, 
but it certainly creates a misleading sense of how the brand was understood at the 
time. Having not even existed as a company before being purchased by Steve Jobs 
in April 1986, it was all but impossible for anybody (with the possible exception of 
well-informed individuals working within the computer graphics industry) to have 
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96 Vincent Canby, ‘Film: “Young Sherlock”, Spielberg Presentation’, The New York Times, 4 
December 1985, p.C21. 
97 Ebert, ‘Young Sherlock Holmes’. 
98 A poor quality but nonetheless useful recording of  this clip can be viewed online: ‘Siskel & Ebert 
At the Movies 1985 – Young Sherlock Holmes’, YouTube, 7 February 2009 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i_maBOyWG90>, Retrieved 1 February 2010. 
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interpreted the special effects work the Graphics Group did as products of Pixar. 
Bunn’s comments demonstrate how easy it is to look to the past and retroactively 
apply our knowledge about what we now know came afterwards, attributing 
coherence and even a sense of destiny to a company whose future was anything but 
certain, and whose brand reflected this uncertainty. 
Pixar would later take steps to better control the discourses it was associated 
with, twisting the perception of work such as the special effects discussed in this 
section, even to the extent that John Lasseter is given sole credit for Young 
Sherlock Holmes’ stained glass knight on the official Pixar web site. 100  It is an 
example of retroactive branding that effectively shifts praise for a particular piece of 
work towards a group of people who were not solely responsible for it. If 
recognition from American film critics was at this point unattainable, were there 
perhaps any less specific discourses that linked Pixar to artistic disciplines, or did the 
company brand lie elsewhere?  
 
Sketchy Histories: Pixar, art and technology 
The word ‘Pixar’ itself had existed since 1981, the product of a dinnertime 
brainstorming session between Loren Carpenter, Alvy Ray Smith, Jim Blinn and 
Rodney Stock. In the midst of developing an imaging computer for George Lucas, 
they did not wish to continue referring to the prospective machine as the ‘difip’ or 
DFP (Digital Film Printer). ‘Pixar’ was the agreed-upon name – an invented word 
that the men thought sounded as though it could be a Spanish verb meaning ‘to 
make pictures’, as well as resonating with technological words like ‘laser’ and ‘radar’, 
or astronomical words like ‘quasar’ or ‘pulsar’.101  
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Despite not being documented in newspaper or magazine articles of the 
period, these specific connotations are important to the Pixar brand insofar as they 
illustrate how the Graphics Group saw itself – not as a group of artists, animators 
or potential filmmakers, but as a forward-thinking technology company intent on 
exploring the boundaries of what computers were capable of achieving. Making 
‘pictures’ was the aim, but exactly what kind of pictures and who for were details 
that remained unspecified. The hardware and rendering software Pixar developed 
had the potential to be used in a huge variety of different ways, but despite the 
company brand having ultimately stemmed from the requests of Hollywood 
filmmaker George Lucas, it is significant that the word ‘Pixar’ was coined as a name 
for a piece of computer hardware – not a company, and certainly not a filmmaking 
company.  
When the Graphics Group was later spun off from Lucasfilm to be sold as 
an independent company, Smith and Catmull named the group after the computer 
they had designed, calling it Pixar, Inc. There is little to indicate that the company 
saw itself as anything other than a computer graphics company at this time, aptly 
symbolised by both the choice of name and the original logo (See Appendix, Fig 
1.1). Luxo Jr.’s eponymous bouncing lamp would become the protagonist of the 
Pixar logo and studio ident from Toy Story onwards, but until that time the 
company used a logo comprising a grey bevelled square with a circular indentation. 
In contrast to the character animation employed by the later version, the original 
logo was modeled on the design of the Pixar Image Computer itself (Fig 1.2), just 
like the name of the company before it.  
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John Lasseter however gave a slightly different account of the thinking 
behind the company name in a special episode of The South Bank Show 
(LWT/ITV, 1978-2010) in 2009. Neglecting to mention the idea of a fake Spanish 
verb or words such as ‘laser’ or ‘pulsar’, he instead claimed that ‘Pixar’ is simply a 
portmanteau of the words ‘pixel’ and ‘art’.102 It seems relevant to point out that this 
explanation has only emerged quite recently (in the abovementioned television show 
and Karen Paik’s history of Pixar, To Infinity and Beyond, published in 2007),103 
and sits comfortably with another view of the brand that came to prominence in the 
twenty-first century – Lasseter’s oft-repeated philosophy: ‘Art challenges 
technology, and technology inspires the art’.104 If this is indeed the way Pixar has 
always approached its work, then there is very little evidence to support the idea 
that the brand represented the meeting of art and technology prior to making a deal 
with Disney to produce Toy Story, even in the way that the company talked about 
itself.  
Ed Catmull offers a possible explanation in The Pixar Story (2007), claiming 
that Luxo Jr. (John Lasseter, 1986) marked a change in Pixar’s direction. In his view, 
it was the making of that specific short film that led the company to see ‘the new 
goal for everybody’ – the fusion of their cutting-edge computer graphics technology 
with traditional concepts of character animation and storytelling.105 This not only 
gives further weight to Lasseter’s art/technology view of the brand, but is also an 
admission that the creation of computer-animated movies was not always a goal that 
was shared by everybody at Pixar. To claim that it did become a shared goal after 
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Luxo, however, is again extremely misleading. The benefit of hindsight has enabled 
Pixarians like Ed Catmull and John Lasseter to make statements in which they 
confidently look back on the early years of the company they helped to found, and 
invite us to share in a series of alleged ‘eureka’ moments that brought them ever 
closer to the creation of the world’s first computer-animated feature film.  
It is certainly the case that Lasseter himself came from an art background, 
having graduated from CalArts’ character animation programme, and his naivety 
and lack of expertise undoubtedly necessitated a cooperative working technique in 
the Lucasfilm (i.e. pre-Pixar days). Pixar historian David Price subscribes to this 
view, posting evidence for the company’s art and technology foundations on his 
blog, including annotated sketches by Lasseter that show him requesting a flexible 
teardrop shape for the animation of André from The Adventures of André and 
Wally B. (Alvy Ray Smith, 1984).106 
If Catmull was correct, and Pixar did indeed shift its concentration towards 
using computer animation to tell stories, then we would expect to see a change 
either in the way the company was written about, or at least in the way in which it 
promoted and spoke about its own work. It seems however that notions of art were 
not successfully integrated with the brand until much later in the company’s history, 
and that Pixar’s early years were almost entirely categorised by associations with 
technology. An apt example from December 1988 saw Pixar appoint Chuck 
Kolstad as President and CEO. Kolstad was promoted from his previous role as 
vice president of manufacturing and engineering, justified by Steve Jobs, who said in 
a press release that ‘Kolstad’s experience as a member of the senior management 
team of a Fortune 500 company and as a team leader will serve Pixar well in 
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implementing its product focus on imaging and rendering.’107 On several occasions 
during the 1980s, company spokespeople (usually co-founders Alvy Ray Smith 
and/or Ed Catmull) even went as far as publically playing down links between the 
work Pixar was doing and Hollywood filmmaking. One newspaper article from 
February 1989 for instance quotes Smith as having stated, ‘a lot of people think that 
since we have produced, over the years, some of these fairly dramatic examples of 
computer animation for major motion pictures, that that is what our business is. It 
is not that at all.’108  
Contrary to Smith’s assertion (and as already discussed in the previous 
section), the evidence provided by contemporaneous film reviews suggests that ‘a 
lot of people’ in fact did not see the special effects the Graphics Group produced 
for The Wrath of Khan and Young Sherlock Holmes as ‘dramatic’, and when praise 
was given out, it was certainly not lavished upon Pixar. What makes this quotation 
all the more interesting however is the fact that Smith exhibits a degree of brand 
awareness – he was evidently concerned with what people thought of Pixar, and 
actively sought to exert some control over the meanings and associations that were 
being discursively attached to the company name. Ed Catmull stated in February 
1986 that what the Lucasfilm Graphics Group had actually wanted was for its ‘work 
[to be] used in a very broad sense,’109 and throughout the 1980s it seems as though 
broadness and potential variety were indeed seen as defining characteristics of Pixar 
and its work.  
One can find ample evidence for this in the media coverage afforded to 
Pixar in their early years, with company spokespeople habitually using any available 
platform to promote their technology’s versatility. Articles would often focus on 
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one particular use for the technology, but the vast majority would also go on to 
include a list of alternative applications. Several such examples appeared in response 
to the news of Steve Jobs’ purchase of Pixar in early 1986, with Catmull stating at 
the time that, ‘besides its use in filmmaking, Pixar computers … can be used in 
medical imaging, mapping, oil exploration, printing and computer-aided design.’110 
Michael Rogers and Lee Goldberg wrote in similar terms less than two weeks later, 
noting that in addition to Hollywood special effects, ‘the Pixar system has been used 
to generate images of underground strata for oil-company geologists and to process 
satellite images for government agencies. But its most dramatic use has been 
medical.’111 That these comments should appear at this particular time may be partly 
explained by journalists’ need to situate Jobs’ purchase of Pixar in relation to his 
reputation as a well-known and successful entrepreneur, but these notions of 
versatility continued to appear well into the 1990s.  
From the very beginning of the Pixar name establishing a presence in 
national media publications, this idea of versatility was clearly observable, despite 
the tendency at the time to talk about them from the perspective of George Lucas’ 
plans to use computer technology in filmmaking. One such article from December 
1983 (well before the Pixar Image Computer was released commercially) described 
Pixar (i.e. the computer) as a venture ‘that could move [Lucasfilm] outside [of] 
Hollywood’, 112  while in 1986 John Wilson described Pixar as a unit that ‘had 
outgrown [Lucas’s] film business.’ 113  Despite being owned by a film director, 
constituting part of a world famous Hollywood special effects company, and being 
driven by two men (Catmull and Smith) who later would claim to have always 
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harboured an interest in the potential for using computer animation in film 
production, somehow the technology they developed was instantly reported as 
being ‘outside of Hollywood’. 
The fact that connections between Pixar and Hollywood were often played 
down should not however be seen as an indication that the company or its 
observers really had a clear sense of what Pixar represented. In fact, the range of 
discourses associated with the company during the 1980s was so diverse that it was 
extremely uncommon for writers to actively disassociate Pixar from any particular 
industry, making the distance so many people put between Pixar and Hollywood all 
the more surprising. Whether the main focus of an article or an example mentioned 
in passing to illustrate a particular point, Pixar’s presence in the print media at this 
time was firmly grounded in a vocabulary of possibilities, and the impact that 
computer technologies could have on various people’s lives.  
As is often the case with significant technological developments, some of 
these articles inevitably demonstrated an underlying fear of technology, particularly 
with regards to the levels of realism one was capable of achieving. One article for 
instance rhetorically asked whether or not photographs were to be believed 
anymore,114 while another rather more sensational piece in Newsweek described ‘the 
potential for abuse’ of photorealistic graphics technology as ‘frightening’, and 
specifically mentioned Stalin, Joseph McCarthy, the Chinese government and 
members of the Nazi party as the sorts of people who could have been poised to 
take advantage.115 More explicit denunciation of Pixar’s products came from former 
Disney animator Frank Thomas, one of the studio’s fabled Nine Old Men, who 
declared in one New York Times article that animators would ‘never adjust to a 
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technical monster’, referring to the potential replacement of hand-drawn animation 
in favour of images produced by computers.116 Lasseter has on several occasions 
cited Disney’s fear of computer technology as the reason why he was asked to leave 
the studio in 1983,117 yet while Thomas’s rejection of it would seem to back up 
those claims, this tension between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of animation does not 
appear to have made its way into public forums. Traditional animators may well 
have felt genuinely threatened by the gradual introduction of computer technology 
into the production of animated films, but if that is the case then it was a debate 
that rarely, if ever, moved beyond the boundaries of the industry and into public 
media discourses. 
While these notions of technophobia did receive some media 
acknowledgement, in the vast majority of cases the potential of computer graphics 
and the work Pixar was doing were discussed in positive terms. Even Frank 
Thomas’s ‘technical monster’ comments appeared in an article in which the 
journalist also argued the other side of the story; that ‘as it becomes clear that the 
artist is no less essential with a computer than with a pencil, more traditional 
animators are warming to the medium.’ 118  This juxtaposition of conflicting 
responses within the same article instantly casts doubt on Lasseter’s largely 
unsubstantiated claims of widespread resistance to CG animation, and hints at the 
process of re-remembering that brands are just as susceptible to as any other series 
of historical events.  
Pixar’s brand may not have been very focused at this time, but 
contemporaneous responses to the company’s technology products were 
overwhelmingly eager to talk about their potential applications, with very few 
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column inches devoted to criticism or resistance. Press coverage of many new 
computer-related technologies have of course been broadly concerned with the 
ways in which they could make certain jobs much faster and/or easier, as well as 
how they could be used to perform simulations and tests that would have been 
impossible for any human to carry out themselves. As one article put it in 
November 1988, in ‘virtually every field, from medicine to publishing to 
moviemaking, digital processing of pictures is changing the way work is done – and 
how much it costs.’119 Speed was frequently used as an illustration of the power of 
the Pixar Image Computer, and one of its key selling points, with Katherine Hafner 
writing in Business Week that it ‘is 200 times faster than a typical minicomputer and 
for some graphics jobs is six times faster than a low-end supercomputer.’120  
As an interesting counterpoint however, consider the way in which Pixar 
would later talk about the technology and processing power required to render 
certain shots from its animated films, such as the fur on the character of Sully in 
Monsters, Inc. (Pete Docter, 2001). 121  To put this another way, Pixar would 
eventually distance itself from earlier associations with speeding up or otherwise 
enabling the concept of image rendering, and instead use the length of time taken 
up by the process as an indicator of the complexity (and by extension, detail and 
quality) of its animation. The earlier focus on speed and ease of use was of course 
entirely appropriate given that the computer graphics industry was still in its infancy, 
and justification was needed to convince others to adopt the technology. While 
entirely necessary then for the company’s survival, Pixar’s constant efforts to appeal 
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to as many different markets as possible meant that most potential brand 
associations were diluted. 
It is clear that when various observers did associate the Pixar name with one 
particular industry (e.g. animation, CAD/CAM, medical imaging, scientific 
visualisation etc.), they always did so in relation to the company’s physical products, 
and so Pixar may not have been considered a brand as it is generally thought of in 
the twenty-first century. Naomi Klein for instance observes that in the mid-1980s, a 
shift occurred in the way businesses targeted success. For her, this was a shift 
towards the production of brands or images of their brands, not products – towards 
marketing instead of manufacturing.122 She cites the example of the sudden success 
of the Saturn automobile, which after having been on sale for several years, was re-
launched by General Motors as ‘a car built not out of steel and rubber but out of 
New Age spirituality and seventies feminism.’123  
As we will see in chapter four, in providing viewers with copious glimpses 
of its Emeryville studio (particularly through the use of DVD bonus features and 
granting studio exposés to selected journalists), Pixar would later go on to associate 
itself as a studio born out of 1960s liberalism and notions of community and the 
family.  In its early years the company undoubtedly did try to market its technology 
products to a variety of industries, but because the item for sale was always a 
physical product and not an image or an abstract concept, it is difficult to describe it 
as a brand in Klein’s sense of the word. I would argue however that this definition 
of branding, for all its focus on abstract concepts, is rather too abstract itself – not 
wrong but incomplete, assuming a great deal about the ways in which consumers 
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interpret and use brands, and largely ignoring the products and services that carry 
them.  
Pixar during the 1980s may not have had one unerring set of ideas attached 
to its products, but it does seem as though some of its individual products were 
talked about in very particular ways within their respective industries. The 
company’s RenderMan software and the application of Pixar technology to medical 
imaging were discussed relatively frequently in certain circles, and as such a set of 
meanings did come to be attached to the products in question. While the majority 
of these meanings revolved around tangible descriptions of characteristics such as 
speed, compatibility, or ease of use, several intangible characteristics such as quality 
and inventiveness began to be discussed. For some people at least, Pixar had 
succeeded in becoming synonymous with a specific product without being 
associated with abstract branding concepts, and had also come to simultaneously 
appeal to at least two very different technological markets. The following section 
discusses medical imaging and RenderMan in more detail, arguing that their 
centrality to the Pixar brand calls into question Klein’s approach to branding. 
 
Of Renderers and Radiologists: The importance of RenderMan and Medical 
Imaging technology 
 
With computer technology (and graphics technology in particular) still very 
much finding its feet in the 1980s, it is not surprising that so many potential 
technological applications for Pixar’s products were discussed, leading to a diverse 
and somewhat inconsistent brand. For each consumer group that made use of the 
products made by Pixar during the 1980s, be they radiologists, seismologists, 
aeronautical engineers, or cinemagoers, it was entirely possible for the Pixar name to 
relate to one relatively consistent set of meanings. There were however two 
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possibilities that stood out, receiving far greater media attention than any of the 
others at the time: the company’s RenderMan products, and Medical Imaging 
technology. Contemporaneous media coverage in fact suggests that either venture 
could have become the foundation of Pixar (and by extension its brand), and for a 
short time at least, it appears as though that is precisely what happened. 
By far the best example of this is in the field of medical imaging, which at 
one point in the mid-1980s looked to be one of the more likely avenues of 
distribution for Pixar’s technology – far more so than animation. The image 
processing capabilities of the Pixar computer worked in combination with imaging 
software to provide medical professionals with three-dimensional, fully rotatable 
images of structures such as the human pelvis. The technology allowed ‘physicians 
for the first time to see underlying bone structures separated from surrounding 
tissue and fat, which [appeared] in conventional images.’124 Pixar announced very 
early on in its time as an independent company that a ‘multimillion dollar’ 
agreement had been made to manufacture relevant hardware and software on behalf 
of Philips Medical Systems.125  
Although the technicalities of the deal were not publicised at the time, the 
agreement’s very existence somehow seems to have been lost from the already thin 
historical narrative of this period, with even David Price’s well-researched history 
failing to mention it. The impact of the deal on the Pixar brand was admittedly 
negligible, quite simply because the news received so little coverage in the national 
print media that very few people would have even known about it. Even more 
importantly in terms of branding, this was an OEM (Original Equipment 
Manufacturer) agreement, meaning that anything Pixar did manufacture for use in 
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Philips’ medical imaging equipment would be marketed under the Philips brand, not 
Pixar’s. The deal would therefore have helped Pixar financially, but done very little 
to spread word of the company and what it stood for. This does however illustrate 
that a company’s brand (i.e. what people think about and associate with a particular 
product) is not directly related to its actual activities so much as its publicised 
activities, underlining the role played by discourse in a brand’s formation. The OEM 
agreement nevertheless suggests that people like Steve Jobs saw medical imaging as 
one of the more promising and lucrative applications of Pixar technology, and he 
may well have been right.  
Pixar’s presence in this particular market was restricted to a relatively small 
number of practitioners (only 35 sites used the Pixar Image Computer for medical 
imaging as of December 1988),126 but there is evidence to suggest that among those 
people, the Pixar name carried significant weight. Business Week journalist 
Katherine Hafner in March 1987 for instance went as far as using the word ‘Pixar’ 
as a verb, writing that radiologists ‘now routinely “Pixar” CAT-scans of fractures to 
detect hidden problems before the bones are set.’127 While this example relates to 
one particular profession, its relevance goes beyond the specificities of medical 
imaging. It demonstrates that the Pixar name had for certain consumers become 
synonymous with a specific activity or task, and thus it is entirely possible (indeed, 
likely) that to them, there were associations in place strong enough that one could 
legitimately describe as a brand. The conflicting discourses that were raised or 
hinted at in contemporaneous newspaper articles or press releases (i.e. those relating 
to other industries/applications) were of course only available to those who 
happened to read them in the first place. In the absence of these alternative or 
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oppositional discourses, those familiar with the application of Pixar’s products 
within a specific field may therefore have had a very clear sense of who Pixar were 
and how their products should be used. It is only when the Pixar name began to be 
reproduced in other discourses, and on a more frequent and widespread basis, that 
those consumers would have become more likely to lose their sense of associations 
that could have become part of the Pixar brand. 
By the time the 1980s came to an end, Pixar had made four short films (as 
well as The Adventures of André and Wally B. while still a part of Lucasfilm), 
winning an Academy Award for one of them (Tin Toy [John Lasseter, 1988]), and 
gradually receiving more media coverage for its animation work as a result. Yet a 
CBS News report on new technology from August 1991 demonstrates that even as 
late as this, Pixar were still very much considered in some circles to have found their 
biggest success in medical imaging technology. The broadcast showed clips of some 
of Pixar’s shorts, but only in order to demonstrate their ‘amazing clarity and detail’, 
as a way of segueing into talking about the application of this technology to CAT 
and MRI scans.128 The company’s animation was in other words still performing the 
function it was originally made for – essentially an advanced trailer that promoted 
the hardware and software used to create it.  
CBS anchor Merlin Olsen went on to use words such as ‘revolutionary’, 
‘spectacular’ and ‘fantastic’ to describe the fully rotatable three-dimensional images 
from inside the human body, and in case there was any doubt as to where credit 
should be given, the broadcast continually referred back to this as being the work of 
Pixar.129 A doctor from the University of Chicago adds that ‘Once you saw one of 
the images generated by [Pixar’s] system, all doubt went away … With the Pixar, all 
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you do is show the image and be quiet and try to peel them off the ceiling.’130 These 
words are of course highly reminiscent of the hyperbole that has been retroactively 
applied to Pixar’s special effects work – the kind of reaction that had perhaps been 
hoped for, but as we have already seen, never really transpired at the time. It is likely 
that the OEM agreement with Philips meant that the recognition Pixar received for 
all its work in the field of medical imaging technology was not as high as it might 
otherwise have been. Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that those who did use the 
technology on a regular basis – namely radiologists – would have been very familiar 
with what Pixar represented, and the CBS spotlight swiftly brought the brand to the 
attention of millions more. 
While the Pixar Image Computer may not have been as successful as Steve 
Jobs or anybody else at the company had hoped, Pixar made a significant 
introduction to the field of computer graphics technology with the release of 
RenderMan in 1988. RenderMan has since become a widely used piece of software 
for the production of computer animation, having been used in more than 200 
feature films since The Wrath of Khan.131 True to what we have already seen with 
many aspects of the Pixar brand however, there is also a degree of ambiguity 
surrounding the use of the product’s name.  
What is now commonly referred to simply as RenderMan was originally 
called Photorealistic RenderMan (or PRMan for short), and as the name implies, 
renders the final digital image based on modelling, texture, and other physics-based 
information input by the user. Media coverage of the product was largely restricted 
to specialist computer publications like InfoWorld and Computerworld, and 
technology sections of broadsheet newspapers such as The New York Times and 
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The Guardian, situating it firmly within discourses around computing and 
technology, with little mention of how the software could be used in filmmaking. 
That RenderMan should be mentioned at all is not particularly noteworthy 
(particularly given Steve Jobs’ fame and involvement in Pixar), but crucially, the vast 
majority of discourses surrounding the product were actually far more interested in 
the RenderMan interface than the PRMan software.  
Michael Alexander in Computerworld became one of the first observers to 
discuss the release of RenderMan in February 1987, and focused almost entirely on 
the usefulness of the interface. The article was relatively balanced, repeating Pixar’s 
claims that the interface would act ‘as a standard that would make it possible for 
designers to use one company’s modelling program with another’s renderer,’ but 
also acknowledging the counter-argument, that ‘publishers whose software offers 
both modelling and rendering features [see] little need for a standard.’132 Alexander 
did add that Pixar ‘also markets Photorealistic RenderMan, its own rendering 
software,’ but made no other comments whatsoever on the product, underlining its 
perceived (lack of) importance in relation to the work the company was doing at the 
time.  
Notions of compatibility and standardisation were frequently discussed 
across different types of articles about RenderMan, with Bob Ponting noting that 
the interface and shading language provided ‘a standard way to link diverse 3-D 
modelling programmes with different shading systems and output devices.’133 Steve 
Jobs referred to Pixar as ‘the Adobe of 3-D graphics’ at the 1989 Siggraph annual 
conference, 134  and several writers subsequently followed his lead and drew 
comparisons between the RenderMan interface and Adobe PostScript, an accepted 
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and standardised language for describing what a printed page should look like. 
Andrew Pollack was one such journalist, noting that as ‘rendering moves toward 
mainstream use, a battle over standards is beginning,’ and Pixar ‘is proposing its 
technology, known as RenderMan, as a standard.’135 
Although Pollack went on to express some ‘competing technology’ that cast 
doubts on Pixar’s ability to succeed,136 the RenderMan interface had already been 
endorsed by a host of prominent vendors. As reported in InfoWorld in May 1988,  
 
Nineteen hardware and software vendors and major end-users participated 
in the Pixar announcement, including Apollo Computer, Sun Microsystems, 
Silicon Graphics, Stellar Computer, and MIPS Computer Systems. All have 
licensed the Renderman interface and will introduce products supporting 
the interface this year or in 1989.137 
 
 The Guardian’s coverage of the same story three days later mentioned that 
Disney would be following suit, but provided no commentary on why the 
Hollywood studio wanted to use the technology.138 Lawrence Fisher however wrote 
a detailed article in the New York Times just under a year later, in which he outlined 
the beginnings of Pixar’s relationship with Disney, and wrote specifically about the 
use of computer animation for making animated films. He states that up to that 
point, ‘Disney [had] used computer animation primarily for backgrounds rather than 
for characters, as in the recent features “Oliver and Company” and “The Great 
Mouse Detective.”’139 Clearly then, Pixar’s RenderMan interface was not only an 
increasingly discussed product by the end of the 1980s, but Pixar had also been 
explicitly linked to Disney and the making of popular animated feature films. Bob 
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135 Andrew Pollack, ‘Business Technology: Picture-Perfect Images, Without the Camera’, The New 
York Times, 22 November 1989, p.D5. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Mark Stephens, ‘RenderMan Interface to Link Modeling, Rendering Packages’, InfoWorld, 23 May 
1988, p.6 
138 Jack Schofield, ‘Computer Guardian (Microfile): RenderMan’, The Guardian, 26 May 1988. 
139 Fisher, op. cit., p.D1. 
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Swain would agree, writing in December 1989 that ‘it shouldn’t be long before we 
[see] the first computer animation feature films,’ and dubbing John Lasseter as the 
person most likely to be the first to succeed.140 
Fisher and Swain’s articles however were more anomalies than illustrative of 
a dominant trend, and the primary discourses attached to RenderMan only really 
mentioned animation in passing. Far more common was the tendency to position 
RenderMan as a key product in the computer graphics industry’s ongoing quest for 
photorealism – an issue that cropped up in almost every article that discussed the 
interface or PRMan. Tony Durham in The Guardian wrote as much in February 
1989, describing Pixar in a headline as having made a ‘breakthrough in realistic 
computer graphics’, and quoting Alvy Ray Smith, who described the interface as ‘a 
piece of paper, a description of this language that Pixar has offered up to the world 
as a standard of how to do all of geometry-based imaging.’141  
As discussed in the previous section, despite the critical and commercial 
benchmark it would later become, Pixar at this point in its history had made little (if 
any) attempt to brand itself as an animation company, or even as a part of the 
entertainment industry. Interestingly though, the evidence provided by print media 
publications also suggests that by the late-1980s Pixar had, in a very literal way, 
come to define a medium – in this case the rendered digital image. Not only that, 
Pixar benefited greatly from being one of the first companies to produce a high 
standard product while the medium of computer imagery was still in its infancy, 
resulting in industry-wide public endorsement of its RenderMan interface.  
To say the company had a focused brand during the 1980s would be wide of 
the mark, but it certainly appears as though ideas and discourses did coalesce 
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140 Bob Swain, ‘Computer: Breathing new life into animation’, The Guardian, 14 November 1991. 
141 Durham, op. cit. 
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around Pixar’s individual products or selected applications of its technology. 
RenderMan was written about in similar terms to Pixar more generally, in the sense 
that it was talked about largely in technology or computing circles, but was 
undeniably seen to be potentially useful in a variety of fields, including ‘medical 
imaging, product design, CAD/CAM, and in special effects for the motion pictures 
and television.’ 142  Discourses linking Pixar to the fields of image rendering and 
medical technology were common but not always consistent, and journalists did not 
always agree on how successful the company and its technology would prove to be. 
Naomi Klein’s concept of what a brand is relies primarily on abstract 
concepts and ideological implications, and while I agree that her definition works 
best with established lifestyle brands such as Nike, Gap or Coca-Cola, it needs a 
series of caveats in order for it to fit with a brand in its early stages of development. 
Is it really possible to say, for instance, when a mere product become a fully-fledged 
brand? Are we really discussing two discontinuous categories or are the two 
approaches to business (focusing on production, or focusing on marketing) actually 
far more fluid than Klein allows for? Pixar’s early history suggests that the latter is 
true. The company’s output during the 1980s and into the 1990s simultaneously 
straddled different markets (therefore making it simultaneously subject to several 
different sets of meanings), but importantly, this reputation seemed to be more 
firmly entrenched in some markets than it was in others. A set of meanings was 
available that related to Pixar’s animation work for example, but these meanings 
were far less developed or consistent than those relating to its work in the field of 
image rendering or medical technology. One temptation could be to consider early 
Pixar as three (or more) separate brands, but these cannot really be separated since 
each field relates back to the same company name, and stories would often overlap 
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with each other in national media discourses. Pixar now dedicates all of its resources 
to its work as an animation studio, but the sheer diversity of the company’s output 
during the 1980s makes it far more difficult to discuss its brand during that time. 
Rather like the character of Jack-Jack in The Incredibles (Brad Bird, 2004), Pixar’s 
early history showed definite potential to be ‘super’, but presently demonstrated a 
great deal of uncertainty, and had yet to really grow into a coherent identity. 
 
Conclusion 
From the outset of its exposure to the American public, the Pixar name has 
been a site of contested meanings and associations. Through an analysis of Pixar’s 
discursive surround during their formative years, I have argued in this chapter that 
the way in which the company was understood in this early period was characterised 
by a number of disparate and at times conflicting products and ideas. As Bob Swain 
wrote in November 1991, ‘computers have been responsible for some remarkable 
moments in film and television over recent years - but without necessarily creating 
widespread interest in this new art form.’143 Likewise, Pixar was responsible for a 
great deal of advancements in various fields of computer graphics technology 
during the 1980s, but the interest generated was perhaps weakened by the 
company’s attempts to appeal to as many different markets as possible. The sheer 
variety of technological applications on display makes it extremely difficult to argue 
in favour of any one aspect of Pixar’s business as being the cornerstone of its 
operations, but among the discourses that refer to one specific product at a time, 
one can observe some degree of consensus.  
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143 Bob Swain, ‘Computer: Breathing new life into animation’, The Guardian, 14 November 1991. 
Retrieved via LexisNexis Academic. 
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Using Naomi Klein’s definition of the modern brand as the production of 
ideas rather than products, it would in fact be difficult to describe Pixar during the 
1980s as a brand. I have argued however that her definition of branding is 
problematic, and leaves little scope for determining the point at which a product 
becomes a brand. While there may not have been many abstract ideas discussed in 
relation to Pixar at the time, there certainly were more tangible meanings and 
associations – particularly speed, compatibility, photorealism and the far more 
subjective notion of quality. The number of potential applications for Pixar’s 
technology meant that these meanings varied greatly, but within each product 
category there were identifiable brands at play. It therefore makes more sense to 
adopt Paul Grainge’s approach to the subject, and think of branding as a discourse 
or series of discourses that enable diverse meanings to coalesce.144 
 The primary business focus for those working at Pixar, as well as the small 
(but steadily growing) numbers of people who wrote about the company and/or 
consumed its products, was on computer hardware and software. Interestingly 
however, despite most of these technology products being closely tied to a 
vocabulary of possibilities, there was a curious but clearly observable distance 
between Pixar and Hollywood filmmaking. Even the fact that computers were 
increasingly being used to create visual effects shots for movies was played down, 
and as such, Hollywood and other art forms were only very rarely discussed in 
relation to Pixar. The process of historicisation that has taken place since the mid-
1990s has played up the importance of animation and special effects, and while it is 
not a lie to suggest that such possibilities were mentioned, it appears that the 
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technology’s capacity to render high quality images was seen to be far more central 
to the Pixar brand.  
 
The totalised approach I have taken to this chapter has allowed me to 
observe John Lasseter’s gradual journey to become the public face of Pixar, slowly 
replacing the computer scientists Ed Catmull and Alvy Ray Smith. His background 
in traditional animation will have inevitably limited the topics he could talk about in 
detail, moving away from technical questions and bringing the focus round to what 
he knew best: two-dimensional, hand-drawn animation in the Disney style. 
Although this will be a hypothesis I aim to test over the course of my thesis, it is my 
contention that the Pixar brand that eventually appeared in the early years of the 
twenty-first century was at least partly an extension of John Lasseter’s star image. 
Once he emerged as the figurehead for the studio, the company was set on a course 
to become known as the talented but childlike, imaginative, cool, family-friendly 
studio that they are generally presented as today – a modern day Walt to a modern 
day Disney.  
Prior to the elevation of the public role Lasseter had to play at Pixar 
however, the closest it came to becoming a brand (as defined by Klein, in terms of 
added value) was arguably by association with its considerably more famous owners, 
George Lucas and Steve Jobs. This branding by proxy was – like the majority of 
media coverage afforded to them in the 1980s – all but incapable of agreeing on the 
company’s key function, but it nonetheless imbued the Pixar name with values of 
‘coolness’ and (technologically) progressive thought that are difficult reputations to 
acquire in a business’s early years. These associations would later become a more 
recognisable part of their brand identity, and manifested themselves most noticeably 
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in Pixar’s media portrayal during the period of tension with Disney between 1999 
and 2006.145 
Ironically, a key part of the development of Pixar’s brand identity was the 
branding by proxy of their involvement with Disney from the early 1990s onwards, 
after having decided to concentrate solely on becoming an animation studio. 
Moving away from its multifarious output during the 1980s, the deal to make a 
feature-length computer-animated movie with Disney gave Pixar the opportunity to 
concentrate on establishing itself as solely an animation studio. Financial stability 
was still a long way off however, and Pixar’s need to reach this stability and open up 
doors to future work in the field of animated filmmaking required the development 
of a consistent brand identity. The transition towards this identity will form the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
 
-You Got A Brand In Me?- 
Layered Reputations and the Consumption of Toy Story 
 
Early on in Toy Story (John Lasseter, 1995), there is a scene in which several 
characters discuss where they come from. Buzz Lightyear – at this point still 
unaware that he is an action figure and not a real ‘Space Ranger’ – proclaims that he 
is ‘stationed up in the Gamma Quadrant of Sector Four,’ but Mr. Potato Head 
offers the more succinct, ‘I’m from Playskool.’ Rex, a nervous dinosaur toy, follows 
suit, declaring to Buzz that, ‘I’m from Mattel. Well, I’m not really from Mattel, I’m 
actually from a smaller company that was purchased by Mattel in a leveraged 
buyout.’ This exchange serves both comic and narrative functions – playfully setting 
up and then subverting expectations, and highlighting an important aspect of Buzz’s 
character – but it also invites questions about the origins of the film itself: If Toy 
Story was a character that could speak, where would it say that it came from? Pixar? 
Disney? John Lasseter? An anonymous crew of geeks? A bank of powerful 
computers?146 
This chapter seeks to interrogate the complexities of the film’s authorship 
through a focus on press reviews and feature articles that appeared immediately 
before and after its release. To what extent were Pixar credited as the film’s authors, 
and what inferences and assumptions, if any, did critics then make about the studio? 
I argue that, contrary to more recent understandings of the film, the overwhelming 
praise that Toy Story received was directed towards Disney, not Pixar. This in turn 
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146 Mr. Potato Head’s response is also interesting in relation to this question of  origins, although 
presumably this is unintentional. The toy has been manufactured and distributed by Hasbro, not 
Playskool, since its first incarnation in 1952. Hasbro acquired Playskool in 1984, who then assumed 
control of  the product. To say that Mr. Potato Head is ‘from Playskool’, then, would be akin to a 
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Toy Story on DVD. For detailed information and photographs on the history of  the Mr. Potato 
Head toy, see Dennis Martin, The Mr. Potato Head Collector’s Page 
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raises questions about the shape of the studio’s reputation at this time, and of the 
link between brands and their products more generally. This was the first time that 
Pixar had ever received widespread, sustained media coverage concentrated around 
one specific product, yet the reception of Toy Story also reveals the overlapping of 
multiple external authors and reputations. 
In short, this chapter argues that Toy Story represents a crucial moment of 
transition for Pixar, as its reputation underwent several key changes that would 
comprise the studio brand in later years. The diverse meanings attached to the 
company name in the 1980s (as described in the previous chapter) were quickly 
simplified or ignored by the time that Toy Story was released. Rather than building 
on pre-existing discourses, then, journalists approached Pixar as a relatively 
unknown quantity, and as such granted the studio a discursive rebirth of sorts. The 
studio suddenly ceased to exist in quite so many different guises; its brand 
associations began to move away from science and technology, broadly defined, and 
coalesced (albeit crudely) around narrower conceptions of animation and 
filmmaking. It was also a moment of transition in terms of scale; Pixar had made 
films before, but they had been produced by and for a far smaller number of 
people, with far less financial and emotional investment at stake. The products the 
company was now making had changed too; from niche and the highly specialised 
to those aimed at a mass audience, and from a wide range of scientific and/or 
technological products to one form of entertainment and storytelling (i.e. 
filmmaking).  
While the Pixar that emerges from these discourses is still a complex and 
inconsistent work in progress, Toy Story was nevertheless the epochal moment in 
the formation of the studio brand. Branded products rarely exist as singular entities, 
but this is particularly true of blockbuster cinema, which tends to exploit its own 
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multimedia potential, extending its narratives into other forms such as video games 
or theme park rides.147 Whatever Pixar was at this time, its reputation was 
overwhelmingly attached to Toy Story, both as a multimedia/transmedia object and 
as a moment in time. This was the first time that the studio’s identity was repeated 
consistently and relatively coherently across multiple media forms. But which version 
of the brand emerged from coverage of Toy Story, and to what extent was this 
identity complicated or impacted upon by competing claims of authorship, 
reputation and textuality? 
 
‘I’m not really from Mattel’: Identifying Toy Story’s author(s) 
The concept of authorship is notoriously problematic, despite its undeniable 
prevalence in popular and critical discourses of consumption.148 As Will Brooker 
argues, ‘the traditional model [of the individual auteur] clings on stubbornly – 
despite attempts to demonstrate that the process of artistic creation involves a 
complex mosaic of meanings.’149 Indeed, undoubtedly buoyed by two commercially 
and critically successful sequels (Toy Story 2 [John Lasseter, 1999]; Toy Story 3 [Lee 
Unkrich, 2010]), Toy Story seems to fit very comfortably alongside many of the 
ideas that Pixar has since come to represent. The movie quickly found its way into 
popular animation canon, partly by virtue of being the first film to have been 
entirely computer animated, but its landmark status was also cemented by an 
overwhelmingly positive critical response. As Variety’s Jerry Beck noted in 2006, 
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147 A great deal of excellent work exists in the field of blockbuster studies. For a collection that 
demonstrates the breadth of possible approaches to the subject, see Julian Stringer, ed., Movie 
Blockbusters (London: Routledge, 2003). For a focus on narrative blockbusters, see Geoff King, 
Spectacular Narratives: Hollywood in the Age of the Blockbuster (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000). A 
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148 See, for example, John Caughie, ‘Authors and auteurs: the uses of  theory’, James Donald and 
Michael Renov, eds., The SAGE Handbook of  Film Studies (London: SAGE, 2008), pp.408-23. 
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‘critics at the time [1995] marvelled at the film’s technical achievement. Animators 
were overwhelmed by the sophisticated 3-D character animation. But moviegoers 
(and Pixar) knew better: It’s the story that makes [audiences] care about the 
characters.’150  
Toy Story was also 1995’s highest grossing film domestically ($192 million), 
and the second highest at box offices worldwide ($362 million, just $4 million 
behind Die Hard: With A Vengeance [John McTiernan, 1995]).151 A small number 
of critics even included it in their shortlist for best film of the year.152 Put simply, it 
would be difficult to imagine a more successful entrance into the notoriously 
unpredictable world of Hollywood filmmaking. From my current vantage point, 
writing this in 2013, it feels perfectly natural to refer to Toy Story as a Pixar film, in 
the same way one might talk about the qualities and conventions of a Steven 
Spielberg film, a Nick Hornby novel or a Lady Gaga single. Doing so enables us to 
make sense of these singular texts by drawing similarities to a larger body of work. 
Pixar is somewhat remarkable in that it is rare for a Hollywood studio to be 
conceptualised in the same way that individual directors are. Neither critics nor 
audiences would be ever be likely to declare their fondness for ‘the new Twentieth 
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150 Jerry Beck, ‘100 Years of Animation: Animation’s 10 Sharpest Turns’, Variety, 29th May - 4th June 
2006, p.A6. Note that this is an apt summary of the way in which the film has been remembered, but a 
closer look at the film’s critical reception reveals a slightly different version of events. Here, Beck 
gives a disproportionate amount of credit to both audiences and Pixar, implying that they alone 
understood the importance of storytelling, whereas other animators and critics were only concerned 
with the film on a technical basis. As I discuss later in this chapter, while technology dominated Toy 
Story’s critical reception in the build up to its release, this tended to be downplayed and became far 
less important after critics actually saw the film. 
151 Anon. ‘1995 Worldwide Grosses’, Box Office Mojo 
<http://boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?view2=worldwide&yr=1995&p=.htm>, Retrieved 10th 
April 2012.  
152 See, for example, Judy Gerstel, ‘Tough to call the year’s 10 best when pickings have been slim’, 
Toronto Star, 24th November 1995, p.D7. Actually, considering how laudatory most of  the reviews 
were, it is surprising that more critics didn’t include Toy Story in their Top 10. This is perhaps a 
testament to the cultural status of  animation more generally, which is still stigmatised as ‘kids only’ 
fare. Chapter 4 picks up on this idea in more detail, and argues that the reputation for quality that 
Pixar eventually developed was predicated on the studio’s ability to appeal to both adults and children 
at the same time.  
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Century Fox’ movie, or to refer to something as ‘Warner Brothers-esque’.153 Yet that 
is precisely the position that Pixar quickly found itself in, even to the extent that it 
became the first team to be awarded the Golden Lion lifetime achievement award at 
the Venice Film Festival.154 
But even if, in purely hypothetical terms, there was universal agreement 
regarding what ‘a Pixar film’ would look like, why it was made, and/or who it would 
appeal to, this consensus would necessarily be predicated on an amalgamation of 
meanings that had developed and shifted over time.155 When Toy Story was first 
released, then, with Pixar’s back catalogue consisting solely of commercials and a 
handful of non-theatrical short films, how did critics make sense of it?156 What we 
see here is a clear disparity between different definitions of ‘success’, with the 
movie’s critical and commercial achievements contributing significantly to Pixar’s 
financial stability and reputation within the industry, but without this translating 
proportionately to its reputation in the eyes of critics. 
While Pixar was by no means absent from the critical discourse surrounding 
the film, the mainstream media very clearly associated Toy Story with Disney. 
Authorship in film and television should always be treated with a degree of 
scepticism, given that they are nearly always highly collaborative media forms. One 
could be forgiven for assuming that credit is generally given to the person(s) 
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153 On the surface, this admittedly may come across as a crude comparison, in the sense that both of  
these studios are now focused primarily on distribution, not production. The studio system of  
Classical Hollywood, for instance, did see individual studios producing their own films, and 
developing reputations for particular genres (e.g. Universal and horror; Warner Bros and the gangster 
film; MGM and musicals). See Thomas Schatz, Hollywood Genres: Formulas, Filmmaking, and the 
Studio (New York: Random House, 1981). However, I use Warner Bros and Twentieth-Century Fox 
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154 Anon., ‘Venice honour for Pixar directors’, BBC, 7th September 2009 
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155 See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of  how the idea of  ‘consensus’ has informed 
debates about Pixar and its films.  
156 It is important to note here that Pixar’s short films had won several awards, including an Academy 
Award for Tin Toy (John Lasseter, 1988). Thus, while short films in general receive scant attention 
from the mainstream press, it would be misleading to suggest the company’s work in the field was 
‘obscure’. 
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deemed to have had the largest creative influence on a text, yet this was not the case 
for Toy Story. Journalists and reviewers at the time of its release appeared to be 
fairly well informed about the production process and the division of labour, yet 
chose to base their assertions of authorship on reputation, not creative input.157  
To be clear, I am not suggesting that journalists were morally obliged to 
recognise Pixar as the film’s authors from the very beginning, but the apparent 
reluctance to acknowledge the studio’s contribution is certainly surprising. With the 
benefit of hindsight, of course, we know that Pixar would eventually become so 
respected as to inspire entire books about its approach to creativity,158 but in the 
eyes of the majority of journalists in 1995, Toy Story was both ‘made by Walt 
Disney’,159 and even, ‘Disney’s neatest film ever’.160 From cinema listings and brief 
plot summaries through to in-depth reviews and interviews with cast and crew, 
Pixar’s contribution was consistently either downplayed or outright ignored. Press 
vocabulary was characterised largely by sentences such as, ‘Disney’s upcoming “Toy 
Story”’,161 ‘Walt Disney Pictures’ first computer-animated feature film’,162 ‘Walt 
Disney Pictures’ “Toy Story”’,163 or ‘another instant animated classic from Walt 
Disney Pictures’.164  
To give a rough indication of just how uneven this distribution was, a 
LexisNexis search revealed 375 English-language newspaper articles that mentioned 
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157 My research in Chapter 1 demonstrated that critics responded similarly to Young Sherlock 
Holmes, which was primarily understood as a Steven Spielberg film despite his negligible creative 
input. Authorship within these discourses thus appears to stem more from pre-existing reputation 
(for critics/journalists and their [imagined] audiences) than actual (or even reported) creative input. 
158 See, for example, Bill Capodagli and Lynn Jackson, Innovate the Pixar Way: Business lessons from 
the world’s most creative corporate playground (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010). 
159 Sonia Reyes, ‘It’s a “Toy Story” told at the cash register’, p.77. 
160 Lewis Beale, ‘At Long Last Disney Is Shooting For The Hip’, Daily News (New York), 20th 
November 1995, p.36.  
161 Anon., ‘Sun Hopes To Rise With New Software’, Variety, 13-19th November 1995, p.32. 
162 Arlene Vigoda, ‘Play’s the thing’, USA Today, 15th November 1995, p.1D. 
163 Lara Wozniak, ‘Tale of  toys and burgers is a sequel’, St. Petersburg Times (Florida), 21st 
November 1995, p.1E. 
164 Steve Persall, ‘Films are perfect fare for holiday’, St. Petersburg Times (Florida), 22nd November 
1995, p.2B. 
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Toy Story within one week either side of its release date. Of those, more than three 
quarters (76.5%; n=287) mentioned Disney, compared to less than one quarter 
(23.2%; n=87) that mentioned Pixar. Only one-fifth (20.8%; n=78) included the 
names of both studios, whereas more than half (55.7%; n=209) mentioned only 
Disney, and the number that discussed Pixar without mentioning Disney was 
negligible, just 9 (2.4%) of the 375 news reports.165 The search included transcripts 
of network news coverage, as well as some duplicate reports by news agencies such 
as Associated Press, and so the precise figures here should be treated with caution. 
Yet the broad trends they reveal are telling, clearly indicating the extent to which 
Disney’s brand name engulfed Pixar’s across Toy Story’s critical reception. 
In fact, Disney was actually talked about in terms that would have been 
more befitting of Pixar’s reputation than its own. As Lewis Beale of New York’s 
Daily News argued, ‘hipness in cartoonery has never been considered a Disney trait. 
That was always the province of Warner Bros. … How times have changed! In 
several recent works, Disney animators have been acting as if they understand the 
meaning of cool’.166 Another article in the Washington Post described the film in 
similar terms, writing that, ‘with its new computer animation feature Toy Story, the 
Walt Disney animation proves again it cannot be accused of lacking a multifaceted 
vision. If anything, the company seems to excel at whatever animated style it 
chooses.’167 These arguments could easily have been framed as a story of a hip, 
young company coming in to breathe life into a stagnating corporation. Indeed, by 
the time of the industrial disputes between the studios in the early 2000s (discussed 
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165 Of  these nine, only one was actually a source that would have been widely consumed – a brief  
discussion of  new film releases by Michael Atkinson during a breakfast news report on CNN. See 
Anon., ‘Critic says “Casino” is “Goodfellas go to Vegas”’, CNN News, 23rd November 1995, 7:39am 
EST. Transcript retrieved via LexisNexis Academic, 1st April 2013. 
166 Lewis Beale, ‘At Long Last Disney Is Shooting For The Hip’, Daily News (New York), 20th 
November 1995, p.36. 
167 Anon., ‘Movies’, Washington Times, 23rd November 1995, p.M9. 
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in the next chapter), this is essentially what the narrative would become. In the 
context of Toy Story’s release, though, the implication was that Disney made this 
progress on its own. 
On the occasions that Pixar was credited, it was usually as ‘a high-tech 
graphics outfit’,168 with the focus very much on the company’s sophisticated 
technology, not its storytelling abilities:  
 
[T]he lovable cartoon character you see on screen is totally a product of the 
computer … [T]o create [Woody’s] scenes for the new Disney release, “Toy 
Story”, animators at San Francisco’s Pixar Studios reached into the virtual 
space of their sophisticated computer system … Both Pixar and Disney 
brought their own strengths to the project. Pixar had an amazing new 
technology. Disney had nearly 60 years of expertise in the field of feature 
animation and a reputation for ensuring good story structure. It also was 
powerful enough to attract outstanding voice and music talent.169 
 
Hard-edged and hyperreal – half Pixar and half pixillated – this is 
workmanship that could be achieved only by something with gigabytes.170 
 
[H]ow well the techie aspects (a sharp-edged, three-dimensional look) meld 
with Disney-style wit and whimsy.171 
 
In some respects, these comments are a reflection of Toy Story’s status as 
the first ever entirely computer-animated feature film, which understandably granted 
it attention from a wide number of media outlets. Yet each of these examples takes 
this debate a great deal further, with Portman’s description of Sheriff Woody as 
‘totally a product of the computer’ being particularly revealing in this context. Gary 

168 Liam Lacey, ‘Film Review: “Toy Story”’, Globe and Mail, 24th November 1995. Retrieved via 
Nexis UK, 1st June 2012. 
169 Jamie Portman, ‘From Computer Screen to Big Screen: “Toy Story” takes animated film-making 
into a new era’, The Gazette (Montreal), 18th November 1995, p.C3. Emphasis added. 
170 Jay Stone, ‘Make way for the future; Film animation will likely never be the same after “Toy 
Story”’, Ottawa Citizen, 24th November 1995, p.E1. Emphasis added. Note that Stone’s use of  the 
word ‘gigabytes’ here is intended to evoke fantastically advanced computers. Bear in mind that the 
average home computer in 1995 had only 200-300 megabytes of  disk space, compared to the 3-4 
gigabytes that each Pixar workstation possessed, and the ~500 gigabytes of  space that was required 
to hold the final frames. Also see Jason Hill, ‘Animated Magic’, Herald Sun, 21st November 1995. 
Retrieved via Nexis UK. 
171 Jane Horwitz, ‘Ode to “Toy”: An Animation Sensation’, Washington Post, 23rd November 1995, p. 
D7. 
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Arnold’s review in The Washington Times even went as far as stating that ‘Pixar 
supplied 77 minutes of the 81-minute running time.’172 While this claim appears to 
have resulted from confusion over the film’s length – both figures were reported 
just as widely as each other – it (falsely) implies that another group of animators, 
presumably from Disney, also helped to produce Toy Story.173 The cause of this 
confusion is, I would argue, less significant than the inference Arnold made from it; 
whether he attributed it to Pixar’s inexperience, Disney’s refusal to relinquish all 
control over the production process, or some other factor, the way in which he 
reported this discrepancy implies a surprisingly limited assessment of Pixar’s 
productive and/or creative capacity. 
Film authorship is traditionally associated with the figure of the director, 
and reviews of Toy Story were no different, with John Lasseter being the only 
individual who really stood out as a potential auteur amid all the reviews. Reviewers 
referred to ‘Lasseter & Co.’ or ‘Mr Lasseter’s Toy Story’,174 while then-Chief 
Technical Office Ed Catmull publically heaped praise on him, revealing that, ‘It was 
very clear from the beginning that John was a master storyteller … He had a skill set 
that we desperately needed. And so we basically listened to everything he had to 
say’175 Disney producer Thomas Schumacher spoke in similar terms, claiming, ‘We 
wanted to work with John Lasseter the filmmaker.’176 The publicity from both 
Disney and Pixar, in other words, constantly strived towards legitimating phrases 
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172 Gary Arnold, ‘“Toy Story” plays delightfully with technology, imagination’, The Washington 
Times, 22nd November 1995, p.C9. 
173 This confusion over running time appears to have resulted from both figures – 77 minutes and 81 
minutes – having been reported by official and/or trusted sources. The author’s personal copies of  
the film demonstrate the extent of  the confusion, with the Region 2 DVD packaging stating a 77-
minute running time, but the Blu Ray stating 81 minutes. One review of  the laserdisc edition claims 
that it is the lower figure is accurate, and that ‘the liner notes incorrectly list a running time of  81 
minutes’. S. Damien Segal, ‘Laserdisc Review: “Toy Story” (Deluxe edition)’, SMR Home Theater 
Magazine, no date <http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~robinson/Reviews/Toy-Story-2-Review.htm>, 
Accessed 20th March 2013.  
174 Gary Arnold,  ‘“Toy Story” plays delightfully with technology, imagination’, p.C9. 
175 Jonah Lehrer, Imagine: How Creativity Works (London: Canongate, 2012), p.146. 
176 Bruce Kirkland, ‘Toying with technology’, Toronto Sun, 19th November 1995, p.S14. 
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that invested an inherently collaborative form of production (animation) with more 
traditional values of individual authorship.177  
Interestingly, however, even this ostensibly specific discursive strand (i.e. 
Lasseter as author) involves a complex layering of different reputations, as 
Lasseter’s reputation as a gifted animator was largely seen as the product of his 
background at Disney, and not him as an individual or the creative culture at Pixar. 
Consider the following references: 
Director John Lasseter is Walt’s digital descendent, having nurtured this new 
animation technology from its earliest days178 
 
Lasseter earned his traditional, hand-drawn animation stripes during his 
years at Disney179 
 
As impressive as the computer images are, it’s the imaginative script and 
attention to detail that power this movie, directed by former Disney 
animator John Lasseter.180 
 
Disney was smart to snap up Toy Story five years ago when Pixar came 
pitching, fronted by former Disney animator John Lasseter, who conceived 
and directed the film.181  
 
Several reviewers even mistakenly described Lasseter as the head of the 
company, with the St. Petersburg Times writing, ‘Director John Lasseter’s major 
studio debut (under the Disney banner, of course) is a logical extension of the 
technique his Pixar Animation Studios perfected.’182 Even more incredibly, the 
Washington Times’ Gary Arnold referred to ‘Mr. Lasseter, a former Disney 
animator who started his own company, Pixar,’183 despite the fact that the company 
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177 As Jerome Christensen  
178 Dave Kehr, ‘Let’s hear it for the “Toy”’, Daily News (New York), 22nd November 1995, p.37. 
179 Jamie Portman, ‘From Computer Screen to Big Screen: “Toy Story” takes animated film-making 
into a new era’, The Gazette (Montreal), 18th November 1995, p.C3. 
180 Paul Delean, ‘Toys are stars in Disney’s latest’, The Gazette (Montreal), 24th November 1995, p. 
C1. 
181 Judy Gerstel, ‘The Toy Story: Canadian plays key role in creating ground breaking Disney movie 
with computer animation’, Toronto Star, 17th November 1995, p.B1. 
182 Steve Persall, ‘A True Treasure From The Toy Box’, St. Petersburg Times (Florida), 24th 
November 1995, p.3. Emphasis added. 
183 Gary Arnold, ‘“Toy Story” plays delightfully with technology, imagination’, The Washington 
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had existed for several years before Catmull and Alvy Ray Smith recruited him. This 
brings to mind the ‘limiting’ role of authorship described by Roland Barthes, who 
argues,  
 
To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to finish it with a 
final signified, to close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very 
well, the latter then allotting itself the important task of discovering the 
Author … beneath the work: when the Author has been found, the text is 
“explained”.184 
 
 As I have demonstrated throughout this section, this explanatory function is 
clearly evident throughout Toy Story’s critical reception, with most reviews either 
referring to Disney or to John Lasseter as the source of the film’s humour, 
creativity, and appeal more generally. However, what my analysis reveals is that the 
conflation of corporate and individual authorship within these discourses belies an 
altogether more complex interplay between different authorships. With very few 
exceptions, the making of a film or television text will require the input of 
companies or collectives as well as individuals.185 Media discourses may seek to 
simplify these relationships or elevate the importance of one authorial claim over all 
others, but the evidence presented above suggests that doing so is invariably an 
artificial exercise that masks the origin and flow of various meanings. What this 
points towards is the need to develop theories of what might be termed 
‘reputational melange’, borrowing from Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s conception of 
‘global melange’.186 Nederveen Pieterse describes the latter in terms of cultural 
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Times, 22nd November 1995, p.C9. 
184 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of  the Author’, John Caughie, ed., Theories of  Authorship: A Reader 
(London: Routledge, 1981), p.212. 
185 This is of  course a simplification, and one that applies primarily to commercial filmmaking. Even 
the rise of  amateur filmmaking, however, owes considerable debt to the cine-clubs that often 
facilitated production through the pooling of  expertise and equipment. See, for example, Ryan Shand 
and Ian Craven, eds., Small Gauge Storytelling: Discovering the Amateur Fiction Film (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012).  
186 Jan Nederveen Peiterse, Globalisation and Culture: Global Melange (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & 
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hybridity and globalisation, with ideas, tastes, art forms and behaviour moving 
beyond their geographical or cultural origins and combining against or reacting 
against different cultural practices. In highlighting the need to theorise hybridity, he 
writes, 
 
We are so used to theories that are concerned with establishing boundaries 
and demarcations among phenomena—units or processes that are as neatly 
as possible set apart from other units or processes—that a theory that 
instead would focus on fuzziness and mélange, cut’n’mix, crisscross and 
crossover, might well be a relief in itself. Yet, ironically, of course, it would 
have to prove itself by giving as neat as possible a version of messiness, or 
an unhybrid categorisation of hybridities.187 
 
 He goes on to propose a ‘continuum of hybridities’, with assimilationist 
hybridity and the mimicry of hegemony at one end, and a destabilising, canon-
blurring hybridity at the other.188 For reputational melange, we might think about 
normalisation and distinction rather than assimilation and destabilisation, focusing 
on the processes and outcomes of reputation construction, and acknowledging the 
multiple reputations that converge around a given text or set of texts. Pixar, for 
instance, is in many respects a distinct entity, with clear proprietary boundaries, yet 
its reputation simply cannot be understood without also considering the 
contributions of individuals such as John Lasseter, Steve Jobs, Michael Eisner and 
George Lucas, or companies such as Apple, Disney, LucasFilm or DreamWorks. 
Since the complexity of this melange increases with public exposure, 1995 marks a 
time when Pixar’s reputation underwent a significant shift. 
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Making the Big Time: Pixar, growth, and transition towards the 
‘mainstream’ 
Toy Story is perhaps best thought of as a period of transition for Pixar, and 
in particular a period of growth and concentration. The bulk of my analysis in this 
chapter is based on reviews and journalism from a fairly narrow period of time (i.e. 
one week either side of Toy Story’s release date), but briefly adopting a broader 
perspective reveals a definite shift in the discursive spaces that the company was 
occupying. If we compare the results of a simple newspaper database search from 
the nine-year period between the founding of Pixar and Toy Story’s release 
(February 1986 – November 1995) to just one year that followed it (November 
1995 – November 1996), the results are striking. Owing to the decidedly unscientific 
nature of this method, these results should of course be treated with some caution, 
and as such, I have deliberately not quoted any precise figures here. Nevertheless, as 
with the LexisNexis search noted above, the trends that emerge from this 
comparison are telling, and certainly indicate that Pixar’s role in media discourses 
underwent significant changes in a comparatively short space of time. The Nexis 
UK search was designed purely to show the number of print articles that mentioned 
the word ‘Pixar’, and the publications they appeared in.  
Prior to November 1995, Pixar was discussed primarily in specialist 
technology magazines, particularly InfoWorld and Computerworld, as well as trade 
or industry publications such as AdWeek, Variety and The Hollywood Reporter. 
The variety of sources on display here mirrors the multi-faceted nature of the 
company during its early years, with publicity tending to relate very broadly to the 
advancement of computer graphics technology and its potential application to 
special effects, television commercials and scientific visualisation. In the year 
following Toy Story, newspaper coverage of the company more than doubled in 
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comparison to the nine years that preceded it, as Pixar became a common fixture in 
the mainstream media. Its presence within the pages of InfoWorld, Computerworld 
and other specialist magazines declined sharply, while coverage in Hollywood trade 
papers Variety and The Hollywood Reporter saw a dramatic increase. The company 
also became a far more regular fixture in national newspapers, suggesting a shift 
from niche to mainstream recognition. While the aggregation of large numbers of 
articles in this way may not explain this transitional period, it does provide some 
indication of the changes that were taking place at Pixar, pointing towards Pixar’s 
increasing public (i.e. media) presence in the wake of Toy Story.189 
Of course, this growth occurred on many levels, and manifested itself in 
different ways, but my focus here is on the growth of reputation. The initial three-
picture deal the studio signed with Disney meant that, regardless of any structural or 
financial changes that might take place (e.g. hiring more staff, shifting business 
objectives), Pixar was now a component of the same critical discourses as one of the 
biggest brand names in entertainment.190 This association with Disney ensured that 
Pixar was given access to production and marketing budgets that far outstripped its 
previous resources, but it also guaranteed Toy Story considerable media coverage. 
Accordingly, in the days leading up to its release, journalists variously described the 
film as a ‘real commercial dynamo,’191 the ‘most anticipated kid-flick of the 
season,’192 and potentially ‘the holiday season’s hottest ticket.’193 In its formative 
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189 See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of  review aggregation and what it can (and cannot) 
tell us. 
190 The three-picture deal would later become a more lucrative (for Pixar) five-picture deal, which 
Steve Jobs negotiated with Michael Eisner after Toy Story’s successful stock offering. Chapter 3 
discusses these industrial and contractual developments in more detail.  
191 Leonard Klady, ‘007’s B.O. luck not contagious’, Daily Variety, 21st November 1995, p.19. 
192 Steve Persall, ‘Look out, it’s time for those holiday movies’, St. Petersburg Times (Florida), 20th 
November 1995, p.1D. 
193 Beth Pinkser, ‘“Toy Story”: A realistic breakthrough’, The Dallas Morning News, 19th November 
1995, p.1C. Note that all of  the reviews and articles quoted in this chapter come from one week 
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years, Pixar had developed a reputation for quality within the computer graphics 
industry, but the abovementioned descriptions point towards expectations that far 
exceeded anything they had previously experienced. 
 One of the most obvious indicators of the company’s sudden leap in 
recognition was the number of publications that wrote about Toy Story before the 
film had been released. While this is common practice within film journalism, it was 
new to Pixar, who had hitherto experienced very little advance press (the only 
exceptions being a handful of short articles featuring forthcoming animation 
festivals, technology conferences or short film exhibitions). Its formative years had 
been marked by media debates that looked towards the future, but often these were 
debates that emphasised technological possibilities, rather than anything the 
company might become, or even produce. If Pixar can truly be said to have had an 
identity at that time, it was one that centred around unpredictability, simply because 
the technologies being talked about had so many potential applications. Nobody, 
including Pixar, knew what the company would become. By association with a 
media conglomerate with as strong a reputation as Disney, however, many of these 
alternative possibilities were discursively killed off.194 The studio was of course still 
capable of succeeding or failing, but there was little doubt about what it would be 
failing at. 
Pixar’s rise to prominence was not simply a case of being associated with a 
media giant, and was in fact intensified through Disney’s own expansion during the 
late-1980s and early-1990s. As Adam Arvidsson notes,  
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194 I say ‘discursively killed off ’, because Pixar, its employees and its technologies could easily have 
been taken in other (i.e. non-filmmaking) directions, even after this point. The company still 
continues to sell its RenderMan software and programming interface, which has become an industry 
standard, yet this has received only minimal recognition within the media since Toy Story.   
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Their growth and diversification was truly astonishing. In 1988 Disney was a 
$2.8 billion per year amusement park and cartoon company; in 1998 Disney 
had $25 billion in sales divided between television and radio (ABC, Buena 
Vista Productions), internet (InfoSeek), film studios (Miramax, Touchstone), 
a cruise line, a residential community (Celebration), sports teams and 660 
Disney retail stores around the world.195  
 
Toy Story’s production and release fell entirely within this ten-year window, 
meaning that, as the Disney name expanded into increasingly diverse media and 
consumer territories, so too did animated characters like Woody, Buzz, and Rex. Of 
course, this is not to say that these different brand identities were henceforth free to 
flow into each other. Maintaining some separation between brands allows each to 
develop its own identity, and provides the parent company (in this case, Disney) 
with a degree of protection from an unknown or unproven quantity (Pixar).196 
Through Miramax, for instance, Disney was able to benefit financially from 
investment in controversial films made by young directors – famous examples 
include the violent, expletive-ridden Pulp Fiction (Quentin Tarantino, 1994), and 
Trainspotting (Danny Boyle, 1996), a Scottish comedy drama about heroin 
addiction – without undermining the homogeneity of its own family friendly image. 
A conglomerate does not serve as a melting pot into which all subsidiary brands are 
poured, but this emerging strategy meant that Toy Story was not simply a 
standalone film, becoming what David Marshall terms an ‘intertextual 
commodity’.197 Arvidsson argues that, 
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When a particular media product (or “content”) can be promoted across 
different media channels and sold in different formats, what is marketed is 
not so much films or books, as “content brands” that can travel between 
and provide a context for the consumption of a number of goods or media 
products.198  
 
Toy Story undoubtedly represents a moment when Pixar’s reputation 
increases significantly, but this growth in stature should be seen as having taken 
place across multiple media industries, not just within Hollywood. Although I 
discuss the specifics of the film’s marketing and tie-in promotions in more detail 
below, it is clear that its cultural presence stretched significantly further than 
anything Pixar had done before. As Toy Story spread itself across different media, 
widening the studio’s reach in the process, critics were also quick to note the 
potentially catalytic impact the film could have on the rest of Hollywood. Roger 
Ebert wrote that, ‘watching [it], I felt I was in at the dawn of a new era of movie 
animation,’199 while the Ottawa Citizen described it as ‘a ground-breaking 
achievement that will likely change the entire character of film animation.’200 Within 
days of its release, then, its cultural impact was deemed significant enough to change 
how animation was made in the future, providing a model for storytelling that 
would ensure quality as well as success.  
What is particularly interesting about these bold predictions is that they 
appeared to stem at least partly from an element of surprise; quality to some extent 
was defined by the extent to which it exceeded expectations. Judy Gerstel, for 
instance, noted ‘one Hollywood movie from this weekend makes it to the Top 10 
[i.e. “best” films of the year] with a bullet. And not one you might expect. Toy Story 
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… will totally knock your socks off.’201 Bruce Kirkland of the Toronto Sun was 
similarly impressed, ‘set to play with your expectations and wreak havoc with all 
prejudices.’202 These expressions of surprise are important, as they not only indicate 
a gulf between expectation and reality (especially in relation to the cultural status of 
animation), but they also meant that Pixar’s transition from niche technology 
company to popular animation studio could later be characterised in a more 
dramatic fashion, rather like the ‘genesis effect’ sequence discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
Such positivity was only really present after reviews started to appear, 
however, with the vast majority of pre-release discourse seemingly torn between 
excitement and uncertainty. As Stuart Elliot wrote in the Dallas Morning News, 
‘though the film is a full-length animated feature, a genre in which Disney excels, 
and advance reviews have been almost giddily enthusiastic, there is considerable 
risk.’203 Elliot goes on to quote one box office analyst, who felt that Disney had 
‘done really well on the marketing … It’s going to have an initial impact, but I don’t 
know how big.’204 Toy Story was seen to harbour the potential for selling a huge 
variety of products, which would explain the considerable marketing investment it 
received. Programmers at southern California’s first commercial IMAX theatre 
chose the film for their opening week,205 and Hasbro were reported to be expecting 
‘a run’ on Mr. Potato Head toys at Christmas,206 yet the faith shown in the product 
appeared to have worried many executives. 
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205 Katharine Stalter, ‘Pushed to the IMAX’, Daily Variety, 15th November 1995, p.9. 
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As Toronto’s Financial Post reported, Toy Story was one of five movies 
predicted to gross over $100 million, but several high profile failures meant that ‘the 
climate [was] decidedly nervous.’207 Tom Hanks and Tim Allen, the voices of 
Woody and Buzz, respectively, appeared similarly uncertain, with one article 
reporting that the actors ‘refused to talk to print journalists about the movie. They 
chose to do brief TV interviews only, instead of fully backing what may become one 
of the biggest movies of the year.’208 It would not have been surprising if Pixar had 
been the reason for this doubt, being as it was, a comparatively young company 
with only very limited filmmaking and storytelling experience. Yet as demonstrated 
above, Toy Story was understood as a Disney film above all else, and so there 
should have been little suggestion that the film would fail because of incompetent 
production. Instead, observers’ uncertainties appeared to be tied to the computer 
technology and whether it would attract or deter audiences. Gary Arnold’s review in 
the Washington Times admits as much when he writes that the film ‘demonstrates 
the viability of the technology at feature length.’209  
Strangely, though, these parameters shifted slightly once reviews started to 
appear. Up until that point, articles had questioned the volatility of the marketplace. 
This varied depending on which sources one chose to listen to, with 1995 seeing a 
‘dearth of family-oriented movies’210 in the eyes of one observer, and ‘a year of great 
children’s films’ according to another.211 Either way, the implied concern for Toy 
Story was over its commercial appeal, not quality, and this doubt disappeared 
immediately when critics saw the film for themselves. Critics actually struggled to 
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find anything negative to say about it, with the exception of a handful who were 
slightly perturbed by the ‘uncanny’ appearance of its human characters.212 In terms 
of reputation, one of the most interesting criticisms levelled at the film came from 
Hollywood’s longest running industry publication, Variety. They argued that Disney 
would surely be ‘kicking themselves’ for missing so many opportunities for 
synergistic marketing opportunities, citing The Lion King (Roger Allers, Rob 
Minkoff, 1994) as an example of the studio’s previous approach:213  
 
You don’t just see “The Lion King” movie, after all, you buy the album, 
beach towels and toys; watch the spinoff syndicated TV show, the Disney 
Channel special, the Disneyland parade and live stage show; read the book; 
play the videogames; and drink out of the McDonald’s collector’s cups.214 
 
Variety was particularly surprised that Toy Story made use of characters that 
Disney did not own the rights to, partly because of its long-standing reputation for 
exploiting synergy in order to maximise profits, but especially in light of the 
conglomerate’s recent expansion: 
 
That’s one reason the Disney/ABC merger – beyond its sheer size and 
scope – fired up the imagination so much more than CBS/Westinghouse. 
One can see the obvious advantage of the network with the strongest 
primetime presence among kids aligning itself with the company that 
possesses the business’s most powerful brand name. The possibilities – 
from movies to TV to publishing to merchandising – are truly awesome.215  
 
To read this one article, however, might give the impression that Disney did 
not strive to sell Toy Story across other media or push the ‘content’ into other 
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markets. This is far from the case, and while this section has explored some of the 
implications of Pixar’s transition into a new industry, I now turn to some of the 
specific ways in which this growth was accompanied by a change in textuality. As 
Pixar grew, it also diversified by virtue of being so strongly tied to a film that was 
being sold across a diverse range of media. By looking at its marketing and the range 
of ways that Toy Story could be consumed, I demonstrate that Pixar itself was by 
this point becoming a brand that was increasingly associated with inhabitable 
storyworlds and textual play. 
 
‘Outside The Theatre Door’: Re-thinking ‘paratexts’ and the consumption of 
Toy Story 
In February 1996, I cheered and applauded as an eight-foot tall dinosaur 
walked alongside a pair of anthropomorphic binoculars. I was eleven years old, and 
my parents had taken me on holiday to Disney World, Florida, where the Toy Story 
parade was a daily occurrence. We filmed and took photographs as plastic army 
soldiers, three-eyed aliens and a giant Slinky dog strolled past, waving in all 
directions. I was aware that these peculiar characters were from a film, but it was 
one that I hadn’t seen, and knew very little about, since its release back home in the 
UK was still more than a month away. In the Magic Kingdom, though, Toy Story 
was difficult to escape, even though I was at that point experiencing it entirely 
through so-called paratexts.  
Gérard Genette first identified paratexts in 1987 in relation to literature. He 
saw them as ‘thresholds’ or ‘vestibules’ that exist between the inside and outside of 
source texts.216 In Show Sold Separately, Jonathan Gray applies Genette’s work to 
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film and television, but deviates slightly in that he refuses to see paratexts as 
‘subordinate’ to a larger text.217 He argues that ‘a film or program is but one part of 
the text, the text always being a contingent entity … the entire storyworld as we 
know it.’218 Indeed, when my parents and I eventually saw Toy Story at an Orlando 
multiplex in the days following the parade, I was so enraptured that I instantly 
sought ways to continue the experience, rushing to spend my pocket money on 
merchandise, toys, books and stationery. My consumption of Toy Story thus neither 
began nor ended with the film itself, and the remainder of this chapter will 
accordingly focus on questions of textuality. Even before its sequels in 1999 and 
2010, Toy Story was always a great deal more than a standalone movie, and it is 
worth reflecting on the roles that such epiphenomena have played in the 
construction of Pixar’s reputation.219  
While I agree with Gray and Genette’s broader aims, in that they endorse 
the study of an often-overlooked set of materials that frequently accompany media 
texts, I would argue that their conception of the paratext (or, more accurately, the 
term itself) is problematically limiting. Gray is careful not to conflate words such as 
‘film’ or ‘program’ with ‘text’, explaining that the ‘text’ is something far larger than 
any one constituent element,220 but the etymology of ‘paratext’ nevertheless implies 
some form of referential hierarchy.221 If the ‘para-’ prefix can mean either ‘beside, 
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adjacent to’, or ‘beyond or distinct from but analogous to’,222 then the ‘paratext’ 
points towards something that it must always be seen in relation to. Yet it would be 
entirely possible to consume many Toy Story products or branded experiences 
without ever seeing the film itself, or even knowing that it was a film at all. Gray 
admits as much in his acknowledgement of instances ‘when the paratext either 
stands in for the entire text or becomes a key and “primary” platform for that 
text’.223 Paratexts, in other words, may not require their prefix at all, since audiences 
are free to consume them in isolation. To think of them as ‘vestibules’ implies that 
the reader/viewer must always make a choice: move on to the ‘text’ or turn back, 
when in fact many ‘paratexts’ – parades and toys being perfect examples – may not 
necessarily function in this way at all. Just as Andy in Toy Story can enjoy playing 
with Sheriff Woody regardless of whether or not he has ever seen Woody’s 
Roundup (the 1950s television serial that we discover Woody originates from in Toy 
Story 2 [John Lasseter, 1999]), so too can most ‘paratexts’ function as texts in their 
own right, capable of standing alone or being subsumed into different narratives 
and intertextual networks. 
So what are the implications of this for the Pixar brand, or for Disney’s 
reputation? If Toy Story was more than just a film, what other forms did it take? 
What are the implications of a marketing campaign that spanned different brands as 
well as a range of media? Rather than seeking to provide a definitive answer about 
what Pixar might have represented at this moment in time, this section aims to 
highlight the brand’s heightened potential for fluidity and intertextuality.  
Toy Story’s marketing campaign actually received a great deal of press 
attention in its own right, with several publications featuring articles on specific tie-
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in products and other licensed promotion. The film had a production budget of $30 
million,224 yet Disney spent a further $20 million on advertising, including 
‘everything from teaser advertisements in newspapers to a site on the World Wide 
Web’.225 Marketing deals were also struck with four key partners – Burger King, 
Minute Maid, Frito-Lay and Payless ShoeSource – who were widely reported to 
have backed the film with a combined $125 million investment in ‘advertising and 
promotional support’.226 While it is far from unheard of for the press to take an 
interest in movie marketing campaigns, the attention in this case was a testament to 
Toy Story’s status as a cultural event as well as a film, which again was new for 
Pixar. The deal with Burger King was particularly noteworthy, described by the 
USA Today as a ‘mega-promotion’.227 This involved the distribution of 35 million 
Toy Story toys (action figures and hand puppets), which dwarfed the 14 million 
handed out in the wake of Pocahontas (Mike Gabriel and Eric Goldberg, 1995), as 
well as the 15 million from the tie-in promotion of The Lion King.228 Other tie-in 
products included Hasbro’s release of a special edition Mr. Potato Head toy,229 
Payless brand shoes, Fritos and Doritos potato chips packaging featuring Toy Story 
characters,230 a soundtrack by Randy Newman, and an animated storybook on CD-
ROM.  
Another promotional text appeared the night before Toy Story’s theatrical 
release, when the Disney Channel aired a half-hour documentary entitled, To 
Infinity and Beyond: The Making of “Toy Story”. In a brief review, Matt Roush of 
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USA Today noted that the programme was ‘intermittently interesting’ and showed 
several clips that were ‘a gas’, but criticised its ‘baldly promotional’ stance and the 
‘fawning narration’.231 This is the only review for this particular Toy Story 
promotion, but Roush’s comments touch on a wider concern, with many observers 
criticising the campaign as a whole for its excessiveness. Liam Lacey of the Globe 
and Mail even described the film itself as ‘a great infomercial for a host of 
manufacturers and toys’,232 while Steven Rea’s otherwise highly positive review in 
the Philadelphia Inquirer is worth quoting at length: 
 
Inevitably, given that a lot of its cast comes affixed with trademark logos 
(Etch-a-Sketch, Magic 8-Ball and Barrel of Monkeys are all put to good use), 
Toy Story is saddled with a certain commercialism. But the writers play off 
of this to winning effect [e.g. the ‘leveraged buyout’ gag], leaving Disney’s 
mega-promotional blitz outside the theater door. But not far outside. With 
Woody and Buzz Lightyear figures already stocked on toy market aisles, and 
Burger King promising Toy Story figures through the holidays, this 
ingenious movie experience is in risk of being tainted by tie-ins, product 
pitches and cross-merchandising schemes.233 
 
 This was a sentiment that was echoed by several other reviewers, who 
struggled to consolidate the movie’s fetishisation of toys with the ubiquity of its 
marketing campaign. Interestingly, however, the pattern that emerged most often 
from such statements was one of forgiveness in the face of perceived quality. Janet 
Maslin of the New York Times for instance speculates that, ‘maybe no one will even 
mind what is bound to be a mind-boggling marketing blitz. After all, the toy tie-ins 
are to old friends.’234 David Steritt agrees, arguing in the Christian Science Monitor 
that, ‘with its many eye-catching shots of consumer products, the picture starts off 

231 Matt Roush, ‘Critic’s Corner’, USA Today, 21st November 1995, p.10D 
232 Liam Lacey, ‘Film Review: “Toy Story”’, The Globe and Mail, 24th November. Retrieved via Nexis 
UK.  
233 Steven Rea, ‘An adventure in animation that’s dazzling’, Philadephia Inquirer, 22nd November 
1995, p.C1. 
234 Janet Maslin, ‘There’s a new toy in the house. Uh-oh’, New York Times, 22nd November 1995, 
p.C9. 
86 
more like a promotional ploy than a kid-friendly entertainment. Happily, the plot 
and dialogue turn out to be hilarious, making this the most enjoyable picture of its 
kind in a very long while.’235 Steve Persall speaks in extremely similar terms, 
describing Toy Story as ‘one of those rare films to be appreciated by adults and 
children, [which] justifies all those burger-joint promotions and Christmas-gift 
products now hitting the shelves.’236 All three of these examples are essentially 
making the same argument: saturated multimedia promotion can be forgiven, 
providing the film in question is sufficiently entertaining and/or nostalgic.237 
Appropriately enough, there are arguably no better examples of promotional texts 
that so regularly satisfy these final criteria as the objects at the centre of Toy Story’s 
narrative: toys.  
Official Toy Story merchandise unquestionably existed for primarily 
commercial reasons, having been created, commissioned or licensed by Disney in 
order to provide consumers with multiple ways of buying into the movie. As Henry 
Jenkins argues, however, our consumption of transmedia extensions cannot simply 
be reduced to the buying and selling of cultural commodities. Writing in relation to 
children playing with He-Man action figures, he writes: 
 
Whether they fully recognised it or not, when media producers sold these 
toys to our children, they also told them things about the nature of the story 
– the story you saw on the screen was not complete and self contained; 
these characters had a life beyond the stories we’ve been sold and told, and 
what happens next is literally and figuratively in the hands of the 
consumer.238 
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Jenkins thus sees licensed merchandise as an invitation for consumers to 
extend the narrative of a particular product or service beyond its established 
parameters.239 Toy Story itself begins with Andy playing out a bank robbery/heroic 
rescue scenario with his toys. His disregard for certain ‘established’ narrative, 
generic and character tropes is presented fondly, as he happily switches between 
accents to voice different characters, combining iconography from the western 
genre (saloons; banks; the lone hero battling an outlaw) with both futuristic and 
fantastical elements (forcefields; dinosaurs; talking animals) to create his own playful 
narrative experience. His disavowal of brands and willingness to combine different 
categories of toy (hand-me-down cowboy doll; porcelain Bo Peep ornament; remote 
control cars) is particularly illuminating. It is a scene that would be familiar to many 
children, as well as functioning nostalgically for anyone in the audience whose 
childhood was less recent. My own response to the scene is still vivid in my mind, as 
Andy’s play instantly chimed with my experience of combining toys from Star Wars 
(George Lucas, 1977), He-Man and the Masters of the Universe (Syndicated, 1983-
5) and Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles (Syndicated, 1987-89; CBS, 1990-96) with 
Lego, Matchbox cars, and WWF wrestling action figures.240 As Jenkins goes on to 
describe the significance of such play, 
 
Sometimes an action figure would stand in for another character not yet 
acquired much as an actor plays a fictional role, and in other cases the 
pleasure was in experimenting with the boundaries between texts and 
genres, with the mixing of characters forcing them to rethink the scripts. 
The cross-over points to the generative dimensions of this action figure play 
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– the ways that kids would move from re-performing favourite stories or 
ritualising conventional elements from the series to breaking with 
conventions and creating their own narratives.241 
 
 It is this potential for playfulness and creativity that I am particularly 
interested in in relation to Pixar. Toy Story ushered in a period of change in terms 
of the way that the studio was talked about by critics, but it also marks a moment in 
time when the nature of consumers’ relationship with the brand was changing in 
other, more fundamental ways. The fact that the movie was accompanied by such 
an extensive marketing campaign meant that American popular culture was littered 
with products bearing its name and/or featuring its characters. Pixar’s consumers in 
the 1980s were not only far smaller in number, but were limited in the range of 
possible interactions with the brand. Toy Story, however, could be watched (the 
film itself), worn (shoes; clothing), played with (toys), eaten (potato chips; candy), 
listened to (soundtrack), explored (CD-ROM), and in one example, which I will 
return to shortly, it could even be visited. Building on the work of Gary Fleming, 
Jonathan Gray points out that licensed toys should not be seen as mere extensions of 
narratives from other media, but as spaces ‘in which meanings can be worked 
through and refined’.242  
The idea of narrative and intertextual play sits particularly comfortably in a 
discussion of licensed action figures or dolls; their physicality emphasises a 
distinction from the stories they originated from, and few guidelines (if any) are 
provided for how they should be played with. It is far less common to see such 
arguments being applied to other products or epiphenomena, as trailers, posters, 
and soundtracks for instance do not typically exhibit obvious scope for the re-
purposing of meaning. Yet even these examples are products that cannot be 
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consumed in isolation; trailers and posters for different films will often cluster 
together, branded clothing will likely be worn in very particular contexts and/or 
alongside other brands, and other licensed products such as soundtracks or food 
packaging might be consumed alongside other, very different acts of consumption. 
Rather than the products themselves inherently lending themselves to intertextual 
play, then, we need to reconsider paratexts in relation to the context in which they are 
consumed. For Pixar, my point here is that Toy Story represents a moment in time 
when the studio brand became consumable in new and increasingly intertextual 
contexts, one that was becoming progressively associated with storytelling and 
storyworlds.  
One of the most intriguing examples of this, and indeed of Toy Story’s 
promotion as a whole, was the construction of an ‘instant amusement park’ in Los 
Angeles – ‘a three-story, 30,000-square-foot Toy Story Funhouse’ situated in the 
Masonic Convention Hall, next to Hollywood’s El Capitan theatre.243 Unlike the 
Toy Story attractions and promotion that took place in Disney World, this venture 
was designed specifically for cinema patrons, who would pay $15 (children), $20 
(adults) or $30 (VIPs, meaning ‘reserved seats and complimentary popcorn and soda 
pop brought to you’) for a combined cinema and amusement park ticket. Timothy 
Gray’s detailed description of the park is worth quoting at length: 
 
For five or six shows each day, the 81-minute movie will end, 1,000 
audience members will exit onto Hollywood Boulevard and, ignoring the 
derelicts rummaging through trash cans, will march a few steps to the 
Masonic for two hours o’ fun. They can play in seven areas: 
 
- Green Army Men's Room: No, not a men’s room, but an obstacle course, 
featuring sound effects in the floor (big “Ta-da!” fanfares if you successfully 
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swing on a rope over a “river,” bleats if you fall from the hand-to-hand 
monkey bars.) 
 
- Woody’s Roundup: A band, deejay and three casts of four to six Western 
line dancers. 
 
- Mr. Potato Head’s Playroom: Guests can play with crayons and Etch-a-
Sketches (giving journalists who were bleated in the Green Men’s Room a 
chance to save face by staying within the lines as they color). 
 
- Buzz Lightyear’s Galaxy: Interactive Flight Simulator, Whack-a-Alien, 
Intergalactic Lazer-Tron, and a 16-minute stage show featuring Buzz & the 
Buzz Lites dancing to such tunes as “Fly Me to the Moon.” 
 
- Pizza Planet: A basement restaurant with chartreuse and purple walls, 
where visitors eat pizza, hot dogs and Alien Slime. 
 
- Totally Interactive Room: Patrons sit inside a giant toy box and play the 
Toy Story videogame. 
 
- Hamm’s Theater: 300-seat venue for the 20-minute “Hamm’s All Doll 
Revue,” with three [performances] every two-hour shift. 
 
After two hours, loudspeakers play the Funhouse theme song and the 
“entertainment and operational personnel” will begin singing and gently 
usher out the visitors. 
 
Disney marketing and distribution executive Richard Cook said at the time 
that the creation of such a place ‘wasn’t about merchandising; it was about the 
movie’, with Variety conceding that ‘there is, in fact, very little merchandising 
here’.244 This is an incredible claim from Cook, given how elaborate this was as a 
piece of promotion, but the fact that Gray agreed with him reveals something about 
how we think of merchandising in relation to film and television. When he writes 
that there is ‘very little’ of it on display inside the attraction, actually what he means 
is that there is little attempt to sell toys or other branded products to those who 
visit. Merchandising, then, is more a question of physical products or tangible 
consumption (e.g. DVD sales), as opposed to the promotion of ideas and 
experiences. By selling the opportunity to temporarily inhabit the world of Toy 
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Story, the Funhouse allows audiences to extend the film’s textual boundaries, and 
blurs the boundaries between the on-screen diegesis and the real world. Patrons are 
encouraged to physically interact with and even become the characters (e.g. the 
flight simulator, or sitting inside the giant toy box), and with most of the activities 
designed around acts of play, usual distinctions between adult and child behaviour 
are dissolved.  
This comes very close to Adam Arvidsson’s description of Nintendo’s 
strategy for extending its content brands: ‘links between these objects created an 
ambience within which kids were free to produce the particular “finishing touch” 
that adapted the product to their life-world – by using the objects provided or 
enacting some of the narrative content of the ambience, in play for example.’245 
Certainly, this appears to be what the Funhouse is striving towards, selling Toy 
Story as not just a film, but a space within which one can celebrate the limitless 
creative potential of childhood, regardless of one’s age.246  
 What this section has aimed to highlight is the way in which Toy Story 
functioned as a series of texts beyond the film itself, and how this meant that the 
Pixar brand was at that time transitioning towards a more fluid, intertextual identity 
associated with storytelling and storyworlds. As Steven Rea wrote, its promotional 
campaign remained ‘outside the theatre door. But not far outside’.247 The idea of 
remaining ‘not far outside’ the film, however, is noteworthy in the sense that it 
alludes to proprietors attempts to structure or influence consumers’ participation, 
interaction and creativity. The animated storybook CD-ROM, for example, allowed 
users to navigate the Andy’s bedroom or engage in a prolonged, light-hearted 
altercation between Woody and Buzz in the Dinoco gas station forecourt, yet there 
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was no scope to do anything that the software producers hadn’t designed as an 
‘interactive’ feature.248  
Perhaps, then, studies of transmedia texts should place more emphasis on 
intertextuality and consumption contexts, considering the potential discord between 
the design or structure of a particular narrative, and the ways in which this can 
potentially be disregarded or combined with other narratives. Jenkins’ oft-cited 
definition of a ‘story [that] unfolds across multiple media platforms, with each new 
text making a distinctive and valuable contribution to the whole’,249 as well as his 
references to an ‘ideal form’ of transmedia storytelling, implies that transmedia is 
always a consciously thought-out strategy, albeit one that does not always succeed in 
enriching the narrative. However, by focusing attention on the relationship between 
brands and intertextuality, via reception studies or audience research, for instance, 
we may well uncover revealing links about the way that brands operate in relation to 
other texts. 
 
Conclusion 
In a Salt Lake Tribune article in June 2010, Toy Story 3 director Lee 
Unkrich was asked by journalist Sean Means about the responsibility involved in 
directing the third installment in a much-celebrated franchise. He responded that, ‘it 
wasn’t like I was some outsider who was asked to do this. It was more like I was 
already the cast of the play, and then one night I was told, “Oh, we need you to play 
the lead tonight.” “Toy Story” and the characters of “Toy Story” are very much in 
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my DNA.’250 Toy Story is also a part of Pixar’s DNA, both as a film and as a 
moment in time, in many ways epitomising the values that the brand has since come 
to represent. In this chapter, however, I have demonstrated that this sense of 
identity was very clearly in a state of transition in 1995. As Mark Jancovich has 
argued, ‘the original understandings of a text are no more or less “real” than those 
of later periods. But there is a problem when the critics of a later period present 
their own interpretations as being inevitably present within earlier contexts of 
reception.’251 Similarly, as tempting as it is to look back at Toy Story as a genesis 
moment in Pixar’s history, it is important to recognise the confusion and fluidity 
that still surrounded the studio in 1995.  
Authorship was especially difficult to discern, with Pixar receiving a 
disproportionately small amount of critical praise for the film. Methodologically, 
this presents the brand historian with a problem, in that the product that the studio 
was most associated with (Toy Story) was discussed as though someone else (i.e. 
Disney) had made it. Nevertheless, one can observe traces of a coherent 
consumable identity forming at this time,252 even if they are in many cases clouded 
by confusion or downplayed.253 While contemporary criticism for the most part 
neglected to recognise Pixar’s contributions, it is important that the film itself was 
so well regarded, as its authorship was later reapportioned to the studio. In a 
reputational sense, then, it was Toy Story that made Pixar, and not the other way 
around. 
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This brings us back to Arvidsson’s conception of brands as ‘informational 
capital’, and in particular his argument that ‘“content brands” that can travel 
between and provide a context for the consumption of a number of goods or media 
products.’254 This would certainly account for the lack of coherence that surrounded 
Pixar before committing to filmmaking, and even after the release of Toy Story. If 
brands provide context for consumption of a wide range of products and services, 
then perhaps we should see them as informational organising structures. My own 
experience of watching the Toy Story parade at Disney World effectively mirrored 
that of the critics who reviewed it, filtering its meanings and characters through 
Disney stories and institutions, and therefore inferring an authorship that did not 
actually exist.255 To me, Buzz Lightyear and Sheriff Woody appeared to be just as 
much a part of Disney’s roster of characters and narratives as Mickey Mouse and 
Goofy, thus altering my initial perceptions and expectations. 
1995 represents a moment when what did exist of the Pixar brand did so in 
relation to an enormous range of other brands. This is of course true of virtually 
every marketplace, but the palimpsesting of reputations involved in Toy Story’s 
marketing campaign was an important moment for Pixar, which had hitherto 
maintained a reasonable degree of control over its own reputation.256 The company 
had already established something of a reputation for quality, but it was not until it 
released a major Hollywood movie that any external observers seemed able to talk 
about its goals and operations with much certainty. Pixar may have been somewhat 
dwarfed by the Disney brand when Toy Story came out, but the fact that it was seen 
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as a distinct entity eventually turned out to be somewhat fortuitous. Over the 
coming years, this sense of difference really began to be emphasised, as the two 
studios were discursively set against each other.  
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 CHAPTER THREE 
-A Mouse Divided- 
Disney, Pixar, and the reception of industrial conflict 
 
In January 2006, the Walt Disney Company announced that a $7.4 billion 
deal had been agreed for the purchase of Pixar Animation Studios.257 Months of 
speculation leading up to that point meant that the deal itself did not come as a 
surprise, but the ways in which the media reacted to it tells us a great deal about 
how far the Pixar brand had evolved over the preceding decade. Observers generally 
responded positively to the news, quoting the views of analysts who deemed it ‘a 
smart strategic move’ for Disney, 258  one that would surely create a ‘potential 
powerhouse’,259 and ‘an arsenal of quality for audiences.’260 It is curious however 
that amidst the numerous articles to have come out of the announcement, this 
positivity was not grounded in a discussion of mutual benefits for the two studios, 
or for audiences. Instead, what one observes when looking at the media reaction to 
the Disney-Pixar deal is an overwhelming sense that Disney animation had suffered 
in preceding years; it needed a saviour.  
The years leading up to the deal had seen the two studios embroiled in a 
series of disputes over their collaborative dealings, including the renegotiation of 
their production/distribution pact after Toy Story’s success in 1995, contested 
views on the status of sequels like Toy Story 2 (John Lasseter, 1999), and the 
breakdown of further contractual negotiations in 2004. The situation gradually 
worsened to the point that Pixar announced that the relationship between the 
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studios was beyond repair, and it would soon be looking for a new business partner. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the build up and reaction to the release of Toy Story 
largely talked about it in terms of being the latest Disney film. For Pixar’s status to 
develop within popular media discourses from Disney’s bit player to its saviour 
incarnate in the space of ten years is quite incredible, and indeed one of the aims of 
this thesis as a whole is to map some of the ways in which this has played out.  
In this chapter, I trace the evolution of the abovementioned industrial 
conflict by focusing in detail on several key moments of tension between the 
studios, and in particular on the ways in which these moments can highlight both 
parties’ shifting reputations. I argue that the Pixar brand was strengthened and even 
shaped by the ways in which these tensions with Disney played out in the media. 
This leads to a discussion of oppositional brand loyalty – the notion that a brand 
can come to be defined through being (discursively) positioned against its 
competitor(s). The figure of Michael Eisner is particularly central to many of these 
debates, since it was he who was Chief Executive of Disney throughout much of 
this time, and eventually became the scapegoat for everything that was going wrong 
at the conglomerate. His ‘micro-management’ and acerbic personality were 
frequently set against the calmer and more creative figure of Steve Jobs,261 and the 
more forward-thinking Robert Iger, who succeeded Eisner as Disney CEO. 
Although this chapter is primarily focused on representations of industrial 
conflict, I will begin with an overview of some of the earlier moments in the 
relationship between Disney and Pixar, those that took place before any (public) 
conflict arose. While such instances do not hint at underlying tension, through these 

261 As one publication described the conflict as a whole; ‘the corporate drama that pitted Jobs against 
Eisner.’ Richard Morgan, ‘Return to Mouse House’, The Deal, 30th January 2006. 
98 
discourses one can observe the development of associations and descriptive 
language that would become more pronounced once tensions did arise.   
 
Stock Characters: Steve Jobs and Pixar’s IPO 
The initial partnership between Disney and Pixar to produce a computer-
animated feature film (i.e. Toy Story) was announced on 12th July 1991, and despite 
failing to register with the majority of the media, the news did receive some 
coverage in a handful of high-circulation publications. Rhonda Rundle of the Wall 
Street Journal wrote just one sentence, describing Pixar as a ‘small computer 
animation venture funded by computer guru Steven P Jobs’, and noting that the 
film would be the ‘first full-length animated feature to bear Disney’s banner without 
being created at [the] studio.’262 The New York Times provided slightly more detail, 
and lauded Pixar for being ‘among the leaders in computer animation.’263 Clearly 
these descriptions of Pixar as both a ‘small’ venture and being ‘among the leaders’ in 
its field are slightly at odds with each other, and the Hollywood Reporter’s 
descriptions remained somewhere in the middle. To them, Pixar was merely ‘the 
company founded by Apple wunderkind Steven Jobs’, and a ‘Northern California-
based company’ – the publication’s choice of words notable mainly for their lack of 
expressiveness.264  To some extent, this ambivalence was characteristic of Pixar’s 
media reputation prior to the company gravitated towards filmmaking (see Chapter 
1), but some consistency can still be observed. 
The Hollywood Reporter and New York Times both combined their 
descriptions with a quotation from Steve Jobs, who stated, ‘Working with Disney to 
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make the first full-length computer-animated film has been a dream of ours since 
we founded the company in 1986.’ 265  While only described as ‘small’ in one 
publication then, the neutral and positive descriptions of Pixar were tempered by 
their juxtaposition with talk of a long-standing ‘dream’ to work with Disney. Jobs 
adds that ‘our dream is now realised and we couldn’t be more excited’,266 implicitly 
positioning Pixar as aspiring to the achievements of Disney – a minnow looking up 
to (and finally getting to work alongside) its hero. The disparity in size and stature 
between the two companies may seem a superfluous point in and of itself, since 
most companies would of course appear ‘small’ in comparison to Disney. What is 
important here however is the fact that Pixar were consistently talked about in 
relation to Disney from as early as 1991, but often using language and qualifiers that 
ensured they were viewed as a distinct entity – perpetually tied to but always 
different from their corporate cousins.  
Released in North American cinemas on 22nd November 1995, Toy Story 
opened to impressive box office takings and a hugely positive critical reception. 
Journalists across the continent were quick to point out that the film succeeded not 
only because of its use of computer animation, but because they saw it as a funny, 
heartfelt and otherwise entertaining piece of filmmaking that would please 
audiences of all ages. I do not wish to repeat my arguments from the previous 
chapter, but for the purposes of my argument here, I will now turn to the reception 
of one specific incident that occurred in the wake of Toy Story’s release: Pixar 
offering its stock to be sold to the public in November 1995. 
While there are a number of reasons why a company may choose to float its 
shares on the stock exchange, initial public offerings (IPOs) chiefly function to raise 
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capital, often with a view to expansion. Crucially for Pixar, though, the move also 
provided the company with an increase in media recognition. As David Price notes, 
Steve Jobs was reportedly unhappy that many consumers believed Toy Story to 
have been a Disney film, and thus saw the IPO as an opportunity to raise the 
studio’s profile as well as funds.267 The media responses to the flotation certainly 
suggest that Jobs succeeded in both respects, as the soaring share price made him a 
billionaire overnight, and the majority of articles reacted extremely enthusiastically 
to the news.  
The Dallas Morning News was particularly positive, describing Pixar as ‘a 
pioneer in an untested industry’, ‘the next Apple’, and declaring that ‘the hottest 
company in the movie business [has become] one of the year’s hottest new public 
companies.’268 This metaphor of heat was surprisingly widespread, with at least four 
additional publications adopting some variation in their own reporting of the story. 
USA Today called Pixar’s stock ‘the latest hot new issue’,269 while the The Wall 
Street Journal said it was ‘looking hot’.270 Interestingly, this was not a success story 
that involved only Pixar, with the Washington Post linking the company’s soaring 
share price to a series of other recently successful IPOs by technology companies, 
representing ‘the latest in a string of hot stock offerings’.271 One analyst in the 
Financial Post agreed, hyperbolically stating that ‘some of these IPOs are hot as the 
hinges from hell.’ Whether or not observers chose to see Pixar as an exception or as 
an important part in an emerging trend, it is clear that the reaction to its stock 
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offering immediately marked Toy Story’s producers as new, exciting, and worth 
attaching oneself to.  
Even those who described the studio’s stock as potentially ‘risky’ appeared 
simultaneously eager to note the potential money that was to be made on the back 
of its success. Central to this idea was the figure of Steve Jobs, whose swift financial 
gains became arguably the biggest sub-story of Pixar’s successful flotation, with the 
USA Today for instance labelling him as ‘the biggest winner’ of the deal.272 Certainly 
there were few reports that neglected to mention Jobs’ personal windfall, with 
Variety putting it into perspective by pointing out that he had earned ‘more than 
$1.3 billion in paper profits … for what is only a part-time job for him.’273 In a 
somewhat sycophantic piece in the New York Times, John Markoff wrote that Jobs 
had ‘struck gold,’ ‘re-emerged as a captain of industry,’ and that his ‘financial success 
… was well deserved, since he held onto his Pixar investment through a difficult 
decade.’274 The notion of Jobs as a model of tenacity is one that has continually been 
taken up by various writers, often encapsulated by a phrase such as ‘comeback’. 
Kevin Maney for example calls his story ‘one of the most remarkable comebacks in 
business,’275 and the subtitle to Jeffrey Young and William Simon’s biography of 
Jobs labels him ‘the greatest second act in the history of business.’ 276  While 
undoubtedly incredibly wealthy and powerful then, Jobs’ reputation is nonetheless 
bound up in notions of having earned his success through determination and hard 
work, overcoming significant obstacles along the way.277  
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Significantly, and perhaps surprisingly, this financial success was in contrast 
to the fortunes of Pixar. Despite its share offering and the box office figures and 
reviews that indicated Toy Story had been a huge hit, several articles reporting on 
the IPO qualified their enthusiasm by pointing out that Pixar would not actually 
procure any significant revenue from the film. Crucially in relation to my argument 
in this chapter, this was not only written about as being implicitly unjust, but Disney 
was frequently cited as the explanation for it. Variety noted that even if its future 
films were ‘extraordinary box office successes, Pixar’s compensation would be very 
small compared with that of Disney,’ and there was every possibility that the current 
arrangement would bring them no significant revenue at all.278 A separate article the 
following day reiterated that ‘Pixar’s compensation would be very small compared 
with that of Disney,’279 with the Washington Post adding that, as well as Disney 
‘picking up the lion’s share of the profits,’ the conglomerate was also moving 
‘aggressively’ to introduce computer animation to its own studios. 280  Other 
examples wrote that Pixar had ‘struggled to pay its bills in the late-1980s,’281 had 
‘lost money in each of the last five years,’282 and that ‘Disney will end up making 
money, and Pixar will just be a provider for them.’ 283  Amidst the enthusiastic 
discussion of Pixar and its IPO, then, across several major publications, there is a 
clearly observable opposition being set up between the two studios. Disney is 
effectively presented as a threat to Pixar’s present and future capacity to make 
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money, and by extension to survive as a business. While at first glance there may 
also appear to be a disparity between Steve Jobs’ newly-inflated wealth and Pixar’s 
financial uncertainties, both parties were linked through being depicted as 
underdogs who everybody wanted to succeed. 
In chapter one I argued that Pixar’s early reputation relied partly upon 
association with Steve Jobs (and George Lucas before him), but this branding by 
proxy began to work in both directions once Pixar became successful in its own 
right. Earlier on in their relationship, Pixar was a relatively unknown brand name 
and Jobs was riding on the coattails of his previous success with Apple – a man 
whose reputation was more valuable than any company he had recently controlled. 
Having struggled to make any significant impact with NeXT, the computer 
company he started after being fired from Apple 1985, it wasn’t until the release of 
Toy Story ten years later and Pixar’s subsequent IPO that either party really looked 
to have achieved its goals. The reputations that emerged from that moment ended 
up exceeding the sum of its parts, with Pixar’s underdog status cemented by 
association with Steve ‘comeback billionaire’ Jobs, whose own reputation was 
enhanced by association with the ‘hottest’ new prospect in Hollywood, Silicon 
Valley, and on the New York Stock Exchange. Variety reported that ‘investors fell 
over themselves in their rush to buy stock,’ implicitly pointing towards a degree of 
exclusivity about the deal.284 Pixar were thus being discursively positioned as an 
exciting trend that needed to be followed. Jobs himself said at the time that he 
‘bought into their dream, both spiritually and financially,’285 and as time went on it 
became increasingly apparent that the media were doing the same thing. 
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Snake Eisner: Disney and Pixar’s shifting reputations 
The success of Toy Story and the studio’s subsequent IPO gave Pixar 
enough leverage to renegotiate the terms of their production pact with Disney, 
becoming co-financiers of each film and dividing the profits equally between them. 
In an official statement following the confirmation of the new arrangement, Steve 
Jobs wrote clearly about how it related to Pixar’s ambitions. 
 
We believe there are only two significant brands in the film industry – 
‘Disney’ and ‘Steven Spielberg.’ We would like to establish ‘Pixar’ as the 
third. Successful brands are a reflection of consumer trust, which is earned 
over time by consumers’ positive experiences with the brand’s products. For 
example, parents trust Disney-branded animated films to provide satisfying 
and appropriate family entertainment, based on Disney’s undisputed track 
record of making wonderful animated films. This trust benefits both parents 
and Disney: it makes the selection of family entertainment that much easier 
for parents, and it allows Disney to more easily and assuredly draw 
audiences to see their new films. Over time we want Pixar to grow into a 
brand that embodies the same level of trust as the Disney brand. But in 
order for Pixar to earn this trust, consumers must first know that Pixar is 
creating the films.286 
 
 What Jobs appears to be most concerned with here is recognition of 
authorship, and the significance of this recognition to the building of a successful 
brand. In a sense this is rather peculiar, given that he also explicitly draws 
comparisons between Pixar, Disney, and Steven Spielberg, thereby calling for both 
recognition (distinction) and association (similarities) with other companies. Having 
only released one feature film up to this point however, Jobs moved swiftly to 
introduce the idea of Pixar being a potential equal of Disney’s. Toy Story had of 
course received considerable praise for its ‘dual appeal’ – the ability to entertain 
both children and adults at the same time.287 Even in these early stages of brand 
development then, the idea that Pixar could be the ‘next Disney’ would have 
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seemed vaguely plausible at that time, and would become increasingly likely as the 
studio continued to produce hit after hit, confirming their ability to live up to their 
own high standards. 
 The enormous success of Finding Nemo (Andrew Stanton, 2003) at the 
worldwide box office and on DVD meant that by early 2004, Pixar’s reputation for 
producing quality family entertainment had risen to the point where they were 
arguably more trusted than Disney, at least in the eyes of the media. When Steve Jobs 
announced on 29th January 2004 that he would be looking to rival studios to 
distribute their films from then on, observers seemed more troubled about the 
future of Disney than Pixar. Variety wrote of ‘investor jitters,’ 288  stressed the 
importance of the corporation finding ‘another smart animation partner,’ 289  and 
quoted the thoughts of former executive Roy Disney, who predicted that an end to 
the relationship with Pixar ‘would prove harmful to Disney.’ 290  The New York 
Times was similarly anxious about the studio’s post-Pixar future, with Laura Holson 
writing that Disney ‘now must prove that it can remain a powerhouse in animation 
on its own,’ and that it would be facing two ‘formidable foes’ in Pixar and 
Dreamworks SKG.291 The prevailing opinion among the American media was that 
while neither party stood to come out of the disagreement in a better position than 
they previously were in, it was Disney that would really struggle to cope.  
Jobs’ decision to look for alternative partners appears to have stemmed 
from a prolonged period of disagreement between the studios. Conversations over 
the handling of sequels and character rights proved to be on-going flashpoints, but 
in the media, one of the primary ways in which this industrial feud had played out 
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was as a clash between Jobs and Michael Eisner. In his biography of Jobs, Walter 
Isaacson describes both men as ‘strong-willed’ and reluctant to compromise, 
personalities that exaggerated other tensions that emerged between them. 292  In 
February 2002, for example, Eisner publicly accused Apple’s iTunes campaign, ‘Rip. 
Burn. Mix’, of promoting theft, misunderstanding the meaning of ‘rip’ in this 
context, and severely angering Jobs in the process.293 Their feuding had played out 
in increasingly public (i.e. media) spaces from the summer of 2002 onwards, with 
Eisner invariably being presented as the least reasonable, the more antagonistic, and 
the most ‘corporate’ in a pejorative sense. In hindsight, it likely that these 
disagreements resulted from their incompatibly similar attitude towards other 
people, although there does seem to have been a curious relationship between their 
reputation and that of the company they represented within these discourses. 
Certainly, this dispute between Disney and Pixar made more sense to the press as a 
dispute between individuals, not companies, but both Eisner and Jobs came to be 
seen as embodiments of their respective companies.294 It seems important, however, 
that unlike Eisner and Disney, Jobs’ pre-existing reputation had created a degree of 
separation between brand and CEO. Thus, despite functioning as the embodiment 
or representative figurehead of Pixar at this time, the layering of reputations here 
allowed for association but with limited contamination; negative qualities, such as 
Jobs’ anger and refusal to learn from Disney, came across as an individual 
personality trait, while his commitment to quality and attention to detail were able 
to be positively linked to Pixar. This of course ties in strongly with the layering of 
reputations discussed in the previous chapter. However, the rather more selective 
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relationship between corporate and individual reputation here is indicative of the 
sense of certainty and consistency that the Pixar brand had acquired in the 
intervening years. 
 Eisner’s status had not been helped by the very public exit of studio 
chairman Roy Disney just a few months earlier, along with fellow board member 
Stanley Gold. Steve Jobs was hardly known for his willingness to compromise, but 
the media’s attitude towards Eisner was consistently worse, writing about him in 
terms that tended to tread a line between contempt and pity. Gold alleged that 
Eisner treated Pixar as ‘second-class citizens,’ while others compared his 
relationship with Jobs as ‘paternalistic’ rather than a partnership.295 The Gazette 
went on to note that as well as initially resisting the theatrical release of Toy Story 2 
(John Lasseter, 1999), Eisner had predicted that Finding Nemo would serve as 
something of a ‘reality check’ for Pixar, a prediction that was spectacularly proven 
wrong when the film was eventually released.296 Of course, those sentiments were 
never intended to be made public, having originated from a private email from 
Eisner to the rest of the Disney board, which was in turn leaked to the press. Over 
time, as incidents such as this combined with the respective studios’ output, the 
image of Eisner that built up in the media was as a bitter, deluded man in control of 
a company that had lost touch with the values it once held dear.297 Not only had he 
overseen a severe slump in the quality of Disney’s output across multiple forms of 
media, Eisner was also guilty of not giving Pixar his full support. The fact that he 
doubted them twice only to be proven wrong twice only enhances the respective 
reputations of the two parties. Add to this the assertion that Eisner publically 
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bragged about the leverage he had over Pixar, and the image of the man that one is 
left with is far from positive. 
 When Roy Disney left Disney in late-November 2003, he arranged to have 
his letter of resignation hand-delivered to Michael Eisner as it was simultaneously 
being faxed to the national media. 298  In it, he cited several reasons for his 
resignation, essentially comprising a list of the numerous failures Eisner had either 
overseen or been directly responsible for since the mid-1990s. Among these alleged 
failures were: an inability to revive the ABC Family Channel; micromanagement 
leading to a decline in employee morale; timid investments; allowing a continued 
exodus of creative talent; and the failure to maintain relationships with partners 
such as Pixar and Miramax.299 In relation to the Disney brand however, there is one 
point on the list that stands out, which I quote here in full: ‘The perception by all of 
our stakeholders – consumers, investors, employees, distributors and suppliers – 
that the company is rapacious, soul-less, and always looking for the “quick buck” 
rather than the long-term value which is leading to a loss of public trust.’300 As 
defined by marketing and business analysts and scholars, it is the level of this ‘trust’ 
that is central to the strength of a brand, and a lack of trust equals a weak brand. 
Ratatouille (Brad Bird, 2007) appears to serve as an interesting example of  
the gulf  in Pixar and Disney’s respective brand strengths, since the kitchen at 
Gusteau’s restaurant was read by a number of  viewers as a metaphor for the 
relationship between Disney and Pixar. In this interpretation, Chef  Skinner stands 
in for the figure of  Michael Eisner, spoiling the legacy of  his predecessor 
(Gusteau/Walt Disney) by abandoning his philosophies and releasing a range of  

298 Price, p.233. 
299 Ibid, pp.233-4. 
300 Ibid.  
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poor quality products (frozen ready meals/straight-to-video sequels.301 As well as 
Roy Disney and Stanley Gold, former Disney employee Henry Caroselli publically 
declared his opposition to the studio’s business practices, arguing in his 2004 book 
Cult of  the Mouse that the studio was emblematic of  contemporary corporate 
greed.302 The departure of  Roy Disney served only to underline how far the studio 
had strayed from the industrial and creative practices associated with Walt Disney 
himself. They had, to put it another way, apparently forgotten how to be Disney. 
 
Conclusion 
What are the implications of this negative press for the Pixar brand and the 
critical consensus that has developed around the studio? And why should the 
representation of Disney have any significant impact on any other company or 
studio? I would argue that the answer rests with oppositional brand loyalty – the 
notion that ones attachment to a particular brand can be expressed as the rejection 
of or opposition to a competitor. As Albert Muniz and Lawrence Hamer have 
argued, such interactions serve to reinforce existing understandings of the brands in 
question, through the publically visible competition between rival brands.303 While 
academic work on marketing and brands has historically prioritised consumption in 

301 This was not a mainstream debate, but certainly there are a large number of  blog posts and online 
forum threads that entertain this idea. See, for example, Lucas R., ‘Ratatouille as a metaphorical 
history of  Disney and Pixar’, Journal of  Cartoon Overanalyzations, 11th May 2008 
<http://cartoonoveranalyzations.com/2008/05/11/ratatouille-as-a-metaphorical-history-of-disney-
and-pixar/>, Retrieved 20th March 2011; Mark-E, response to ‘Gustaue’s [sic]: A Disney Metaphor?’, 
Pixar Planet, 24th January 2009, 7.49am 
<http://www.pixarplanet.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=22&t=3239&start=30>, Retrieved 20th 
March 2011; Synian, ‘A Short History of  Pixar Through Ratatouille (2007)’, Reverie, 9th April 2013 
<http://synian.wordpress.com/2013/04/09/a-short-history-of-pixar-through-ratatouille/>, 
Retrieved 15th April 2013; Carol Platt Liebau, ‘Ratatouille: Art Imitates Life Imitates Business?’, 
CarolLiebau, 29th July 2007 <http://carolliebau.blogspot.co.uk/2007/07/ratatouille-art-imitates-life-
imitates.html>, Retrieved 15th April 2013. 
302 Henry M. Caroselli, Cult of the Mouse: Can we stop corporate greed from killing innovation in 
America? (Berkeley, California: Ten Speed Press, 2004). For a detailed historical account of the 
power struggle at Disney, see James B. Stewart, Disney War: The Battle for the Magic Kingdom 
(London: Pocket Books, 2006). 
303 Albert M. Muniz, Jr. and Lawrence O. Hamer, ‘Us versus Them: Oppositional brand loyalty and 
the Cola wars’, Advances in Consumer Research, 28 (2001), pp.355-61. 
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terms of ‘conversion rates’, this chapter has highlighted the extent to which the 
meaning of brands function in symbolic ways, and therefore outside of the context of 
consumption. 304  Observable across the American national press then, Disney’s 
increasingly negative publicity cemented the idea that Michael Eisner, and by 
extension the studio he was in control of, had become greedy and lost its creative 
edge. Pixar, on the other hand, had for several years worked closely enough to 
Disney to be associated with them, but was distinct enough for the two brands to 
remain separate.  
The coverage of the conflict and incongruities between the studios 
ultimately encouraged the emergence of a series of discourses that had been 
building for some time, and reinforced the Pixar brand in the eyes of the journalists. 
Although these differences were eventually resolved, the merging of the two 
companies initially did little to damage Pixar’s reputation, which for some years at 
least, managed to remain a distinct corporate auteur whose ownership was 
presented as being almost tangential.305  
 
 
 
 
 

304 Margaret Hogg has conducted some excellent work on this subject. See, for example, Margaret K. 
Hogg, Emma N. Banister and Christopher A. Stephenson, ‘Mapping symbolic (anti-) consumption’, 
Journal of Business Research, 62 (2009), pp.148-59; Margaret K. Hogg, ‘Anti-Constellations: 
Exploring the Impact of Negation on Consumption’, Journal of Marketing Management, 14 (1998), 
pp.133-58; Margaret K. Hogg, Emma N. Banister and Christopher A. Stephenson, ‘Mapping 
symbolic (anti-) consumption’, Journal of Business Research, 62 (2009), pp.148-59. 
305 The conclusion of  this thesis reflects on how this dynamic has shifted during the time that I have 
been researching and writing Pixar. As I write this in 2013, it does appear that the Disney brand has 
started to bleed into Pixar to some extent, something which did not seem likely after the success of  
Toy Story 3 in 2010. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
-Almost Pixarian- 
Genre, rivalry, and emerging discourses of quality 
 
 
Press reviews for any new film or television show will invariably seek to 
supplement their evaluative comments by providing some context to their subject. 
Often this will involve discussing its adherence to (or deviation from) genre 
conventions, or drawing comparisons to other texts with similar narratives, 
representations, or visual styles. In the autumn of 1998, however, two films were 
released in American cinemas that bore a particularly striking resemblance to each 
other. Released just seven weeks apart, DreamWorks SKG/Pacific Data Images’ 
Antz (Eric Darnell and Tim Johnson, 1998) and Disney/Pixar’s A Bug’s Life (John 
Lasseter, 1998) were both animated movies, both computer-generated, and both 
told stories of anthropomorphised ants who had become dissatisfied with their 
relationship to the rest of the colony.306 It was of little surprise, then, when critics 
drew comparisons between the two, using each in turn to pass judgement on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the other.  
In the New York Times for instance, Janet Maslin called them ‘uncannily 
similar,’307 while Todd McCarthy of Variety described A Bug’s Life as ‘the second 
good computer animated ant adventure in as many months.’308 McCarthy had 
praised Antz, but wrote that it ‘doesn’t possess the potential to live up to’ Toy 
Story, which at that point was still the only major computer-generated animation 
feature to have been released.309 A Bug’s Life was still several weeks away, but critics 

306 DreamWorks SKG is hereafter abbreviated to DreamWorks, and Pacific Data Images to PDI. 
307 Janet Maslin, ‘Out-of-step Ant Sails Out To Save The Hill’, New York Times, 25th November 
1998, p.E1. 
308 Todd McCarthy, ‘“Bug’s” Strives for Top of  Ant Hill’, Variety, 16-22nd November 1998, p.33. 
309 Todd McCarthy, ‘D’works Throws a CGI Picnic with “Antz”’, Variety, 21-27th September 1998, 
p.104. One other CG animated film had been released in the intervening period, but outside of  the 
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nevertheless sought to use it as a basis for comparison, writing that ‘Disney’s bugs 
look funnier, funkier and more traditionally cartoonish than the more authentically 
drawn arthropods of “Antz”’310 From the very beginning of DreamWorks’ 
involvement in animation, then, the studio’s reputation worked in tandem with the 
reputation(s) of Disney and Pixar. To what extent, then, is the reverse true? Is it 
possible to trace the shifting meaning(s) of the Pixar brand name by looking at its 
closest competitors? It is this relationship between competing studios that will form 
the basis of this chapter, as I seek to interrogate the generic discourses involved in 
the early years of CG animation.  
I begin by looking more closely at the critical responses to Antz and A Bug’s 
Life, examining the extent to which critics pitted the two films against each other, 
and what that rivalry was said to entail. Both films were the products of relatively 
unknown companies vying for a foothold in Hollywood. Despite the critical and 
commercial success of Toy Story three years earlier, Pixar’s reputation as an 
animation studio was still very much overshadowed by its more illustrious 
production partner, Disney. DreamWorks on the other hand had only existed since 
1994,311 and until the release of Antz, the studio had only ever been responsible for 
live action productions.312 PDI, who carried out the animation work, were even less 
well known.313 At what point did Pixar, to some extent buried under the weight of 
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United States: the Brazilian feature, Cassiopéia (Clóvis Vieira, 1996).  
310 Rita Kempley, ‘Thoracic Park: Spielberg’s Animated “Antz” is No Picnic’, Washington Post, 2nd 
October 1998, p.D1. 
311 For more on the history of  DreamWorks, see Nicole LaPorte, The Men Who Would Be King: An 
almost epic tale of  moguls, movies, and a company called DreamWorks (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, 2010). 
312 I am by no means suggesting that DreamWorks had not had any success up to that point. Among 
the studio’s releases prior to Antz were Deep Impact (Mimi Leder, 1998) and Saving Private Ryan 
(Steven Spielberg, 1998), the latter of  which was the highest grossing domestic release of  the year. 
See Anon., ‘1998 Domestic Grosses’, Box Office Mojo 
<http://boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?yr=1998&p=.htm>, Accessed 10th January 2011. 
313 For a historical account of  the various companies experimenting with computer graphics 
technology in the 1970s and 1980s, see Michael Rubin, Droidmaker: George Lucas and the digital 
revolution (Gainesville, FL: Triad Publishing Company, 2006). 
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critical debates surrounding Disney, emerge as a creative force in its own right? And 
how did we arrive at a time when Pixar is used as shorthand for the best that 
animation has to offer? The chapter aims to answer these questions by analysing 
reviews of rival studios’ films. I use the Shrek and Ice Age franchises as case studies, 
tracing the way in which the reputation of Hollywood animation has shifted. 
Ultimately I argue that the critical reception of these generic rivals informs, and is 
informed by, Pixar’s reputation. Critics consistently hold the latter studio up as a 
benchmark against which all other animation should be measured, and in doing so, 
draw distinctions between ‘mainstream’ and ‘quality’ animation.   
 
DreamWorks versus Disney?: Antz and A Bug’s Life 
Antz had originally been scheduled for a March 1999 release, but an 
announcement in June 1998 indicated that this was to be pushed forward by five 
months to 2nd October 1998. It would now beat A Bug’s Life to the box office. This 
came at a time when a number of national and regional newspapers were 
commenting on the proliferation of apparent film ‘pairings’. 1997 for example had 
seen the close release of two volcano/disaster movies – Dante’s Peak (Roger 
Donaldson, 1997) and Volcano (Mick Jackson, 1997) – and two films set in Tibet – 
Seven Years in Tibet (Jean-Jacques Annaud, 1997) and Kundun (Martin Scorsese, 
1997). These were followed by two asteroid-themed global disaster pictures in 1998 
– Deep Impact (Mimi Leder, 1998) and Armageddon (Michael Bay, 1998).314 As 
Konrad Yakabuski of the Globe and Mail noted, this was not an especially new 
phenomenon: ‘Hollywood studios, of course, have a long history of clambering 
onto the same bandwagon, which often results in copycat films. The track record 

314 The similarities in narrative between The Truman Show (Peter Weir, 1998) and EDtv (Ron 
Howard, 1999) led to the continuation of  this debate into 1999. Both featured protagonists that 
were, to varying degrees, the reluctant stars of  their own reality TV shows, battling for a life away 
from the cameras.  
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generally shows that the first of two similarly themed films to get released has the 
better chance of scoring big at the box office.’315 Marketing strategist Jack Trout 
agreed with this latter assertion, arguing that ‘It’s always the first one that captures 
the hearts, the souls and the eyeballs of the marketplace … unless there’s something 
dramatic or unique in the second one, which is rarely the case.’316 By bringing 
forward the release date of Antz, DreamWorks were therefore optimising their 
chances of a healthy box office performance, at least according to prevailing 
marketing wisdom. Some observers saw the move as being significant for a different 
reason, though.  
Elizabeth Snead and Susan Wloszczyna wrote in the USA Today that, ‘films 
with dueling themes often jockey for position because the first one out usually wins 
at the box office, but this film may have a rivalry behind it.’317 It is this idea of 
rivalry that will be explored in this chapter, as I seek to unpack some of the ways in 
which Pixar’s reputation and identity is demonstrably tied to the discourses 
surrounding other studios. Actually, the conflict being referred to in Snead and 
Wloszczyna’s example is the relationship between DreamWorks’ co-founder Jeffrey 
Katzenberg, and Disney, where he had previously been in charge of the animation 
unit. Katzenberg had overseen the resurgence in Disney animation that occurred 
between the late-1980s and mid-1990s, but was forced to resign in 1994 following a 
dispute with CEO Michael Eisner.318 As a result, the press were quick to describe 
DreamWorks’ animation output as a challenge to his former employers.  
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315 Konrad Yakabuski, ‘Truman Show has Quebec cousin SEEING DOUBLE’, Globe and Mail, 
22nd May 1998, Arts, p.C1. 
316 Quoted in Andy Seiler, ‘The sky’s falling! The sky’s falling! Dual Global Disasters Reflect Trend 
Of  Doubling Up On Film Ideas’, USA Today, 7th May 1998, Life, p.4D. 
317 Elizabeth Snead and Susan Wloszczya, ‘DreamWorks getting antsy with “Antz” date’, USA Today, 
25th June 1998, p.1D. 
318 For a comprehensive account of Katzenberg’s relationship with Eisner, see James B. Stewart, 
Disney War: The Battle for the Magic Kingdom (London: Pocket Books, 2006). 
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Sources say [Katzenberg] has shown near obsessive zeal in his bid to create 
the first true competition for Disney in animation. It’s no coincidence that 
DreamWorks’ third pic out of the gate will be “Mouse Hunt,” which could 
be taken as a not-so-veiled reference to his former bosses. For its part, 
Disney is expected to bring out its own heavy artillery with the opening of 
its second Disney/Pixar 3-D computer-animated project, “A Bug’s Life,” 
against “Prince of Egypt.” Both are slated for release sometime around 
Thanksgiving next year. “It would be like Disney to open it on the same day 
as Katzenberg’s film,” said one marketing chief at another studio. “There’s 
no love lost between the two.”319 
 
It is important to notice here that it is Prince of Egypt (Brenda Chapman, 
Steve Hickner and Simon Wells, 1998), not Antz, that was intially seen as the focal 
point for this alleged rivalry. It was a view corroborated by the New York Times, 
who wrote that Prince of Egypt ‘was viewed as a challenge to Disney’s hegemony in 
animation.’320 What this implies is that the distinctions that were drawn between 
Antz, A Bug’s Life and the studios behind them had as much to do with industrial 
conflict as with the individual merits of the films themselves. The similarities in 
subject matter made them an apt pairing, but the above evidence suggests that they 
would have been seen as rivals even if their narratives had differed wildly. They 
were matches in terms of genre, and therefore competing for the same audiences. 
In light of Antz’s schedule alteration, a spokesman for DreamWorks stated 
that ‘The movies are so different. [The timing of the release of] “Bug’s Life” was 
never really a consideration.’321 Yet this did not prevent the press from presenting 
the move as a brave statement of intent in this ongoing corporate dispute. An article 
in the Daily News of Los Angeles quoted one analyst who said, ‘I’m very impressed 
that DreamWorks has that much confidence and it shows that we’re entering a new 
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319 Dan Cox, ‘Dream Schemes: Pricey New Studio Ready to Roll Out Pix’, Daily Variety, 18th 
September 1997, p.1. Note that Prince of  Egypt would have been DreamWorks’ first animated 
feature film had the studio stuck to its original release schedule. After Antz was brought forward, 
Prince of  Egypt was pushed back, and was eventually released domestically in December 1998. 
320 Bernard Weinraub, ‘“Antz” Jumps The Gun On Disney’s “Bug’s Life”’, New York Times, 25th 
June 1998, p.E8. 
321 Andrew Hindes, ‘D’works Ups “Antz” launch’, 25th June 1998, Daily Variety, p.5. 
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golden age of animation with Disney and DreamWorks going toe-to-toe.’322 
Hindsight, however, tells us that this rivalry did not transpire as predicted, and 
eventually it was Pixar that became the animation yardstick that Disney had once 
been.  
 
A note on method 
Before surveying the attitudes of critics towards Pixar’s rivals, it is worth 
drawing attention to the methodological barriers that this focus presents us with. 
Firstly, defining who or what counts as a ‘rival’ or ‘competitor’ is not as 
straightforward as it might appear. Commercially speaking, Pixar is in direct 
competition for audiences with every major Hollywood studio. This includes parent 
company Disney, to whom they are ultimately accountable, despite retaining 
creative control over the production of their films. Should a chapter such as this 
therefore be looking at reviews of every major studio release since A Bug’s Life in 
1998? Doing so would involve collating and analysing reviews for so many disparate 
films that picking up on relevant patterns of discourse would prove difficult, and 
would leave little room for detailed qualitative analysis of contextual debates. What 
is needed is an approach that focuses on a manageable sample of films that are part 
of similar discourses to Pixar, allowing analysis in both a synchronic and a 
diachronic manner, so that the studios’ shifting reputations can be traced across time, 
as well as at specific moments in time.  
In talking about Pixar’s competition in this chapter, my working definition 
of ‘rival’ refers only to rival animation studios. This taxonomical decision is not 
without its problems. The cultural status of animation as both a genre and medium 
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322 Dave McNary, ‘Allen Deal May Make Investor DreamWorks’ Top Shareholder’, Daily News of  
Los Angeles, 9th July 1998. Retrieved via LexisNexis Academic, 10th January 2012. 
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means that labelling Pixar an animation studio, as opposed to a film (production) 
studio for example, implicitly situates its output within a very specific range of 
values and expectations. Jason Mittell has argued in relation to television, for 
instance, that animation has been stigmatised as children’s entertainment since the 
1960s.323 Moreover, this decision could at first glance be seen to undermine my 
argument in other chapters of this thesis, that Pixar has come to be recognised as 
‘more than’ an animation studio. Up (Pete Docter, 2009) and Toy Story 3 (Lee 
Unkrich, 2011) were after all included in the Academy Awards’ Best Picture 
category for their respective years, nominated alongside far more ‘traditional’ Oscar 
fare such as The Hurt Locker (Kathryn Bigelow, 2009) and The King’s Speech 
(Tom Hooper, 2010). To some extent, then, Pixar has managed to transcend its 
status as a ‘mere’ animation studio. Yet in order to trace the discourses involved in 
this cultural ascent, we must necessarily restrict our analysis to the reputations of 
other animation studios, providing us with a sense of what Pixar has been seen to 
move away from.  
Is it sensible to compare studios from different countries, or working in 
different forms of animation? After all, the definition of ‘animation’ could easily be 
adapted to encompass companies as diverse as the cel animation of Japan’s Studio 
Ghibli, the stop motion work produced by Aardman Animation in the UK, or the 
performance-capture work carried out at New Zealand-based Weta Digital. Such 
comparisons would undoubtedly be worthwhile. Critical discourses surrounding 
anime in the United States and United Kingdom have for example drawn frequent 
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323 Jason Mittell, ‘The Great Saturday Morning Exile: Scheduling cartoons on television’s periphery in 
the 1960s’ in Carol A. Stabile and Mark Harrison, eds. Prime Time Animation: Television animation 
and American culture (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.33-54. Also see Jason Mittell, ‘Cartoon Realism: 
Genre Mixing and the Cultural Life of  The Simpsons’, The Velvet Light Trap, 47 (Spring 2001), 
pp.15-28. 
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associations with discourses of art cinema and cult fandom as much as animation.324 
A cross-cultural comparison, however, would make it extremely difficult to 
distinguish whether differences in studio reputation were attributable to their 
output, discourses relating to their respective countries or national cinemas, or to 
the varying forms of animation in which they work.  
Pixar’s strong performances at the American box office do provide us with 
another potentially useful reference point. All but one of the studio’s thirteen 
feature films to date has been among the ten highest grossing movies of the year, 
with the only exception being Ratatouille (Brad Bird, 2007), which placed eleventh 
and still grossed more than $200 million domestically. Accordingly, it seems 
appropriate to choose rival films that are competing for a similar share of film 
audiences. Yet a focus on American animated movies that were also box office hits 
still leaves us with a potentially very large sample of movies. Even taking into 
consideration Disney animation’s resurgent success in the early 1990s, the decade 
preceding Toy Story saw only six animated features make it into the domestic box 
office Top 20. Toy Story’s success marks a turning point for animation, with twenty 
films being released in the decade that followed, and a further twenty-six in the five 
years between 2006 and 2010 inclusive.325 By all accounts, the market for animation 
(particularly computer-generated) has expanded significantly since the release of 
Pixar’s first feature.326 While all thirteen of Pixar’s features to date have placed 
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324 See, for example, Susan J. Napier, From Impressionism to Anime: Japan as Fantasy and Fan Cult 
in the Mind of the West (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
325 This figure includes fully animated features only, and thus could be even higher if  one were to 
include films that used a combination of  live action and animation/motion capture, such as Alice in 
Wonderland (Tim Burton, 2010) or Avatar (James Cameron, 2009) for example. The only non-
Disney (fully) animated film to make the domestic Top 20 in the decade preceding Toy Story was 
Universal’s An American Tail (Don Bluth, 1988). Anon., ‘Movie Box Office results by year’, Box 
Office Mojo <http://boxofficemojo.com/yearly/>, Retrieved 2nd July 2011.  
326 I stress that I am not drawing a direct causal link between the release of  Toy Story and the 
subsequent improved fortunes of  animation at the American box office. One could easily take 
Aladdin (Ron Clements and John Musker, 1992) or The Lion King (Roger Allers and Bob Minkoff, 
1994) as the focal point of  these figures, and the trend would still be just as noticeable. Toy Story can 
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comfortably in the annual US Top 20, this means that, between 1995 and 2010, well 
over thirty films have been released by rival studios such as Dreamworks 
Animation, Blue Sky Studios and Sony Pictures Animation among others.327 
In summary, then, this chapter’s definition of what constitutes a rival film for 
Pixar is based on finding a comparable sample, and hinges on three clear criteria:328 
 
1. The films must all be animated. Pixar’s films may have been talked about as 
being ‘more than’ animation, but the discourses of quality that have 
developed around them are nevertheless intrinsically linked to the medium 
in which they are produced. 
2. They must be the products of Hollywood studios. Comparing Pixar to 
Studio Ghibli or Aardman Animation films would mean that cultural 
differences and attitudes to non-American cinemas would need to be 
accounted for. 
3. They must be comparable in terms of production budgets and box office 
performance.  It would not be fair to compare reviews of a two million 
dollar movie with reviews of a two hundred million dollar movie, as the 
expectations of the critic would inevitably be very different. 
 
With these criteria in mind, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the 
critical reception of the Shrek and Ice Age franchises, produced by 
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be said to have proven the viability of  computer animation as a medium that could potentially be 
successful at the box office, although it would still be a number of  years (which also saw films such 
as Antz, A Bug’s Life, and Shrek add to its reputation) before CG animation completely replaced cel 
animation at the major studios.  
327 This trend shows no sign of  slowing down, with 6 of  the US box office Top 20 in 2011 being 
fully computer animated, followed by 5 in 2012. Ibid. 
328 These criteria could certainly be applied to the study of  rivalry in cinema or brands more 
generally. Analyses borrowing this model could define rivals and/or narrow down research samples 
by searching for similarities across three criteria: (1) generic categorisation, or product category in the 
case of  non-media brands; (2) industrial and/or production context; (3) economic context, in terms 
of  investment and revenues. 
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DreamWorks/PDI and Blue Sky Studios/20th Century Fox respectively. The two 
series constitute eight films in total – four in each series – and all were released in 
the years between 2001 and 2012. All but the fourth Ice Age film – Ice Age: 
Continental Drift (Steve Martino and Mike Thurmeier, 2012), which placed 16th – 
were among the ten highest grossing films of the year at the US box office, and 
were made by animation studios that, during that time period, also produced a 
number of other animated features that grossed hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Finally, their status as franchises assures a degree of continuity to the critical 
discourses within the reviews, making it easier to trace the ways in which specific 
ideas have developed, changed or disappeared over time.329 
 
Expectation and Legitimation: Shrek and Ice Age 
Shrek (Andrew Adamson and Vicky Jenson, 2001) met with a cavalcade of 
praise when it was released in the summer of 2001. Entertainment Weekly described 
it as ‘a coming of age for DreamWorks, the upstart studio’,330 the Washington Post 
stated that it ‘outdoes PDI/DreamWorks’ own “Antz”’,331 and Variety felt that the 
‘scriptwriters [had] let their imaginations go’.332 Critics were in other words quick to 
draw attention to the impact it would have on DreamWorks’ reputation, implicitly 
pointing towards pre-existing question marks surrounding the studio’s ability to 
produce hits. Shrek’s status as a benchmark in animation (not just in the history of 
DreamWorks itself) can be seen ten months later, when reviews of Ice Age began to 
appear. For instance, Elvis Mitchell of the New York Times wrote, ‘Because it lacks 
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329 All reviews are taken from the same sample of  publications – the five daily newspapers with the 
highest circulations that also publish regular film reviews, plus Variety and Entertainment Weekly as 
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collected by the Audit Bureau of  Circulation 
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331 Desson Howe, ‘“Shrek”: A Funny, Fractured Fairy Tale’, Washington Post, 18th May 2001, p.T45 
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the comic sophistication of pictures like “Monsters, Inc.” and “Shrek,” the blandly 
likable computer-animation extravaganza “Ice Age” actually seems like a fossil, a 
relic from a bygone era.’333 It is worth pointing out that Mitchell’s comments were 
far more negative than most critics (who for the most part enjoyed the film), but the 
hierarchy of quality that he refers to was a common theme throughout reviews of 
Ice Age. Comments appearing in Entertainment Weekly (‘never matches … the 
heartfelt heft of “Shrek,” but it’s an antic and sweet-spirited pleasure’)334 and Variety 
(‘doesn’t attempt to be knowing or self-satirical (a la “Shrek”) … but there are many 
clever touches and tongue-in-cheek allusions’)335 for example showed slight 
variations in their overall evaluations of the film, but, like Mitchell, both used Shrek 
as a basis for comparison. What this points towards is a commonly held assumption 
regarding Shrek’s reputation, which at that time was often employed as shorthand 
for quality family entertainment.336 
Mitchell’s closing statement, that Ice Age felt to him like ‘a relic from a 
bygone era,’ is also worthy of further attention. The fact that critics could not agree 
on this issue is less important than the fact it was being debated at all. Shrek had 
become known not simply for its perceived quality, but because it represented 
something new and ‘hip’.337 Animation, it seems, had changed over the preceding 
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2002, p.E22. 
334 Owen Gleiberman, ‘Ice Age (2002)’, Entertainment Weekly, 13th March 2002 
<http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,217132,00.html>, Retrieved 4th January 2012. 
335 Joe Leydon, ‘Ice Age’, Daily Variety, 18th March 2002, p.10. 
336 Note that Shrek was not the only point of  comparison here; Pixar’s own Monsters Inc. (Pete 
Docter, 2001) also featured several times in these debates, but usually in a list of  other films. Shrek 
was employed as shorthand in this way with greater frequency and often on its own, suggesting that 
it was the computer-animated film that served critics’ purposes most effectively. Of  course, ‘quality’ 
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looking towards other media for inspiration in its storytelling, distribution and marketing, but his 
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years. As Glenn Lovell put it, ‘Obviously aware that the Nickelodeon set’s taste in 
animation has evolved a bunch since Sponge Bob [sic] and the Rugrats, the people 
behind “Ice Age” have left “The Land Before Time” far behind for something a bit 
more nervy and “now.”’338 Joe Leydon even suggested that the ‘attempt to be 
knowing or self-satirical’ would constitute ‘ticking off the list of animated-feature 
plot conventions.’339 Describing these qualities as ‘plot conventions’ may be 
attributable to a clumsy choice of wording in writing the article, but it also points 
towards the importance of a very particular comic tone in animation at that time. 
Leydon went on to praise Ice Age because there is ‘no time wasted on generic 
production numbers set to blandly kid-friendly tunes,’ for which ‘parents … will be 
eternally grateful.’340 The discourses involved in legitimating computer animation, 
then, reveal a desire for the genre to broaden its target market, and move beyond its 
association with childishness. 
These debates are highly reminiscent of the discourses highlighted in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, with Toy Story also having received considerable praise for 
having broken away from animation conventions. The difference between that 
moment in time and the release of Shrek and Ice Age, however, is that the latter 
films were not just seen to be breaking away from animation conventions, but 
specifically from Disney conventions. In Shrek’s case, this was a far smaller leap on 
the part of critics, who were delighted by what they saw as the clear mockery of 
Disney and its history. Variety’s Robert Koehler for instance wrote in his review of 
the DVD that,  
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[Director Andrew] Adamson sounds awfully disingenuous when he says that 
Lord Farquaat’s castle/theme park was inspired by a combination of 
Mussolini’s Rome, Albert Speer, the Hearst Castle, the Universal City theme 
park and Vegas, when everybody knows that this was Katzenberg’s pointed 
lampoon of Disney and Disneyland.341 
 
 
Roger Ebert agreed, writing that, ‘No doubt [the recognisable Disney 
characters], and a little dig at DisneyWorld, were inspired by feelings DreamWorks 
partner Jeffrey Katzenberg has nourished since his painful departure from Disney’342 
Whether or not Katzenberg really was responsible for Shrek’s numerous alleged 
Disney references is open to debate. Indeed, the apportioning of credit or blame for 
specific ideas represents a perennial problem of authorship studies. PDI employee 
Penney Finkelman Cox does however confirm that, ‘Jeffrey was very, very involved 
with “Shrek”; there wasn’t a frame of that movie that he wasn’t in the cutting room 
to see. But the advantage you had at PDI is that you had five days [each week] 
without him in your face.’343 Any sense of ambiguity was all but ignored by the 
press, and ultimately Katzenberg’s personal history and acrimonious relationship 
with Disney informed much of what was said about Shrek. In fact, every publication 
within my research sample mentioned what they saw as thinly veiled taunts at 
Disney, who in turn received no sympathy for being the butt of the jokes.  
Elvis Mitchell was particularly scathing, arguing that ‘Disney created the 
fairytales that were 90 percent merchandising and 10 percent boredom.’344 He went 
on to state that, ‘the cycle of kiddie musicals typified by “Aladdin” seems to be 
drawing to a close, possibly because video stores have walls of these animated sing-

341 Robert Koehler, ‘Shrek’, Variety, 12-18th November 2001, p.30. 
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along films already.’345 This implies that part of his problem with Disney animation 
was their perceived ubiquity, which in turn has connotations of mass production 
and commercialism, which are seen as enemies of creativity. Roger Ebert was the 
only critic who expressed any sense of scepticism over Shrek’s Disney allusions, but 
only did so in order to dismiss the rumour that the film’s antagonist, Lord Farquaad, 
was modelled on Michael Eisner.346 Nobody challenged the far-from-flattering 
nature of these representations, with the only debate being whether or not it could 
be described as ‘playful’.   
The notion that good animation equals good family entertainment is strongly 
evident across reviews of Shrek and Ice Age, both of which were praised for their 
ability to appeal to a very wide audience. Desson Howe of the Washington Post said 
of Shrek that, ‘While kids can chortle at Farquaad torturing the Gingerbread Man in 
a protracted, cookie-crumbling scene … grownups can smirk at jokes about 
Disneyland’s character-named parking lots.’347 Todd McCarthy agreed, describing it 
as ‘a lively romp for kids and an enormously clever comedy for adults.’348 Ice Age 
received similar praise, with Glenn Lovell of the San Jose Mercury News arguing 
that it ‘should appeal to parents who are into clever wordplay as well as 
preschoolers who live for flying-poop jokes.’349 Such comments are clearly intended 
as compliments, appear frequently within reviews of popular Hollywood animation, 
and are often coupled with predictions of healthy box office revenues and/or DVD 
sales. But this process of legitimation is not without implications for animation 
more generally.  
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Repeated references to a dual or layered appeal, whereby children can enjoy 
certain aspects of the film, and adults another, reinforces the distinction between 
the two audiences. It implies that they cannot take pleasure from the same things; 
an adult would not laugh at slapstick moments or ‘flying-poop jokes’. It is also a 
distinction that leaves little room for adolescent audiences, who would be unlikely 
to see themselves as children or adults. In fact, many of these reviews are more 
specific than simply addressing adults or ‘grownups’, with explicit references to 
parenthood throughout. Ann Hornaday’s Washington Post review is a vivid 
example, beginning, ‘The question isn’t whether you’re going to go to “Ice Age.” If 
you’re the parent of anyone under 10, you are going to “Ice Age.” The question, as 
it always is with kids’ movies, is whether you should take a good novel and an Itty-
Bitty Book Light.’350 Parenthood therefore functions as the means through which 
animation is justified for adult consumption, reinforcing the idea that animation is 
fundamentally ‘childish’. As the subtitle to Lovell’s article put it, Ice Age’s ‘humor 
means that even adults will find it very cool.’351 How, then, did critics’ notions of 
‘quality’ in relation to computer animation change over the subsequent years? 
 
 
The Genrification of Computer Animation 
 
In his review of the DreamWorks animated feature, How To Train Your 
Dragon (Dean DeBlois and Chris Sanders, 2010), Richard Corliss of Time magazine 
wrote that, ‘in its loftier moments, [the film] might almost be called Pixarian’.352 
Apparently seeing little need to explain what exactly this might mean, Corliss does 
at least point out that he considered the movie to be ‘a little more serious and more 
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ambitious than the signature DreamWorks films’.353 His words are clearly intended 
to be complimentary, and yet implicitly position the ‘signature’ DreamWorks film as 
one of comparatively poor quality. Pixar films are, by extension, inherently more 
‘serious’ and ‘ambitious’.  
As I have shown in previous chapters, Pixar is no stranger to being praised 
by critics and journalists, with compliments coming from a variety of industries and 
publications. The company’s early years saw the studio develop a reputation as an 
industry leader in computer graphics technology, but with little agreement about 
how such technologies should or would be applied in the future. Even after the 
release of its first feature film and the subsequent sale of its hardware division, Pixar 
continued to be praised for its technological advances as much as its filmmaking 
success. What Corliss’ words demonstrate, however, is that the studio’s reputation 
for quality actually stems in part from discourses that had for several years 
circulated around the output of other studios. As Rick Altman has argued in his 
work on film genre, ‘what we usually think of as single entities (the studio, the 
spectator) actually comprise multiple discursive sites.’354 This clearly applies to Pixar, 
whose brand clearly exists outside of the output of the studio itself, and regularly 
dominates discussions of animation that has been produced entirely by other 
companies. 
I chose to focus my analysis in this chapter on the Shrek and Ice Age 
franchises for the sake of consistency, but it does seem as though reviews of most 
animated films at this time were telling a similar story: Disney’s hold on Hollywood 
animation was wavering. As Rick Lyman wrote in the New York Times, ‘if there is 
one major difference today from the early 1990s, when Disney was having its 
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biggest hits, it is that so many other studios have moved into the market.’355 He 
went on to clarify, however, that these shifts were not simply down to increased 
competition, but a shift in the stylistic and tonal qualities of the films in question: 
 
The animated films that have clicked with teenage males – the most coveted 
audience because of their tendency to see favourite films again and again – 
have been smart, ironic computer-generated comedies like “Shrek” and the “Toy 
Story” films that were somehow able to overcome the perception in 
teenagers’ minds that they were made for younger children.356 
 
Although there was debate among critics as to the value and worth of 
contemporary animation, most were in agreement that the genre had undergone 
important changes in recent years, the significance of which went beyond the 
normalisation of CGI. In one 2006 article in the New York Times, for example, 
Charles Solomon lamented what he referred to as the rise of ‘cellphone films’. 
Movies such as Robots (Chris Wedge, 2005), Madagascar (Eric Darnell and Tom 
Mcgrath, 2005) and Chicken Little (Mark Dindal, 2005) were, to him, guilty of an 
overreliance on dialogue for its own sake. He complained that ‘filmmakers and 
studio executives are afraid to let [characters] be quiet’, citing numerous counter-
examples of animation that used dialogue sparingly, if at all.357 His scope was broad, 
reaching back to characters like Mickey Mouse, Bugs Bunny and Tom and Jerry, but 
also referring to more up-to-date examples such as Wallace and Gromit, Les 
Triplettes de Belleville (Sylvain Chomet, 2003), and the films of Hayao Miyazaki. 
Solomon’s words point towards a tension between animation as a medium and 
animation as a genre, almost as though a hitherto undisputed idea had begun to 
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separate. Clearly animation is itself a category that can be (and has been) defined in 
a huge variety of ways, but the implication here is of a pre-existing critical consensus 
regarding what animation meant and what its merits were, at least in Hollywood 
terms.  
The fact that Solomon also mentions Brother Bear (Aaron Blaise and 
Robert Walker, 2003) and Home on the Range (Will Finn and John Sanford, 2004) 
confirms that this is not something he sees as being tied exclusively to computer 
animation, and is a question of broader generic shifts. As Rick Altman argues, 
genres should not be seen simply as qualities of texts, but as ‘by-products of 
discursive activity’, and certainly we can see such a discursive struggle pervading the 
critical reception of animation throughout the first decade of the twenty-first 
century.358 No example typifies this shift more than the emergence of the term 
‘Shrekification’, used by NPR’s Andrew Lapin in 2011 in relation to Disney’s 
Winnie the Pooh (Stephen J. Anderson and Don Hall, 2011). He described the film 
as ‘an antidote to the shrill, snarky Shrek-ification of modern family franchises,’359 
indicating that Shrek’s position as CG animation benchmark had shifted 
considerably from where it was at the beginning of the decade. The series became 
diluted by a string of sequels, and pilloried for the biting humour and popular 
culture references that it was originally lauded for. Importantly, this slide down the 
cultural hierarchy from ‘quality’ to ‘mainstream’ should not be seen so much as a 
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reflection of Shrek, but of computer animation as a whole. The issue was that these 
discourses were no longer circulating around a limited cycle of films, but a much 
broader series of industrial and stylistic developments that had come to define the 
genre itself, even to the extent that Disney ceased producing traditional 2-D cel 
animation.360  
This brings us back to Richard Corliss’s review of How To Train Your 
Dragon, and his reference to the ‘signature’ DreamWorks film. For what is 
ostensibly a review, Corliss dedicates very little space in his article to a discussion of 
the movie itself, choosing instead to use it as a mere jumping off point for a vague 
comparison between DreamWorks and Pixar. His initial observations are 
complimentary towards both studios, but keen to draw distinctions between them. 
As he puts it, ‘Pixar’s features are closer to the old, elevated Disney style, while 
DreamWorks’ films are flat-out cartoons, proud to carry on the fast, cavorting 
Warner tradition.’361 This discursive ‘othering’ of Pixar’s rivals is clearly visible 
throughout the article, as he goes on to state, 
 
DreamWorks movies, made mostly in the Hollywood suburb of Glendale, 
are team efforts. A Pixar film may have one writer besides the director; it’s 
total auteur handicraft. Most DreamWorks movies credit two directors and 
several writers, and play like the spiffiest vaudeville. The DreamWorkers 
aren’t in the masterpiece business; they just want to provide an expert good 
time.362 
 
 
Corliss is explicit about his investment in auteurist discourses here, and 
there is evidence of other critics responding similarly in relation to the Shrek and 
Ice Age series. Stephen Hunter’s largely negative review of Shrek the Third (Chris 
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Miller and Raman Hui, 2007) includes a passage in which he lauds the film’s visuals, 
but does with a sarcastic reference to ‘the DreamWorks animators, all 600 of them 
or whatever’.363 The fact that directors and writers are discussed far more frequently 
in reviews of Pixar films than those made by other studios also seems relevant. 
Granted, this may well be a genuine reflection of the studios’ differing approaches 
to filmmaking, but the centrality of authorship to the Pixar brand is difficult to 
ignore. As noted above in relation to Shrek and Ice Age, part of CG animation’s 
legitimation has relied upon the extent to which it caters for the adults in the 
audience. A.O. Scott’s review of Shrek 2 (Andrew Adamson, Kelly Asbury and 
Conrad Vernon, 2004) puts this question at the centre of the debate between 
DreamWorks and Pixar: 
 
In terms of its attitude toward the audience, DreamWorks 3-D animation is 
in some ways the opposite of Pixar, choosing to divide its viewers by age 
rather than uniting them. The music, […] the in-jokes and the occasional 
touches of bawdiness are intended to placate insecure adults while the bright 
colors and jaunty storytelling enchant their children and teach them to be 
themselves, like all the other kids with Shrek dolls and ears. This kind of 
strategy is hardly uncommon in pop culture these days.364 
 
 
Shrek, Ice Age and many other films from the first decade of computer-
generated animation had been praised for leaving behind the ‘childish’ conventions 
of Disney animation, and providing entertainment for children and adults alike. 
Scott’s thoughts on the perceived difference between Pixar and DreamWorks’ 
‘attitude towards the audience’ are interesting, pointing towards a distinction 
between films that appeal to children and adults, and films that appeal to everyone. 
This also implies that the most distinguished texts will be those who are seen to 
demonstrate the greatest respect for its audiences. The stigma of ‘childishness’ that 
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has been attached to animation for decades is particularly significant here, because 
discourses of parenthood have played a prominent role in establishing what CG 
animation should (or should not) be aiming for. We can see this quite clearly in the 
genre’s formative years, as critics initially expressed great surprise and delight at 
being able to take pleasure in ‘children’s’ films.  As Desson Howe said of Ice Age, 
‘Your kids will love it. Better yet, so will you.’365 Once this early surprise became 
normalized, however, a noticeable cynicism emerges towards films that are overtly 
playing to two separate age groups. Managing to appeal to all age groups 
simultaneously is, conversely, seen as an indicator of cleverness, and often referred 
to as a lost art in Hollywood cinema.  
Tellingly, in a 2009 article in the New York Times, A.O. Scott included 
Shrek in an article entitled, ‘Movies of Influence’. 
 
Pixar may have raised computer-generated animation to the level of art, but 
it was this loud, rambunctious DreamWorks adaptation of a William 
Steig picture book that set the template for 21st-century family 
entertainment. License a lot of pop songs, lock in merchandising 
opportunities, recruit A-list celebrities to read a script full of winking 
allusions and semi-rude jokes for the grown-ups and hokey morals for the 
kids, and watch the money pour in.366 
 
Critical responses to the Shrek and Ice Age sequels varied hugely, but in 
general deemed them markedly inferior to the installments that spawned the 
franchises in the first place. Glenn Lovell’s subheading for his Shrek 2 review sums 
up this response, stating plainly that the movie ‘suffers from sequelitis even as it 
retains original’s charms’.367 Sequels frequently struggle for critical praise, both due 
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to inevitably being judged against previous installments, and to the connotations of 
unoriginality. It is likely that Pixar benefited considerably from having largely 
avoided making sequels to its films, and only really investing in such a business 
strategy after being taken over by Disney. Scott’s words above attest to the 
relationship in critical discourses between ‘mainstream’ animation and, if not 
sequels, then commercialization. As he puts it, ‘the template for 21st-century 
entertainment’ is less about narrative structure or production practices, and more to 
do with the film as a commodity: music licensing, recruiting stars, merchandising, 
and money. 
If Pixar is so frequently positioned as being distinct from the standardized 
output of DreamWorks, Blue Sky/20th Century Fox, and most other animation 
studios, can we consider the studio a cult object? Mark Jancovich and Nathan Hunt 
have stressed that,  
 
Cult texts are defined through a process in which [they] are positioned in 
opposition to the mainstream, a classification that is no more coherent as an 
object than the cult and is also a product of the same process of distinction 
that creates the opposed couplet mainstream/cult.368  
 
Despite the difficulty in defining what constitutes ‘cult’ and ‘mainstream’ 
texts, then, it is clear that Pixar occupies a curious position between the seemingly 
opposite ends of this binary spectrum. Building on Jancovich and Hunt’s work, 
Matt Hills has suggested that it is possible for the two labels to co-exist or even 
‘merge in specific ways’, becoming what he terms ‘mainstream cult’. 369 He goes on 
to argue, ‘mechanisms of cultural othering are, precisely, relational; all that matters is 
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that “cult” can be defined against something that it is not.’370 Where other chapters 
in this thesis (particularly Chapter 2) go into more detail about Pixar’s ability to 
appeal to a broad and diverse audience, the evidence presented here complicates the 
extent to which this appeal can be described as ‘mainstream’.  
The studio’s budgets, box office revenues, and wide cultural reach make it 
difficult to define Pixar’s appeal as ‘cult’ in the usual sense of the word. Indeed, as 
Douglas Atkin has argued, nothing draws more attention to the boundaries of a cult 
as limited access.371 Yet it is clear the discourses of quality on display in the studio’s 
reception work to define Pixar as distinct from (and implicitly superior to) the 
mainstream. As Michael Newman and Elana Levine have argued in relation to 
television, legitimation ‘depends upon a delegitimated “other” television – that of 
the past but also that of the contemporary genres, production modes, technologies, 
and practices that do not receive the stamp of legitimacy.’372 While the Shrek and Ice 
Age franchises have received considerable plaudits from critics over the years, and 
collectively amassed close to five billion US dollars in box office receipts alone, the 
studios that made them have found themselves in an unfortunate position.373 
Justifiably or not, they have come to represent the mainstream, while Pixar has been 
firmly established as existing on a level above that. These respective positions are by 
no means permanent, but nevertheless are sufficiently entrenched that individual 
exceptions (the critical lambasting of Cars 2 [John Lasseter, 2011], or the extensive 
praise for How To Train Your Dragon, for example) appear to have little impact on 
the overall reputations of the studios.  
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370 Ibid. 
371 Douglas Atkin, The Culting of  Brands: When Customers Become True Believers (New York: 
Portfolio, 2004), p.27. 
372 Michael Z. Newman and Elana Levine, Legitimating Television: Media Convergence and Cultural 
Status (London: Routledge, 2012), p.13. 
373 All box office grosses obtained from Box Office Mojo <www.boxofficemojo.com>, Retrieved 6th 
January 2012. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
-Whistle While You Work- 
Pixar’s ‘Behind the Scenes’ Narratives 
 
 
The sheer quantity of media articles that have been written about Pixar 
demonstrates a commonly recurring desire on the part of journalists and film critics 
to explain the studio’s unbroken string of critical and commercial success. Writers 
have variously justified their coverage of Pixar in terms of going in search of their 
‘secret’, 374  ‘how they do it’, 375  or ‘what makes [them] so special’. 376  What is 
particularly interesting about these articles, however, is how frequently writers look 
beyond the studio’s films, and even the people that make them, and instead focus 
on Pixar’s headquarters in Emeryville, northern California.377 As William Taylor and 
Polly LaBarre of the New York Times succinctly put it in 2006, ‘The secret to the 
success of Pixar Animation Studios is its utterly distinctive approach to the 
workplace.’ 378  Bill Capodagli and Lynn Jackson also hint at this idea in the 
introduction to their 2010 book, Innovate the Pixar Way, describing Pixar as ‘a 
childlike storytelling “playground” … a place that enables storytellers to create tales 
of friends and foes who share great adventures in enchanting lands.’379 Note the 
choice of language here: Pixar is not an organisation, studio, company, or group of 
people, but a place.  

374 Jonah Lehrer, ‘Animating a blockbuster: How Pixar built Toy Story 3’, Wired, 24th May 2010 
<http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/05/process_pixar/all/1>, Accessed 5th January 2011. 
375 Sam Leith, ‘WALL-E: How Pixar found its shiny metal soul’, The Sunday Telegraph, 22nd June 
2008, p.10. 
376 Paul McInnes, ‘Inside Pixar: “I haven’t thought about anything but Toy Story 3 for four years’, 
The Guardian, 7th July 2010 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/video/2010/jul/07/pixar-toy-story-
3-making>, Accessed 5th January 2011. 
377 While Emeryville is a small town in Alameda County, California, all further mentions of  
Emeryville will refer specifically to the Pixar studio space and grounds, unless otherwise stated. 
378 William C. Taylor and Polly LaBarre, ‘How Pixar adds a new school of  thought to Disney’, New 
York Times, 29th January 2006, Sec. 3, p.3. It is also worth noting that this article appeared in the 
‘Business’ section of  the newspaper, not under ‘Arts’, underscoring the pedagogical discourses 
surrounding the studio. 
379 Bill Capodagli and Lynn Jackson, Innovate the Pixar Way: Business lessons from the world’s most 
creative corporate playground (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), ix. 
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But how do ideas about what Pixar represents tie into this place? I argue 
that Emeryville plays an integral role in the discursive construction of the Pixar 
brand, and that writing about the studio space itself demonstrates the need to 
explain and locate the brand’s core so that it may be replicated. Indeed, the subtitle 
to Capodagli and Jackson’s book is Business lessons from the world’s most creative 
corporate playground, aptly demonstrating the (hyperbolic) pedagogical terms in 
which Pixar is often discussed. The studio exists to be learnt from as well as 
celebrated. 
It is Emeryville, and in particular the media attention afforded to it, that will 
form the basis of this chapter. If media publications are so keen to consistently 
publish articles about this place, I ask what exactly it is about the building, its 
people, and its corporate culture, that commands so much attention. These 
discourses demonstrate the need for certain (successful) brands to be reified or 
embodied in order to be understood, requiring a tangible space or object onto 
which abstract qualities and stories of success can be projected. Emeryville currently 
performs this role, but there is evidence to suggest that many of the ideas associated 
with Pixar’s ‘identity’ can in theory be attached to any physical space or indeed a 
person. Since the aim of this chapter is to explore the idea of studio space and the 
extent to which Emeryville factors into the critical consensus around Pixar, it is 
worth beginning by interrogating the importance of going ‘behind the scenes’. 
 
A stranger from the outside!: Going ‘behind the scenes’ at Pixar 
Upon arriving at Emeryville, all visitors to the studio are issued with a badge 
that reads, ‘A stranger from the outside!’ The text echoes the words of the Pizza 
Planet aliens from Toy Story, who waver between amazement and curiosity after 
Sheriff Woody and Buzz Lightyear enter their (previously) hermetically sealed world 
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(of a claw crane machine). More than this however, the use of that quotation draws 
attention to the peculiar insider/outsider dichotomy at Pixar. Before looking at the 
specific features of Emeryville, it would be useful to unpack this dichotomy, since it 
provides a context for the ways in which Pixar is talked about more generally. 
By labelling studio visitors as strangers to be stared at in amazement, studio 
employees are by extension positioned as the aliens, ordinarily cut off from the rest 
of the world but now suddenly in touching distance. Of course, the visitor badges 
are almost certainly intended to be humorous, and the unusual wording could be 
interpreted in this way even if one had never seen Toy Story. For the joke to be 
fully realised though, one must both have seen the film and recognise the use of the 
quotation outside of its original context. This may be just one small observation, but 
its ramifications go beyond simply spotting or not spotting a reference. 
As Nathan Hunt has forcefully argued, insider knowledge in the form of 
trivia plays a crucial role within fan cultures. Far from being meaningless, he sees 
trivia as ‘important exactly because its value can be recognised only by insiders’,380 
and as such is used to ‘define and police the borders of fandom’ while 
simultaneously ‘producing, maintaining and negotiating hierarchies within 
fandom.’381 The Pixar badges therefore serve to visually distinguish insiders from 
outsiders at Emeryville, but also complicate this notion through the use of in-jokes, 
references and trivia, which contribute to the creation of hierarchies among the 
outsiders. The visitor who ‘gets’ the joke may still wear a badge that labels them a 
‘stranger’, but through an in-depth knowledge of Pixar and the movies it has made, 
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380  Nathan Hunt, ‘The importance of  trivia: Ownership, exclusion and authority in science fiction 
fandom’, Mark Jancovich et al., eds., Defining cult movies: The cultural politics of  oppositional taste 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p.198. 
381 Ibid, p.186. 
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the outsider can ostensibly narrow the gap between themselves and the people who 
actually work at the studio.382  
Making-of documentaries and behind-the-scenes features that provide fans 
with this kind of ‘insider’ information have been a popular fixture of DVD releases 
ever since the medium took off in the late-1990s. In her work on home cinema 
cultures, Barbara Klinger argues that such texts place the viewer in a position of 
privilege. Privy to a seemingly secret world of information, the collector is schooled 
in detail about the film production process, creating a ‘cognoscenti’ among them – 
the intra-fan hierarchies of which Hunt speaks. 383  So-called Easter Eggs are a 
particularly good example of the types of trivia involved in this interplay – partly 
hidden materials that form part of a DVD’s special features. In Pixar’s case, Easter 
Eggs tend to consist of references to its earlier (and even forthcoming) work. Every 
Pixar short and feature film since 1987 has contained references like this, with 
characters, props, and consumer products from one film cropping up in the 
background of another. 384  Several online threads on Pixar fan forums have 
attempted to document as many of these references as possible, of which there are 
hundreds across the Pixar oeuvre.385 The discussions on these forums suggest a 
desire among fans to inform others about newly-discovered references, whilst 
simultaneously competing with each other to see who can spot the most obscure 
examples. Fans frequently provide screengrabs from the DVDs as evidence, often 
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382 Companies are increasingly adopting more ‘democratic’ approaches towards brand management, 
allowing consumers to participate with their products and services, and therefore contribute to brand 
meaning. The author is grateful to Nick Johnson of  Useful Social Media for his helpful 
conversations and the generous sharing of  research into how marketers view this relationship. For a 
discussion of  branding as a process of  negotiation between fan consumers and proprietors, see 
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University of  California Press, 2006), p.68. 
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385 See for example, rachelcakes1985, ‘The Definitive Pixar In-Jokes List’, Pixar Planet Forums, 15th 
March 2008, 3:49am PST. <http://www.pixarplanet.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=2822>, 
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shown in extreme close-up to demonstrate their skill in uncovering the reference. 
What is significant here is that Pixar has consistently facilitated and catered towards 
this kind of consumption by continually referring to and talking about itself. Partly 
this has manifested itself in the studio’s courting of journalists, authors and business 
executives, and employees’ willingness to talk about their craft. But the easter eggs 
noted above exemplify a more specific aspect of the studio brand, in the sense that 
its films, like the company itself, has become a space to be playfully explored.386  
A number of scholars have already argued that behind the scenes features 
are not an entirely new media phenomenon, with Craig Hight likening their function 
to electronic press kits (EPKs),387 and John Thornton Caldwell noting precursory 
trends in 1940s television programming and the emergence of the star system.388 
These features have become increasingly important in recent years as film and 
television producers have taken advantage of the possibilities of DVD and Blu-ray 
technology, re-packaging (and thus re-framing) the theatrical text with an often 
extensive collection of audiovisual materials that invite the viewer in. Industry 
reports suggest that consumer proclivity for bonus features has played a key role in 
the appeal of DVD as a medium,389 a trend that Blu-ray, with its increased storage 
capacity, is well poised to capitalise on.  
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In their analysis of the Monsters Inc (Pete Docter, 2001) 2-Disc DVD, 
Robert Alan Brookey and Robert Westerfelhaus observe the commercial benefits 
presented by extratextual material. They argue that Pixar used such featurettes to 
position itself as not only distinct from Disney at a time of industrial conflict (as 
discussed in Chapter 3), but as an autonomous creative collective with an emphasis 
on ‘fun’ and ‘quality’.390 The DVD extratext in other words is capable of performing 
a key role in the establishment of an auteur reputation, with the author in Pixar’s 
case shown to be a group as opposed to a single person. Hight takes issue with 
Brookey and Westerfelhaus’s view of the DVD as a single text, however. He argues 
that, while useful for exploring possible ways in which the audience’s understanding 
of a text may be constructed, such an approach ‘ignores fundamental differences in 
the manner and variety of ways of the ways in which audiences engage with 
DVDs.’391 Some viewers for instance may ignore some or even all of the bonus 
features included on a given disc, choosing instead to watch only the main feature. 
Building on previous work by Lev Manovich, Hight instead proposes that when we 
watch a DVD, we should think of ourselves not so much as viewers but as users, 
‘navigating our way through menus and following the pathways that they provide.’392  
Both the American and British media have demonstrated an increasing 
fascination with Pixar’s Emeryville studio since the company moved there in 2001, 
with detailed behind-the-scenes exposés having appeared in publications that 
include Variety, Empire, The San Francisco Chronicle, The Telegraph, The 
Independent, and The New York Times. The articles are curiously similar in their 
argument, a phenomenon self-consciously commented on in one such piece by Sam 
Leith in The Telegraph: 
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390 Robert Alan Brookey and Robert Westerfelhaus, ‘The Digital Auteur: Branding identity on the 
“Monsters, Inc.” DVD’, Western Journal of  Communication, 69.2 (April 2005), pp.109-128. 
391 Hight, p.9 
392 Ibid. 
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As a journalist … you want to dislike Pixar; or at least find its dark side. 
Where’s the story in “happy people make brilliant films, get well paid for it, 
love their work”? But all the evidence points to that being the case. [As] 
much as you tire of hearing about the silver scooters, the primacy of 
storytelling, the staggering attention to detail (you hear stories – one 
animator spent days watching videotapes of his own eyeballs) and the 
fanatical determination to get it right, you cannot get away from the fact that 
not only is most of this stuff demonstrably true, it has given the company an 
unbroken record of hit movies. Good hit movies.393 
 
Here, Leith not only acknowledges that the same stories are constantly 
being repeated, but also that ‘this stuff’ is precisely the reason why Pixar has become 
so successful. The implication is that the studio employees’ use of silver scooters to 
transport themselves from office to office is equally as important as hard work and 
‘attention to detail’. This is a very unusual causal link on many levels, but however 
accurate an assertion it is, the fact remains that the critical consensus that has built 
up around Pixar is heavily reliant upon a detailed knowledge of the studio’s ‘wacky’ 
production culture. Emerging from the vast majority of articles, broadcasts and 
DVD features that seek to go behind the scenes at Emeryville, is a sense of a place 
that collapses notions of age in order to create films that connect with as many 
people as possible. ‘Normal’ adult behaviour is replaced with ‘childish’ behaviour, 
yet always in a way that is controlled and safe, as demonstrated by Jessi Hempel’s 
article on the studio: 
 

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In most companies, it’s extremely bad form to deck your boss. Not so at 
Pixar, where Technical Director Bill Polson clocked the president over the 
head – many times – shortly after he was hired. His weapon: long, thin red 
balloons. His audience: 12 classmates, ranging from janitors to animators to 
executives. His motivation: the teachers told him to.394 
 
Such idiosyncratic behaviour is something that never seems to escape the 
attention of outside observers who come to visit Pixar, but it is also worth noting 
that the company goes out of its way to make sure people know about it. By 
presenting what they do as ‘fun’ and not laborious, Pixar encourages its visitors and 
those who read about the studio culture to see it in a positive light, encouraging and 
rewarding further investigation. 
Pixar is of course not alone in taking advantage of the marketing potential 
of this technology, but the studio’s reputation is arguably more pronounced due to 
its consistency in repeating themes, characters, motifs, and values across DVD 
releases and media interviews. As demonstrated by the Emeryville visitor’s badges 
discussed above, these motifs and characters do not only appear in other media 
forms (e.g. video games, trailers, posters, studio stationery), but also in a variety of 
physical spaces. These includes merchandise, particularly toys, as well as characters 
appearing in theme parks, and Pixar’s enormous Buzz Lightyear balloon that took 
part in four of the five Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parades between 2008 and 2012 
inclusive.395  
Christopher Anderson makes a similar point about brand coherence in 
relation to the Disneyland television show and the ways in which it presented 
Disney to 1950s American audiences. By dissecting the animated production 
process and continually illustrating how it works by drawing on the studio’s own 
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394 Jessi Hempel, ‘Pixar University: Thinking Outside the Mouse’, San Francisco Chronicle, 4 June 
2003 <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2003/06/04/pixar.DTL>, 
Accessed 25th January 2011. 
395 John Lasseter also took part in the parade as a balloon carrier in 2008 and 2010. 
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back catalogue, Disneyland effectively positioned itself as an outlet for commentary 
on the studio’s films. It encouraged audiences to see continuities across Disney’s 
films, to develop an appreciation for the production process, and to recognise the 
studio’s body of work as a ‘unified product of Walt’s authorial vision.’396  
The comparison with Disney is of course rather appropriate, given that it 
was the world-famous animation studio that first provided Pixar with the financial 
backing to make Toy Story in the early 1990s, and ever since a $7.4 billion takeover 
in 2006, is now also Pixar’s owner. 397  Walt Disney assured the press that his 
television series Disneyland would stand as entertainment, despite the fact that a 
large proportion of its content consisted of thinly veiled advertisements. 398 
Anderson notes that the show generated ‘fanatical interest’ in the studio’s 
amusement parks, quoting one unnamed ABC executive who is alleged to have said, 
‘Never before have so many people made so little objection to so much selling.’399 
However, in one crucial way, the relationship between Disney and the Disneyland 
series differed from Pixar’s and its own attempts at producing studio exposés. As 
discussed above, Pixar is for the vast majority of people an exclusive place that they 
will never get to go to, whereas Disneyland existed largely to encourage audiences to 
physically travel to the amusement parks.  
Importantly, then, despite Pixar’s willingness to allow various groups of 
people access to Emeryville to photograph, film, and/or write about the building 
and its people, the majority of people’s ‘access’ is virtual. There is no shortage of 
sources that can shed light on Pixar’s studio space and corporate culture, with 
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‘behind the scenes’ articles having appeared in the English-language press 
throughout the world, while scores of similar examples have been published online. 
Seeing inside Emeryville is easy, but it is almost always mediated, virtual, and 
entirely on Pixar’s terms. Actually going there is a practice generally reserved for 
selected commentators, relevant film industry insiders, or the occasional school 
group. The studio space has become subject to what John Urry calls the tourist gaze 
– an attitude towards the experience of places, spaces and objects that situates them 
in opposition to everyday life, and regulated, organised work in particular.400 He 
notes that, although tourist relationships exist in the journey towards a destination 
and a period of stay there,401 tourist consumption is visual above all else.402 The 
public is denied access to Emeryville, which at the same time is presented as a space 
governed by principles of fun and inclusivity. As we saw in relation to its imagined 
audiences in the previous chapter, Pixar’s reputation for quality is closely related to 
its ability to unite seemingly disparate aspects of its own identity. The brand 
manages to exude inclusivity and exclusivity, sophistication and frivolity, and its films 
manage to be both forward-thinking and nostalgic. With that in mind, it is worth 
turning our attention towards the specificities of Emeryville, and the ways in which 
that has played into the brand’s apparent universality.  
 
Architecture with a plot?: Studio space as a canvas for brand reification 
Pixar’s Emeryville studio has been described in a variety of laudatory terms, 
existing in the eyes of the media as a ‘digital dream factory’,403 ‘an incubator for 
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401 Ibid, p.2. 
402 Ibid, p.111. 
403 Rick Lyman, ‘A digital dream factory in Silicon Valley; Pixar’s new digs coddle animators, writers 
and tech heads’, New York Times, 11th June 2002, p.E1. 
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creative minds’,404 ‘a sprawling playground’,405 ‘an eclectic campus of free-spirited 
artists’,406 and in the words of John Lasseter, ‘a home that reflects how cool [they] 
are.’407 Words such as ‘campus’ are used again and again to refer to the site, invoking 
images of universities and colleges – places at the cutting edge of scientific, 
technological, philosophical and cultural thought. The term ‘dream factory’ has also 
appeared in at least three separate newspaper articles, in publications from both 
coasts of the United States as well as one from the British tabloid newspaper The 
Mirror.408 This label in particular attests to the peculiar line Pixar is seen to tread 
between being a serious (and extremely successful) producer of culturally important 
films, and to use Chloe Veltman’s words, ‘behaving like children’. 409  Notice, 
however, that the above list of descriptions also span different stages of a person’s 
life, from incubator, through to playground, campus, a factory and a home, 
reflecting the seamlessness with which the Pixar brand manages to slip between 
different age brackets; by extension, it is a brand you can never outgrow. But how 
do specific features of the studio play into this idea? 
Karen Paik writes in her 2007 book To Infinity and Beyond that the 
Emeryville studio space was designed with two goals in mind: to ‘renew the sense of 
community that had begun to dissipate in the company’s piecemeal expansion’, and 
‘to make sure that the new space wouldn’t inadvertently kill the intangible “rough 
and tumble magic” that had flourished at [its previous headquarters in] Point 
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Richmond.’410 The implication is that the creative culture that Pixar has come to be 
known for was at some point in the late-1990s in danger of disappearing, and that a 
new site was needed in order to restore or even enhance its effectiveness. In the 
studio’s attempt to foster community and creativity, it was Steve Jobs who was 
reportedly the most heavily involved in the design process, so much so that the 
building and its grounds are occasionally referred to as ‘Steve’s movie.’ 411 
Architecture firm Bohlin Cywinski Jackson was commissioned to design the 
building, which upon completion comprised a 200,000 square foot, two-storey 
construction of steel and brick, set amid 15 acres of landscaped grounds. Designed 
for 600 employees, master planning was also carried out for expansion to house 
over 1,000 employees in the future.412 The hub of the building is a vast atrium, with 
the wall that houses the main entrance comprised entirely of glass and steel. Natural 
light consequently fills the atrium, and the space acts as a point that has to be 
traversed regularly in order to get to different parts of the building, encouraging 
employees from different departments to necessarily run into each other on a daily 
basis.413  
Far from simply being the core of Pixar’s physical studio space, this atrium 
also serves as a central component of the discourses that surround the space, and 
the studio more generally. Almost every single article, interview or DVD feature 

410 Karen Paik, To Infinity and Beyond: The Story of  Pixar Animation Studios (London: Virgin 
Books, 2007), pp.167-8. 
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that takes audiences or readers behind the scenes at Pixar will either mention the 
atrium explicitly or use it as a filming location. Accordingly, this communal space is 
positioned as the starting point not only for studio visitors (‘corporeal tourists’, as 
Urry would refer to them),414 but for anybody interested in finding out about what 
Pixar does, how it does it, and why it does it. Employees are routinely shown 
walking or riding scooters across this floor space as they go about their business, 
and frequent gatherings and company announcements are often shown to take place 
in the lobby. The consumer of one of these behind the scenes features is thus 
positioned as a participant in the Pixar community, sharing in the studio’s paper 
plane throwing competitions or celebrating as the opening weekend box office 
figures for the latest film release are announced. To run with Zahid Sardar’s analogy 
of the atrium as Pixar’s ‘town square’,415 reading about or watching footage from 
inside Emeryville is akin to accepting an invitation to become a citizen. 
The insider/outsider dichotomy discussed above becomes particularly 
interesting when we consider which areas of Emeryville act as recurring motifs 
when journalists or camera crews visit the studio. Aside from the atrium and its 
adjoining areas (which include a café and a free cereal bar), film footage is often 
shot inside a number of employees offices, with John Lasseter and his toy-filled 
shelves providing by far the most common interview backdrop. Lasseter’s ‘childlike’ 
behaviour has often been contrasted with his status as the creative head of Pixar 
(and now Disney),416 serving as the symbolic embodiment of what Pixar represents 
– the injection of a child’s sense of creativity and fun into the serious business of 
filmmaking.  
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415 Zahid Sardar, ‘Pixar Unbound’, San Francisco Chronicle, 3rd February 2002, Magazine, p.26. 
416 See for example, Veltman.  
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Animator Andrew Gordon’s office also figures heavily in discussions around 
Emeryville. Crucially though, Gordon himself is generally not named, or mentioned 
only in passing – it is his office, or rather one specific part of his office that takes 
centre stage. This space is in fact that only part of Emeryville except the atrium to 
be mentioned in Jeffrey Young and William Simon’s biography of Steve Jobs. As 
they put it, ‘Off in one corner [of the building] is a waist-high passageway into the 
Love Lounge, a stainless-steel lounge for on-the-job relaxing that embodies the 
unique spirit of the place.’417  
There are several interesting points here. Firstly, the space is actually an air-
conditioning shaft that Gordon discovered in his office and subsequently decorated 
with furniture, fabrics, photographs and a variety of ‘kitsch’ items, before it 
eventually became popular among employees (and the media) for its unusualness. 
Young and Simon’s implication that the Love Lounge was intentionally part of the 
building’s design is thus highly misleading. Secondly, the phrase ‘on-the-job 
relaxing’ brings us back to the abovementioned manner in which discourses 
surrounding Emeryville (and Pixar more generally) frequently combine leisure 
terminology with contrastingly vocational words. Thirdly, and most importantly, it is 
my contention that the Love Lounge features so heavily in reports of Emeryville 
precisely because it is seen to embody ‘the unique spirit’ of Pixar. Just as a DVD 
Easter Egg positions the viewer as an insider, rewarding them for their curiosity and 
skill in navigating the disc’s features, the Love Lounge performs a marketing 
function, existing as a ‘hidden’ area of Pixar which itself is normally inaccessible to 
the public, waiting to be discovered by skilled explorers. Clearly there is a 
contradiction here, in the sense that images from this ‘secret’ area are among the 
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most widely publicised features of the entire studio. When New York Times 
journalist Rick Lyman was given a tour of the studio prior to writing an article about 
Pixar, he was asked by at least three separate people whether he had ‘visited the 
Love Lounge yet’.418 This strongly suggests that Pixar are keen for certain areas of 
the studio to be seen (and therefore written about and discussed) far more than 
others, insisting that all visitors are shown and educated about very specific features 
of Emeryville – those that fit in in-keeping with symbolic and thematic notions 
about what the studio is seen to represent. It is in a sense, to use Beth Dunlop’s 
phrase, ‘architecture with a plot’.419 
Pixar has only been located at Emeryville since between 1998 and 2000 
however, with their previous offices being at Point Richmond, slightly further north 
in the San Francisco Bay area, and San Rafael immediately after leaving Lucasfilm.420 
At Point Richmond Pixar had its own screening room but not the funds to install 
cinema seating, and so Lasseter asked everyone in the company to donate any 
unwanted furniture. As he describes the end product: 
 
Our screening room was filled with the most ugly collection of ‘70s couches 
you’ve ever seen. But it was great because it was like this eclectic kind of 
quilt, you know. Right in the middle was this big La-Z-Boy recliner – my 
director’s chair. That room became kind of the soul of Pixar, in a way.421 
 
Here we see notions of workspace and corporate identity combining in a 
very similar manner to the way(s) in which Emeryville’s Love Lounge is discussed. 
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The implication is that a collection of physical objects (in this case ugly, mismatched 
couches) are being seen to stand in for bigger, less tangible ideas about what Pixar 
represents. One gushingly laudatory online article in which Jason Adams describes 
his own experience of visiting Emeryville gets close to touching on this idea:  
 
In my review of Cars, I mentioned not knowing how Pixar “does it” and I 
wasn’t exaggerating. One could argue that it’s the focus on story and 
characters or a genuine love for the medium, but there’s still something 
intangible that’s oft summed up by the vague term “heart.” Even if the 
secret turned out to be black magic, the thing I wanted most on this trip [to 
Emeryville] was to get some insight in to their mysterious and awesome 
sauce.422 
 
It is the intersection of the workspace with what Adams refers to as 
‘something intangible [often called] heart’ that I see as being central to a strong 
brand.423 As I argued in the introduction to this thesis, while brands (particularly 
well-developed ‘lifestyle’ brands) are often seen to transcend the products to which 
they were originally attached, a brand cannot exist without products and services to 
carry it. While clearly subjective, what the above quote from Adams demonstrates is 
that the features of the Pixar brand that he loves so much are seen to be somehow 
embedded in the films that the studio makes, and yet still cannot be grasped unless 
one can engage with something more tangible, which in this case is Emeryville. 
This idea is further supported by an article by Peter Hartlaub, who argued in 
September 2003 (long after Pixar had moved to Emeryville) that the proverbial 
‘secret’ to the studio’s ‘magic’ actually lies in CalArts, the Disney-funded university 
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where many of Pixar’s chief creative staff learned the art of animation.424 While 
Emeryville is clearly shown to play an important role in the critical consensus that 
surrounds Pixar and its work then, it seems that this is not so much dependent 
upon that building’s specific features as it is the fact that it is a physical space for the 
reification of the brand’s intangible qualities. Like the individual cubicles that Pixar 
animators were encouraged to wreck, decorate, paint on, or reconstruct to their own 
design and specifications,425 Emeryville is a canvas upon which abstract notions of 
what the studio represents can become three-dimensional.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
-Imagined Consensus- 
Review Aggregation and Post-Takeover Pixar 
 
 
Tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes, disgust provoked by horror or 
visceral intolerance (‘sick-making’) of the tastes of others. 
-Pierre Bourdieu426 
 
 
Most of the time film is subjective. This time it’s not. 
-Josh Tyler, CinemaBlend427 
 
 
 
My academic interest in Pixar began towards the end of 2008. Rising critical 
acclaim for the studio showed no signs of halting its progress, with WALL-E 
(Andrew Stanton, 2008) being touted by a number of respected journalists as not 
only the best animated movie of the year, but a deserving candidate for the 2009 
Academy Award for Best Picture.428 Over the subsequent two years, the extent to 
which observers were lauding Pixar’s work intensified, with the studio eventually 
garnering Best Picture nominations for both Up (Pete Docter, 2009) and Toy Story 
3 (Lee Unkrich, 2010).429 What struck me as surprising about Pixar’s reputation was 
just how widely held it seemed to be. Despite being a self-confessed fan of its 
output and professed approach to filmmaking, one of my primary motivations for 
writing this thesis was that it seemed so difficult to find anyone who would write 
anything negative about Pixar. As Martin Barker points out, films are open to ‘an 
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unlimited number of questions … each of which will lead you to investigate and 
analyse … with different priorities.’430 But surely if the possibilities for responding 
to Pixar’s films were ‘unlimited,’ somebody must have something critical to say 
about them? I specifically remembered reading a number of negative reviews of 
Cars (John Lasseter, 2006), but the post-WALL-E consensus appeared to suggest 
that the studio was incapable of putting a foot wrong.  
I was certainly interested in exploring the studio’s reputation in terms of what 
critics had come to value about its work, but I soon recognised that doing so would 
also require some consideration of what it means to dislike Pixar. As Pierre 
Bourdieu put it, ‘it is no accident that, when they have to be justified, [tastes] are 
asserted purely negatively, by the refusal of other tastes.’431 Where chapters 3 and 4 
of this thesis look at how brands develop reputations in relation to rival or closely 
related brands, this chapter takes a different approach to the function of distastes 
and how they relate to critical consensus. My interest here is in the period following 
Disney’s takeover of Pixar, and specifically the moments when critics have written 
negative reviews of one of its films. What are the implications of criticising a brand 
that everyone else appears to adore? What reactions have such reviews provoked 
among online communities? And most importantly, to what extent has this criticism 
impacted upon Pixar’s reputation?  
I begin with a case study of the critical reception of Cars, which prior to its 
sequel was widely regarded as being the studio’s weakest film. I argue that the 
agreed-upon reaction to the film actually changed over time, as journalists struggled 
to consolidate their initial negativity with the increasingly widespread opinion that 
the studio was all but infallible. From there I move on to a discussion of Rotten 
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Tomatoes and notions of consensus, with a particular focus on a recent trend within 
film criticism that places greater emphasis on aggregation and quantification. I see 
this trend as having contributed to an intense streamlining of opinion, polarising 
responses and in many cases functioning as a form of evidence for ‘proving’ that a 
particular film is ‘better’ than another, or that an individual possesses objectively 
‘good taste’. This leads into a case study of the critical reception of Toy Story 3 (Lee 
Unkrich, 2010), specifically interrogating the bizarre controversy that arose when 
two critics (and later, a third) wrote negative reviews of the film. The mere existence 
of this furore raises a number of interesting questions, and I argue that the 
controversy demonstrates the power of the social component of taste, and the ways 
in which taste can shift. This is, to put it another way, a chapter about how even 
negative criticism can, under the right conditions, shift to such an extent that it 
actually strengthens the praise around a cultural object instead of harming it. 
 
When is a failure not a failure?: The critical reception of Cars 
 The critical reaction to John Lasseter’s Cars is perhaps best described as 
‘mixed,’ although as we will see later on in the discussion of websites such as Rotten 
Tomatoes, very rarely (if ever) do critics unanimously agree about the merits and 
artistic qualities of any film.432 This is not to say that Cars was devoid of admirers, 
however. Kenneth Turan of the Los Angeles Times, for instance, commended its 
‘purring heart,’433 while Time’s Richard Corliss labelled it ‘an instant classic,’434 and 
Hollywood Reporter’s Michael Rechtshaffer felt certain that it was ‘destined to 
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emerge as one of the season’s biggest performers.’435 In-keeping with Bourdieu’s 
assertion that tastes are often expressed as distastes, many of these positive reviews 
demonstrate a continued desire to discursively situate Cars in opposition to 
animated films produced by Pixar’s rivals. Turan’s review for example argues that 
 
Disney, Fox, DreamWorks and others have led us to equate computer 
animation with bulletproof repartee and snappy patter, turning every 
creature on the planet into a Borscht Belt comedian. It’s not that those films 
haven’t been a treat, or that Cars doesn’t have its share of gags that make 
you laugh out loud. But Lasseter’s latest is not powered by glibness and 
speed but by warmth, emotion and good-hearted charm.436 
 
Rechtshaffen agrees, writing that ‘while the other guys [i.e. other animation 
studios] are still hawking talking animals, the folks at Pixar continue to up the 
anthropomorphic ante with terrific characters and crowd-pleasing storytelling.’437 
While this opposition was discussed in more detail in chapter 4 of this thesis, it is 
important to re-emphasise that Pixar has come to represent something far more 
profound and accomplished than any of its contemporaries. Notice that even 
Disney, Pixar’s parent company by this point in time, are referred to as being 
distinct and inferior. Indeed, this thesis begins from the central premise that, in 
Jonah Lehrer’s words, ‘Nobody in Hollywood seems to know anything. Pixar seems 
to know everything.’438 
Even reviews that otherwise responded negatively to the movie were keen 
to offer some praise, and at the very least, Cars was widely hailed as an impressive 
technical and visual achievement. Paul Arendt’s review for BBC website is typical of 
such sentiments, describing the film as ‘a surprisingly lame affair,’ and yet 
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simultaneously ‘a marvel of technology.’439 That he sees the film as ‘surprisingly 
lame’ as opposed to simply ‘lame’ is a testament to the weight of expectation that 
critics placed on the studio at this time – Pixar was expected (or even required) to 
offer something more than its rivals. Importantly, Arendt is being openly critical of 
Cars, and opens his review with the almost eulogistic declaration, ‘It had to happen 
sometime. After a run of standard-setting CGI movies, Pixar has finally delivered a 
dud.’440 Brian Lowry in Variety was of the same opinion, writing that, ‘With Cars, 
Pixar’s enviable streak of creative triumphs comes to a skidding stop.’ 441  Both 
reviewers are clearly being critical of the film, but even amidst this criticism there 
remains a very strong sense that the studio’s ‘story’ is one of constant success and 
universal praise.  
Talk of Pixar being on something of a ‘run’ informs much of what is written 
about them, and should be seen as a central tenet of the consensus and discourses 
of quality that have surrounded them for years. One article that appeared in The 
Business in 2003 for instance stated that Pixar are ‘as close to a sure thing as exists 
in the unpredictable movie business,’442 and in January 2006 the Globe and Mail 
wrote that Disney were ‘acquiring Pixar in the midst of a long-profitable winning 
streak.’443 What is particularly interesting about this streak is that it was proclaimed 
by many journalists to be going strong, even after many Cars reviews argued it had 
already ended. In November 2006, just five months after the film had been 
criticised by people like Arendt and Lowry, the Toronto Sun reported that ‘Lasseter 
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is optimistic that Ratatouille will continue the [studio’s] golden streak.’444 Gregg 
Kilday of the Hollywood Reporter suggests that this is precisely what happened, 
noting after the release of WALL-E (Andrew Stanton, 2008) that Pixar had ‘turned 
out nine winners in a row,’445 and the success of that film in 2008 had in fact 
prompted the USA Today to declare, ‘It’s official: Pixar can sell anything.’446 
When Manohla Dargis of the New York Times wrote in her review of Cars 
that ‘one clunker won’t shut down or even threaten the factory line’,447 she could 
have had little idea of just how right she was. Far more than simply being strong 
enough to withstand a relative ‘dud’, the Pixar consensus was apparently strong 
enough by 2006 (after just seven feature films) that the dud would effectively be 
erased from the studio’s historical narrative.  
This becomes all the more pronounced when we consider the critical 
response to its sequel, which met with a curiously similar series of criticisms in 2011. 
Peter Bradshaw’s Guardian review labelled Cars 2 (John Lasseter, 2011) as 
‘uninspired’,448 while The Telegraph’s Sukhdev Sandhu considered it to be ‘just as 
so-so’ as the original. 449  Others bemoaned its overly complicated plot, and 
throughout reviews from both sides of the Atlantic ran an overwhelming sense that 
the film was too ‘commercial’. As A.O. Scott of the New York Times put it, ‘Cars 2 
is certainly built to move merchandise, … an effective advertisement for licensed 
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playthings.’ 450  Of course, such comments can commonly be found in critical 
discourses surrounding certain blockbusters – particularly franchises and sequels – 
but it says a great deal about Pixar’s reputation that commercialism should be a 
cause of complaint where it had not been a problem before.451  There has, after all, 
been little criticism of the considerable merchandise sales associated with the Toy 
Story franchise, implying that is that it is perfectly acceptable for a film to be 
‘commercial’ if it simultaneously demonstrates sufficient artistic achievement. 
Again, however, Cars 2 was not seen in a wholly negative light. In particular, 
the vast majority of critics were quick to praise the look of the film, variously 
describing it as ‘winningly vibrant’,452 ‘visually stunning’,453 ‘gorgeous’,454 and 
‘brilliantly animated’.455 Both Cars films received criticism for having relatively dull 
plots, both were seen to have spectacular visual effects, and most importantly, both 
were seen as Pixar’s first ‘flop’ in a long line of critical and commercial successes. 
The mere fact that two separate films could be awarded this unenviable label 
indicates the constant revisions that Pixar’s narrative has been subjected to. Many 
critics deemed Cars a ‘failure’ when it was released, but then struggled to 
consolidate this assessment with Pixar’s subsequent overpowering narrative of 
success. Individual critics even went as far as retrospectively altering their stance on 
the film, with Peter Bradshaw explaining that it grew on him after repeat viewings 
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with his young child.456 What all of this suggests is that the reviews were heavily 
influenced by the idea of prevailing consensus – a pre-conceived (and/or collectively 
agreed-upon) idea of the value of the film itself and of Pixar. Aside from specific 
plot details, Cars and Cars 2 received such similar comments that the two sets of 
reviews were almost interchangeable, yet review aggregation websites indicated a 
huge gulf in quality between them. In the following section, I argue that Cars’ 
Rotten Tomatoes score of 74% ‘fresh’, when compared to Cars 2’s score of only 
38%, reveals less about the quality of either film, and more about review 
aggregation’s limited capacity to reveal patterns of taste. 
 
Looking out for Number One: Rotten Tomatoes and what it can(not) tell us 
The process of review aggregation essentially involves converting the 
qualitative contents of a film review into quantitative data, either by producing an 
average score based on the star rating awarded by each critic, as is the case with 
Metacritic, or simply by counting the number of ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’ reviews, 
like Rotten Tomatoes. Media articles about Pixar frequently refer the website, 
particularly since Ratatouille (Brad Bird, 2007) onwards, and almost always without 
any qualification as to the implications of the ‘Tomatometer’ scores. One Variety 
article from 2008 used the scores as evidence for the apparent convergence of the 
tastes of critics and audiences, noting that successful box office hits were also 
scoring highly on aggregation sites. Specifically using WALL-E as an example, 
stating plainly that the film was the ‘best reviewed film of the summer (97%), if not 
the year.’457 Using Rotten Tomatoes scores in this way is common practice, with 
journalists effectively using them as proof of a film’s competency. Pixar even used 
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456 Bradshaw, ‘Cars 2 – review’. Note the similarities between this and the ideas discussed in Chapter 
4; Bradshaw – like the critics writing about Ice Age and Shrek – legitimated the film through 
discourses of  parenthood. 
457 Anon., ‘Critics get in summer spirit’, Variety, 28th July 2008, p.41. 
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the phrase ‘Best reviewed film of the year’ to promote their films for Academy 
consideration during its Oscar campaigns in 2008, 2010 and 2011.  
The trophy cabinet in the atrium of Pixar’s Emeryville studio is generally only 
reserved for the most prestigious of all the awards their work has received, but their 
Golden Tomato for WALL-E takes its place alongside all the Academy Awards.458 
Given how the studio has benefited from the website and the critical consensus that 
it has come along with it, it is unsurprising that they appear so willing to embrace 
the Tomatometer as a measure of success and quality.  
Of course, Pixar would only continue to do this for as long as its results 
reflected positively on the studio. John Lasseter, for instance, wrote in 2007 that, ‘In 
the early days of Ratatouille’s release we were checking it, every day, on Rotten 
Tomatoes. We were 100% for a while! I think when people start seeing 100% up 
there for a while they start coming in and saying, “I'm going to write a bad review to 
see how much it drops!”’459 When asked about the negative reviews for Cars 2 in 
2011, however, he claimed ‘I typically don’t read reviews’.460 The most obvious 
point to make about these two statements is that they are clearly contradictory; it is 
difficult to believe that Lasseter would be so heavily invested in the Rotten 
Tomatoes score for one Pixar film that he required constant updates as reviews 
rolled in, but then not read reviews at all for a later release. Even so, both examples 
indicate Pixar’s attempts to strengthen and/or negotiate the ways in which 
journalists were talking about the studio, demonstrating a clear awareness of the 
discourses surrounding it. It is worth noting, however, that it is theoretically possible 
for someone to be an avid follower of Rotten Tomatoes scores without ever 
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458 Author’s Interview with Joe Utichi, 5th February 2011. 
459 Joe Utichi, ‘Exclusive: John Lasseter on Pixar Past, Present and Future’, Rotten Tomatoes, 23rd 
October 2007 <http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/ratatouille/news/1682430/exclusive-john-
lasseter-on-pixar-past-present-and-future/>, Retrieved 21st April 2010. 
460 Brooks Barnes, ‘It Wasn’t A Wreck, Not Really’, New York Times, 18th October 2011, p.C1. 
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actually reading a single review, so Lasseter’s comments aren’t necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  
Anybody with an internet connection today has potential access to hundreds 
of reviews for almost any film they wish to read an opinion on, and this increase in 
visibility has in turn encouraged more people to turn to publishing their own 
reviews online. Rotten Tomatoes founder Senh Duong began the site in 1998, 
aiming to provide ‘movie lovers of all backgrounds quick and easy information on 
the latest movies hitting the theatres,’ in order to ‘help users make a decision on 
what to watch.’461 The theory is that instead of having to read scores of reviews 
from different publications, users can see at a glance how the critical community 
responded, and decide based on each film’s score whether they wish to see it or not. 
It is not difficult to see why this might be appealing, particularly to time-constrained 
journalists with less time to gather research, conduct interviews, or verify facts.462 
But while aggregation undeniably provides a gauge of sorts, it clearly does not tell 
the whole story about a film’s reception. 
One of its limitations for instance is that aggregation comes with a confused 
sense of who exactly is included in its ‘critical community’. Much has been written 
about the supposed ‘death’ of film criticism over the years, attributed in part to the 
rise of non-professional critics (or ‘fan-critics’), empowered by blogging and the 
Internet more generally.463 This has in turn created a heightened ambiguity between 
professional and non-professional criticism. James Berardinelli of Reelviews.net and 
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461 Anon., ‘Interview with Senh V. Duong of  “Rotten Tomatoes”’, The Trades, 29th September 2000 
<http://www.the-trades.com/article.php?id=367>, Retrieved 15th April 2011. 
462 This has been a growing trend throughout journalism in western countries for decades. For more 
on the subject, see Nick Davies, Flat Earth News: An award-winning reporter exposes falsehood, 
distortion and propaganda in the global media (London: Vintage, 2009). 
463 For a detailed discussion of the history and development of film criticism, particularly in relation 
to blogging and the internet, see Jonathan D. Lupo, ‘Accounting for TasteFilm Criticism, Canons 
and Cultural Authority’, PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2007. Chapter 4, ‘The 
Internet, Fan-Critics, and the Democratisation of Film Criticism’ is particularly relevant to my 
discussion here. 
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Harry Knowles of Ain’t It Cool News are perhaps two of the most prominent 
examples, having built up enormous readerships and subsequent power within the 
American film industry, despite having no formal training and having risen to 
prominence purely through publishing reviews on his own website. Clearly if 
aggregation websites were to include every single blog review of a particular film, 
the number of reviews that counted towards each Metacritic rating or score on the 
Tomatometer would instantly jump. But is this a good reason to exclude certain 
reviews?  
As Barbara Klinger has argued, ‘exhaustiveness [in historical research, is] 
impossible to achieve, [but] necessary as an ideal goal.’464 We may ask for instance 
should a blog post be deemed inherently less valuable to a review aggregation 
website, purely because it is written by a non-professional or read by fewer people? 
Similarly, even had access to web statistics that proved more people visited a 
particular blog or website, does that make it inherently more valuable? The extent to 
which Rotten Tomatoes scores can be seen to provide an accurate reflection of a 
critical community is clearly problematic at best.  
This community is also an overwhelmingly western one, since the only 
reviews that count towards the Tomatometer are American and British publications 
and websites. 465  In his book on Céline Dion and taste, Carl Wilson gives an 
astonishing example of one of the ways in which tastes can vary between countries 
and cultures, quoting the Jamaican-American music critic Garnette Codogan: 
 
And the places [Dion] turns up in Jamaica are all the more curious. I 
remember being at sound-system dances and hearing everyone from Bob 
Marley to Kenny Rogers (yes, Kenny Rogers) to Sade to Yellowman to 
Beenie Man being blasted at top volume while the crowd danced and drank 
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464 Barbara Klinger, ‘Film History, terminable and interminable: Recovering the past in reception 
studies’, Screen (Summer 1997), 38.2, p.108. 
465 Correct as of  January 2013. 
162 
up a storm. But once the [DJ] began to play a Céline Dion song, the crowd 
went buck wild and some people started firing shots in the air … I also 
remember always hearing [Dion] blasting at high volume whenever I passed 
through volatile and dangerous neighbourhoods, so much that it became a 
cue to me to walk, run or drive faster if I was ever in a neighbourhood I 
didn’t know and heard Céline Dion mawking over the airwaves.466 
 
Dion’s incredible popularity outside of the United States significantly 
complicates her seemingly universal unpopularity in the eyes of western music 
critics, and demonstrates that all tastes, however pervasive they may seem, should 
be open to scepticism and criticism.  
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of review aggregation lies in its 
quantification of qualitative data. Paul Arendt’s review of Cars provides a vivid 
example of the nature of the film’s ‘mixed’ reception. Rather than manifesting itself 
as a disagreement between critics (that is, arguing with each other as to whether it 
was ‘good’ or ‘bad’), few of the reviews were unanimous one way or the other, 
generally expressing a variety of positives and negatives that tipped slightly in one 
direction. This may seem like a fairly obvious point to make, but it is one that 
appears to be ignored all too often by a culture that is increasingly displaying a 
propensity towards review aggregation websites and notions of consensus more 
generally. A hypothetical film could receive one review that responds to it with an 
unmitigated stream of hyperbolic praise, and another review that is largely 
ambivalent but nevertheless ultimately deems it worthy of paying to see, and both 
reviews would count as ‘fresh’ in terms of the Tomatometer. A perfect score 
therefore would not necessarily suggest a ‘perfect’ film. In fact, the reduction of a 
critic’s qualitative response to a number or score effectively encourages the erasure 
of minor grievances that were included in an otherwise positive review, or praise 
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466 Carl Wilson, Let’s Talk About Love: A journey to the end of  taste (London: Continuum, 2007), 
p.48. 
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contained within an otherwise damning assessment. Even in the highly unlikely 
event that every critic were to be in absolute agreement about a film’s respective 
merits, neither a 100% nor a 0% score on Rotten Tomatoes would tell us anything 
at all about why critics felt that way. 
This is not about any one person or institution intentionally skewing facts, 
but it demonstrates the level of adherence that contemporary film critics must have 
towards the cultural zeitgeist. The example of Toy Story 3 demonstrates this very 
well indeed, with the film having scored an extraordinarily high 99% on the 
Tomatometer, based on the aggregation of 249 reviews. Certainly, receiving such a 
high percentage of ‘positive’ reviews is an impressive achievement, even taking into 
consideration the abovementioned drawbacks of review aggregation. The remainder 
of this chapter however will look at the 1% of critics – a mere three out of 249 – 
who deemed the film ‘rotten’. Although I will give some consideration to the 
criticisms of the individual reviewers, what is most interesting about this case study 
is the vociferous reaction that it provoked. The situation became a ‘controversy’ 
that was rarely about the specificities of the reviews, and more to do with the 
expression of astonishment and disgust that anybody could even consider disliking 
Toy Story 3. Through interrogating this controversy, some fascinating issues are 
raised as to the nature and function of film criticism, review aggregation, and some 
of the ways in which they intersect with taste cultures. 
 
Trolling in the Aisles: The critics who disliked Toy Story 3 
On Friday 18th June 2010, the stage was set. Toy Story 3’s Tomatometer 
score still sat at 100% after more than 130 reviews had been counted. With its 
predecessors –Toy Story (John Lasseter, 1995) and Toy Story 2 (John Lasseter, 
1999) – having also scored 100% when they were released, a number of people were 
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entertaining the distinct possibility that the trilogy could end up with a ‘perfect’ 
Rotten Tomatoes score. As the number of Rotten Tomatoes-approved reviews 
began to climb and the third instalment remained on 100%, various observers had 
begun to speculate about whether or not this would continue. Twitter users467 and 
various forum threads exclaimed their excitement that Toy Story 3 ‘STILL [had] 
100% on Rotten Tomatoes,’468 before this speculation turned its attention to one 
man in particular. As Roger Ebert put it in a tweet, ‘Toy Story 3 has 100% on the 
Meter after 77 reviews. World awaiting Armond White.’469 
New York Press film critic Armond White has in recent years developed a 
reputation for disagreeing with other critics in relation to a number of high profile 
Hollywood releases. His reviews frequently elicit a range of responses from 
bemusement to outright anger, as journalists and online film fans struggle to come 
to terms with his opinions. White wrote that Toy Story 3 is ‘so besotted with brand 
names and product-placement that it stops being about the innocent pleasures of 
imagination,’ and concluded by labelling it ‘drivel’ and ‘a sap’s story.’470 It is not 
particularly surprising that those who did enjoy the film should get upset about such 
an evaluation, especially since he also suggested that the trilogy as a whole ‘isn’t for 
children and adults, it’s for non-thinking children and adults.’471 His words thus 
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Realtime search suspended after Twitter deal ends’, Telegraph, 5th July 2011 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/8617985/Google-Realtime-search-suspended-
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468 Baddoctor, ‘“Toy Story 3” STILL has 100% on “Rotten Tomatoes”’, IGN, 16th June 2010, 
6:24pm <http://boards.ign.com/teh_vestibule/b5296/192976307/p1>, Retrieved 26th April 2011. 
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came across as a personal attack as much as an honest evaluation of artistic merit, 
again highlighting the peculiar balance between objectivity and subjectivity that 
review aggregation debates often tread. Accordingly, the bulk of the Toy Story 3 
controversy centred on White, with Peter Sciretta of Slashfilm describing the news 
of the film dropping from 100% to 99% on the Tomatometer with the simple 
words, ‘What happened? You guessed it. Armond White’.472  
Actually though, the controversy that arose involved two additional critics: 
Cole Smithey, who had published his review within minutes of (or possibly even 
before) White’s on June 18th, and Jeremy Heilman two days later. 473  Smithey 
contextualised the film in relation to the Toy Story trilogy as a whole, expressed 
disappointment at its use of 3-D, which he felt came across as ‘an afterthought,’ and 
added that ‘the inappropriately cruel and drawn out climax sequence is too intense 
for younger children.’474 Heilman agreed with Smithey’s thoughts on the 3-D, and 
more scathingly wrote that the film  
 
frequently indulges in the cheap brand of crass humour that has defined [the 
Shrek] series, with fart jokes, ethnic jokes, and gay jokes throughout its run 
time. All of this seems well beneath the level of sophistication that people 
insist Pixar films possess, and suggests something of a shark jump for the 
studio.475 
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make him the man who first ‘ruined’ Toy Story 3’s Tomatometer score. While neither critic’s review 
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Whether or not one agrees with White, Smithey, or Heilman, their 
arguments are certainly worthy of debate, and are by no means out of step with the 
standards and conventions of American film criticism more generally. Toy Story 3 
does feature extensive use of brand name products, several of which existed before 
the first instalment of the trilogy, but most of which can now be found in a variety 
of guises in retailers throughout the world. The use of 3-D is a controversial topic 
of debate among many critics, not just those who disliked this film, with Roger 
Ebert and Mark Kermode arguably standing as two of the most outspoken critics 
either side of the Atlantic. Both men were very complimentary of Toy Story 3.476 
Heilman’s aversion to the film’s ‘fart jokes, ethnic jokes, and gay jokes’ is also a 
point worth discussing, since the stereotypically Spanish version of Buzz Lightyear 
and the camp, emasculated Ken doll function as sources of repeated humour 
throughout. However legitimate these reviews were however, the responses from 
Rotten Tomatoes users were, frankly, astonishing. Every film that receives a 
Tomatometer score has its own page, with a list of every critic whose review 
counted towards it, stating whether they rated it overall ‘fresh’ or overall ‘rotten’. 
Each of these includes a one-line quotation, an external link so that users can read 
the review in its entirety, and there is also an option for them to leave a comment of 
their own next to each critic’s summary. Most critics will on average receive 
somewhere between zero and ten comments in response to their reviews, with some 
of the more widely known critics sometimes receiving slightly more. In the case of 
Toy Story 3, Peter Debruge of Variety and Roger Ebert received 50 and 47 
comments respectively, but Cole Smithey’s review received 395, Jeremy Heilman’s 
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476 See for example, Roger Ebert, ‘“Toy Story 3” (G)’, Chicago Sun-Times, 16th June 2010 
<http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100616/REVIEWS/100619990>, 
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413, and Armond White’s a huge 850. 477  Needless to say, the comments they 
received were overwhelmingly aggressive, and often extremely offensive or 
threatening.  
Taking a step back from the specificities of the reviews themselves, it is 
worth considering for a moment the implications of a small number of negative film 
reviews becoming newsworthy. What does it say about notions of subjectivity and 
taste if such a thing can even begin to be talked about as a controversy? Time for 
instance described Armond White as a ‘lifelong devil’s advocate [who] chose to 
trounce on’ the film,478 while the Wall Street Journal reported that ‘many Pixar-
lovers and fanboys … have had it with his contrarian positions, which he 
sometimes seems to stake out just to annoy people.’479 These are views that echo the 
online comments left by visitors to White’s review on the New York Press website, 
as well as the Rotten Tomatoes page for Toy Story 3. Even more common than 
‘devil’s advocate’ or ‘contrarian’ however is the label ‘troll’. 
Etymologically, the word ‘trolling’ (distinct from ‘trawling’) comes from the 
fishing practice of drawing a baited line through the water, either with a rod or boat, 
in order to entice bites from fish that come near the surface.480  In web parlance, 
trolling originated on early Usenet groups in the late-1980s, with the word troll 
being used to ‘denote someone who deliberately disrupts online communities [by] 
asking stupid questions and seeing who [rises] to the bait.’481 Labelling Armond 
White a troll may well seem perfectly reasonable to anybody who truly loved Toy 

477 Figures correct as of  1st March 2013. 
478 Steven James Snyder, ‘Can 147 critics be wrong? Meet the two pundits who trashed “Toy Story 
3”’, Time, 19th June 2010 <http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/06/19/can-147-critics-be-wrong-meet-
the-two-pundits-who-trashed-toy-story-3/>, Retrieved 15th April 2011. 
479 Anon., ‘Armond White’s “Toy Story 3” review enrages fanboys and groupthinkers’, Wall Street 
Journal, 19th June 2010 <http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2010/06/19/armond-whites-toy-story-3-
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Story 3, but accusing him of deliberately criticising the film to irritate others has 
very problematic implications. By questioning his sincerity at all, even in a relatively 
balanced manner, there are only two possibilities that are being entertained within 
these discourses:  
 
1. He is a troll. If this is true, he knows the film is good, and has 
deliberately given it a bad review to provoke its fans. 
2. He is not a troll. If this is true, he genuinely disliked the film, even 
though everybody else enjoyed it. This choice is so out of step with 
consensus that there must be something wrong with him. 
 
Whichever of those conclusions one comes to, the implication is that there is 
very clearly wrong with Armond White, and absolutely nothing wrong with Toy 
Story 3, which was entirely beyond reproach. As Josh Tyler put it, ‘most of the time 
film is subjective. This time it’s not.’482 
It is worth reiterating at this point that Armond White’s review of Toy Story 
3 is not the first time he has been labelled a troll, and he had come in for similarly 
heavy criticism one year earlier in response to his negative review of District 9 (Neill 
Blomkamp, 2009). The resultant furore was significant enough for Roger Ebert to 
weigh in on the debate for himself, coming to White’s defence by doing what very 
few of his readers appear willing to do with his reviews: take his points seriously. 
Ebert made clear in his blog post that he disagreed with White’s evaluation of the 
District 9, but that nevertheless his arguments were legitimate, and that he as a critic 
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was ‘pretty much on the money.’483 The following day however, Ebert updated his 
piece with a retraction of sorts, after a reader sent him some more information. It 
was an image that simply depicted a table, with some of the films that Armond 
White had reviewed positively, versus some that he had reviewed negatively. Here 
are the first ten from each column, as they appear on the image. 
 
Bad movies according to Armond Good movies according to Armond 
Julie and Julia (Nora Ephron, 2009) Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen 
(Michael Bay, 2009) 
Transformers (Michael Bay, 2007) Land of the Lost (Brad Silberling, 2009) 
Hunger (Steve McQueen, 2008) Dance Flick (Damien Dante Wayans, 
2009) 
Gomorra (Matteo Garrone, 2008) Terminator Salvation (McG, 2009) 
Revolutionary Road (Sam Mendes, 2008) Next Day Air (Benny Boom, 2009) 
The Curious Case of Benjamin Button 
(David Fincher, 2008) 
Fanboys (Kyle Newman, 2008) 
Che (Steven Soderbergh, 2008) Confessions of a Shopaholic (P.J. 
Hogan, 2009) 
The Wrestler (Darren Aronofsky, 2008) Bedtime Stories (Adam Shankman, 
2008) 
Doubt (John Patrick Shanley, 2008) Transporter 3 (Olivier Megaton, 2008) 
I’m Not There (Todd Haynes, 2007) Noah’s Arc: Jumping the Broom (Patrik-
Ian Polk, 2008) 
Figure 1. Table breaking down some of Armond White’s reviews into ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ movies.484 
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While he noted that he was standing by his specific comments about 
White’s District 9 review, Ebert wrote that in light of this new evidence,  
 
I [have] to withdraw my overall defense of White. I was not familiar enough 
with his work. It is baffling to me that a critic could praise “Transformers 2” 
but not “Synecdoche, NY.” Or “Death Race” but not “There Will Be 
Blood.” I am forced to conclude that White is, as charged, a troll. A smart 
and knowing one, but a troll.485 
 
Here, Ebert retreats from his initial decision to analyse the qualitative 
content of White’s reviews, and instead rejects his opinions based on a series of 
‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’. The table reproduced above says nothing of why Armond 
White gave positive or negative reviews to each film, and ignores any conflicting 
content they may have included, such as a small amount of praise for a film that he 
was otherwise critical of. And yet this was apparently evidence enough for a critic of 
Roger Ebert’s standing, knowledge, and experience, to conclude that White is a 
troll. Such evidence was also enough for the thousands of people who decided to 
make their feelings known to White after the publication of his Toy Story 3 review. 
Several comments expressed their feelings towards the three critics on the Rotten 
Tomatoes page for the film, for example: 
 
[White] says transformers 2 was better!? WTF!?WTF!? like woooow. and he 
gave Jonah Hex a good review. he said it was the best movie opening this 
weekend....WTF!??486 
 
Yes, giving [Toy Story 3] a rotten and Jonah Hex a fresh cements [White] in 
the hall of shame.487 
 
How can [Cole Smithey] think Toy Story 3 is rotten but give both 
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Marmaduke and Shrek 4 a fresh rating?? Really???? And then complain 
about the price [for  
3-D tickets]???????488 
 
Hold on hold on hold on...[Jeremy Heilman] gave The Human Centipede a 
fresh review, but Toy Story 3 a rotten one? [He’s] joking, right?489 
 
 
The fact that Ebert defended White and then subsequently retracted (or 
rather, qualified) that defence on the basis of evidence like this, presents an 
interesting point. It suggests that disagreements over individual responses to a 
particular film may well be acceptable, but only on condition that ones tastes are 
otherwise befitting of a recognised pattern. Viewed individually, films are apparently 
open to debate and opinion, but direct comparison of two films somehow creates a 
situation whereby it is acceptable to like some far more than it can be with others. 
Carl Wilson again makes this point succinctly in relation to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
findings, writing that 
 
[Bourdieu’s] point is not that people are only pretending to like or dislike the 
culture they like and dislike, trying to con people into thinking highly of 
them. The pleasure of listening to music or playing a sport is obviously real. 
The argument is that the kinds of music and sports we choose, and how we 
talk about them, are socially shaped.490 
 
The controversy surrounding Toy Story 3’s reception thus has less to do 
with Toy Story 3 being objectively ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and more to do with the fact that 
Pixar films have come to be recognised as fitting in with the kinds of film that 
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488 ‘“Toy Story 3” Article ratings and comments: Cole Smithey’, Rotten Tomatoes, Beng9210, 18th 
June 2010, 03:19pm 
<http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/toy_story_3/comments.php?reviewid=1889775 >, Retrieved 
25th April 2010. 
489 ‘“Toy Story 3” Article ratings and comments: Jeremy Heilman’, Rotten Tomatoes,ImMikeUrNot9, 
20th June 2010, 12:45pm. 
490 Wilson, p.91. 
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people are expected to like.491 As Matt Singer put it in an article for the Independent 
Film Channel, if you are ‘not a fan of “Toy Story 3”, [then] the internet suggests you 
keep that to yourself.’ 492  Indeed, the second half of this sentence here is a 
particularly important one, since it is worth reminding oneself that this controversy 
should not be seen as an accurate reflection of the movie-going population in 
general, but of (visible) internet users.493 
Aside from the disparity in sheer number of comments (with White alone 
receiving more than the combined totals of Smithey and Heilman), the responses to 
the three ‘negative’ reviews were strikingly similar to each other in tone and content. 
Pejorative labels such as ‘idiot’, ‘douche(bag)’ and ‘asshole’ were used liberally, as 
were suggestions as to what the three men should do instead of being film critics. 
Some were far angrier than others, with one respondent telling Heilman, ‘Just kill 
yourself so America can sleep again. You’re a total turd. Die mother****er, please 
die,’494 or one commenter who suggested to Cole Smithey, ‘how about you practice 
eye surgery on yourself with a sharp stick?’495 Armond White was not exempt either, 
with one post appealing to him, ‘[you] just had to break Toy Story 3's perfect score. 
Well, I sure hope this makes you happy, Mr. White. I bet it made your weekend. I 
have one thing left to say: Why you don’t you just **** off and die!’496 Such vitriolic 
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491 This is akin to the concept of  ‘quality’ television, although I would argue that what I am 
describing here is far broader in scope, applying to a wider range of  texts. Quality TV has come to be 
associated with a fairly narrow group of  shows (i.e. almost exclusively dramas with extremely high 
production values) and the networks that have produced them (e.g. AMC, HBO, Showtime, Netflix), 
whereas ‘unimpeachable’ films like Toy Story 3 do not appear to share any obvious formal or 
industrial qualities. 
492 Matt Singer, ‘Not a fan of  “Toy Story 3”? The internet suggests you keep that to yourself ’, IFC, 
20th June 2010 <http://www.ifc.com/blogs/indie-eye/2010/06/not-a-fan-of-toy-story-3.php>, 
Retrieved 27th April 2011. 
493 The idea of  v’isibility’ would certainly be worthy of  further exploration, as phrases such as ‘the 
Internet’ and ‘Twitter’ appear to be deployed as evidence of  public opinion with alarming regularity. 
Rarely is there any acknowledgement about potential sample bias, or why it might be problematic to 
extrapolate the words of  a small number of  people in order to make broader generalisations. 
494 ‘“Toy Story 3” Article ratings and comments: Jeremy Heilman’, rono3849, 21st June 2010, 
11:13pm. 
495 ‘“Toy Story 3” Article ratings and comments: Cole Smithey’, Decisi8ns, 18th June 2010, 05:33pm. 
496 ‘“Toy Story 3” Article ratings and comments: Armond White’, Star Child, 18th June 2010, 
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posts may seem somewhat over the top, but they are representative of the tone of 
the majority of other comments, a testament to the polarising potential of taste. 
The pseudo-threatening nature of these particular examples is undoubtedly 
exacerbated by the anonymity that online communication presents. As Michael 
Marshall wrote, the New Scientist website was subject to a sharp increase in the 
amount of abusive language as soon as a new feature was introduced that allowed 
readers to comment on its articles. Having had to moderate the comments in order 
to confirm with their stated house rules, Marshall wrote that ‘while most of them 
are perfectly polite, there’s a stubborn minority that are rude, intentionally 
provocative, or just plain abusive. It seems people will say things online that they 
would never say face-to-face.’497 To anyone familiar with online spaces (particularly 
social media, or spaces that report news stories and opinion pieces and allow readers 
to comment below), this would be unlikely to come as a surprise. It is nevertheless 
worth considering that the polarised expressions of taste involved at the heart of the 
Toy Story 3 controversy were strongly facilitated by the Internet.  
Numerous social psychology experiments have for example demonstrated 
that electronic communication, with its distinct absence of non-verbal or 
paralinguistic cues, makes it much harder to reliably convey and/or interpret the 
intended meaning of a message.498 Nicholas Epley and Justin Kruger argue that 
expectations and stereotypes are ‘essential’ to everyday communication, with the 
‘ability to go beyond the information given [being] a key feature of any intelligent 
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497 Michael Marshall, ‘Don’t flame me, bro’, New Scientist, 19th November 2007 
<http://www.newscientist.com/blog/technology/2007/11/dont-flame-me-bro.html>, Retrieved 
10th April 2010. 
498 See for example, Nicholas Epley and Justin Kruger, ‘When what you type isn’t what they read: 
The perseverance of  stereotypes and expectancies over e-mail’, Journal of  Experimental Social 
Psychology (2005), 41, pp.414-22. Also see Justin Kruger et al., ‘Egocentrism over E-Mail: Can we 
communicate as well as we think?’, Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology (2005), 89.6, 
pp.925-36. 
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system.’ 499  They go on to add, however, that ‘inaccurate expectancies, whether 
derived from stereotypes, erroneous first impressions, or negative preconceptions, 
can cause information to be interpreted in a manner consistent with those 
expectancies, thereby perpetuating the expectancy.’500 Their findings suggest that if 
huge numbers of online film fans expect Armond White to ‘hate’ a particular film, 
the qualitative content within his reviews is far more likely to be interpreted as 
negative and hostile than if it had been written by somebody with a more respected 
reputation. Many of the examples of Pixar reviews I have used in this chapter 
suggest that the same may also be true of positive preconceptions. 
Journalist and author Jonah Lehrer would agree, arguing that ‘although we 
think we make political decisions based upon the facts, the reality is much more 
sordid. We are affiliation machines, editing the world to confirm our partisan 
ideologies.’ 501  He goes on to add that even when faced with evidence that 
contradicts what we expect (and crucially, want) to hear, see, or read, ‘we silence the 
cognitive dissonance through self-imposed ignorance.’ 502  Political affiliation and 
taste are of course closely related, both being socially shaped, the product of an 
interaction between what Bourdieu would term cultural capital, habitus and field.503  
Lehrer’s work also helps shed light on the nature of the Toy Story 3 
controversy. Armond White’s reputation as an alleged contrarian certainly goes 
some way to explaining the far higher number of comments his review received in 
comparison to Smithey’s and Heilman’s. Several readers expressed their 
unfamiliarity with the latter two critics, and insinuated that they must either be 
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499 Epley and Kruger, p.419. 
500 Ibid. 
501 Jonah Lehrer, ‘The Ignorance of  Voters’, Wired, 27th April 2011 
<http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2011/04/the-ignorance-of-voters/>, Retrieved 27th April 
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associates of White’s (‘Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum’),504 or doing his bidding 
(‘Another reviewer paid off by Armond White’).505 The consistency in tone and 
content across responses to all three critics however, combined with the lack of 
engagement with the specificities of the reviews, suggests that this situation had very 
little to do with what they had actually written. Rather, in the same way that we 
‘impose ignorance’ on ourselves upon receiving information that runs contradictory 
to what we want to hear, Lehrer’s research implies that people may have been keen 
to surround themselves with opinions that parallel their own. Carl Wilson argues 
that this is extremely common, since doing so effectively confirms and legitimates 
our tastes. We seek out others who will tell us what we want to hear.  
Sociologist Duncan Watts makes an important link between the tastes of 
individuals and those of groups. In a 2007 article in the New York Times, he 
outlined the concept of cumulative advantage, tested in an experiment into the 
music consumption habits of more than 14,000 individuals online. The experiment 
aimed to test the effects of social influence on these habits, and revealed that people 
were more willing to purchase a particular song or give it a higher rating if they also 
saw that other people had been doing the same. 
 
Even if you think most people are tasteless or ignorant, it’s natural to 
believe that successful songs, movies, books and artists are somehow 
“better,” at least in the democratic sense of a competitive market, than their 
unsuccessful counterparts, that Norah Jones and Madonna deserve to be as 
successful as they are if only because “that’s what the market wanted.” What 
our results suggest, however, is that because what people like depends on 
what they think other people like, what the market “wants” at any point in 
time can depend very sensitively on its own history: there is no sense in 
which it simply “reveals” what people wanted all along. In such a world, in 
fact, the question “Why did X succeed?” may not have any better answer 
than the one given by the publisher of Lynne Truss’s surprise best seller, 
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Eats, Shoots & Leaves, who, when asked to explain its success, replied that 
“it sold well because lots of people bought it.”506  
 
Here we see a vivid example of consensus in action, with the popularity of a 
cultural object being largely determined by social influence above all else. Those 
participants of the experiment that were able to view the consumption habits of 
others were in a similar position to Rotten Tomatoes users, who when faced with a 
large number of choices of films to potentially watch, use the website’s scores to 
help make their decision. 507  The Tomatometer provides a starting point for 
influencing a user’s film consumption habits, but also serves as ‘evidence’ for 
justifying his or her existing tastes. Watts’s research would suggest that the 
Tomatometer polarises people, providing users with a sense that, if they aren’t 
watching and liking (or disliking) the same films that others are, then they missing 
out. As he puts it, ‘what we often want is not so much to experience the “best” of 
everything as it is to experience the same things as other people and thereby also 
experience the benefits of sharing.’508  
 
Conclusion 
When Toy Story 3’s Rotten Tomatoes score dropped from 100% to 99%, 
the reaction that the first ‘negative’ reviews received was swift and fierce. Armond 
White, Cole Smithey, and later, Jeremy Heilman, expressing their distaste for Pixar’s 
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506 Duncan J. Watts, ‘Is Justin Timberlake a product of  cumulative advantage?’, New York Times, 15th 
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latest release, all came in for intense abuse on the website itself, being insulted, 
accused of being trolls, and having their credentials as film critics called into 
question. Rotten Tomatoes users were in other words expressing their own taste by 
coming together en masse to reject the critics’ distastes. To some extent, there are 
reasons why Toy Story 3 should be the subject of a controversy of this kind, namely 
in the sense that the trilogy had been released over a fifteen-year period. As such, 
audiences who enjoyed the films had already invested in two previous stories with 
the same characters, and several reviewers noted that changes in their own lives 
over that period had had a significant bearing on their reactions to the third 
installment.  
Toy Story and Toy Story 2 also carried with them the weight of ‘perfect’ 
Rotten Tomatoes scores, although it is important to note that the website was only 
founded in 1999, with many reviews (obviously including Toy Story, but also some 
of the sequel’s reviews) being posted to the site retrospectively. Just as we saw in the 
case of Cars, and with Duncan Watts’ experiment, while consensus does leave room 
for criticism, the social component of taste tends to polarise rather than fragment 
opinion. 
Importantly, the consensus surrounding Pixar and the films it produces is 
strongly informed by the notion of the ‘winning streak’. While this idea manifests 
itself primarily through observers who link each of the studio’s films together in an 
unbroken chain of success, it was given an added dimension upon the release of 
Toy Story 3. The nature of how the film’s Tomatometer score unfolded – 130 
‘fresh’ reviews before a single ‘rotten’ one – undoubtedly exacerbated the reaction 
that White, Smithey and Heilman received, creating a winning streak (Toy Story 3 
on the Tomatometer), within a winning streak (the Toy Story franchise), within a 
winning streak (Pixar’s oeuvre). Before Rotten Tomatoes existed, it would have 
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been easier for fans of a film to restrict their reading of reviews to a select few 
publications, more easily enabling the dismissal of any opinions that contradicted 
their own. But the rise of Rotten Tomatoes has made ignoring conflicting reviews 
far more difficult, since anybody who uses the website at all is inextricably linked to 
every review that counted towards a film’s score.  
The importance of the vitriolic responses to Armond White, Cole Smithey 
and Jeremy Heilman’s reviews of Toy Story 3 however go far beyond this one film, 
and beyond Pixar. Roger Ebert’s defence of Armond White and then his 
subsequent retraction suggest a paradox, whereby everyone is indeed entitled to 
their own opinion about a cultural object, but there nevertheless exists a definite (if 
intangible) sense of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ art. Individual ‘discrepancies’ (i.e. opinions 
that conflict with consensus) are perfectly legitimate, but only on condition that they 
are not repeated across multiple cultural objects. Aggregation of course makes this 
effect far more pronounced than it has ever been, since it not only simplifies and 
collates multiple reviews for multiple films, but the Tomatometer scores provide an 
instant way of comparing one film to another. We can see at a glance that Toy Story 
3 is nigh on ‘perfect’, and Jonah Hex (Jimmy Hayward, 2010) is ‘rotten’ – the figures 
are there for all to see.  
Pixar is by no means the only studio to have benefited from the polarising 
effect of the Tomatometer, and it will not be the last, but the highest and lowest 
scores on the website stand as a clearly observable indicator of what cinematic taste 
does and does not consist of at any given time. Film critics and internet-savvy film 
fans should by no means be seen to represent ‘the audience’ for any given release, 
but cumulative advantage theory suggests that these relatively small audiences will 
play an increasingly central role in the formation of tastes. The more it is reported 
that ‘everybody’ loves Toy Story 3 or Pixar, the more people will be encouraged to 
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seek out the studio’s work, already wanting to see it in a positive light. Of course, 
this can work in the opposite way too, whereby people may approach a cultural 
object with the intention (whether conscious or not) of disliking it. Doing so is itself 
an expression of cultural distinction. Others may approach the text with a 
considerable degree of scepticism, doubting whether it actually lives up to the hype 
from critics and/or audiences. In both cases, however, branding and reputation can 
make the difference, and even the most vehemently derisive review of a Pixar film 
must be seen in relation to all that has come before it – an all but indisputable 
narrative of success. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Beyond Infinity, Beyond Animation?: The Future of 
the Pixar Brand 
 
In many ways, the work of a critic is easy. We risk very little, yet enjoy a 
position over those who offer up their work and their selves to our 
judgment. We thrive on negative criticism, which is fun to write and to read. 
But the bitter truth we critics must face is that in the grand scheme of 
things, the average piece of junk is probably more meaningful than our 
criticism designating it so. But there are times when a critic truly risks 
something, and that is in the discovery and defence of the new. The world is 
often unkind to new talent, new creations. The new needs friends. Last 
night, I experienced something new: an extraordinary meal from a singularly 
unexpected source. To say that both the meal and its maker have challenged 
my preconceptions about fine cooking is a gross understatement. They have 
rocked me to my core. In the past, I have made no secret of my disdain for 
Chef Gusteau’s famous motto, “Anyone can cook.” But I realise, only now 
do I truly understand what he meant. Not everyone can become a great 
artist; but a great artist can come from anywhere. It is difficult to imagine more 
humble origins than those of the genius now cooking at Gusteau’s, who is, 
in this critic’s opinion, nothing less than the finest chef in France. I will be 
returning to Gusteau’s soon, hungry for more.  
 
- Anton Ego (Peter O’Toole), Ratatouille (Brad Bird, 2007) 
 
 
The monologue above is taken from the end of Ratatouille, when the 
notoriously surly food critic Anton Ego (Peter O’Toole) triumphantly admits that 
he has been won over by Remy the rat’s fine cuisine. Ego offers a self-effacing re-
assessment of the value and worth of his profession in comparison to the art and 
artists he writes about, conceding that ‘the average piece of junk is probably more 
meaningful than our criticism designating it so’. He champions the ‘new’ and the 
‘unexpected’, and expresses his profound delight at having had his preconceptions 
challenged by a ‘genius’. It is but one moment from one of Pixar’s many feature 
films, yet it also appeared to stand for a great deal more than that, reading very 
much like a paean from the studio to itself.509 The reference to Remy’s ‘humble 

509 A 2011 feature by Entertainment Weekly also noted this association, selecting Ego’s monologue 
as one of ‘Pixar’s Top 12 moments’, and suggesting that it ‘could have just as easily been written 
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origins’ chimes comfortably with the romanticised narratives of early Pixar, depicted 
as a talented but struggling company who eventually succeeded through 
perseverance. It was a speech that, in hindsight, appeared to set the tone for critics 
who would write about the studio, pre-empting the hyperbole that would follow in 
subsequent years. 
Indeed, when I first began work on this doctoral thesis in October 2009, 
Pixar occupied a seemingly unassailable position in American popular culture. The 
release of Up (Pete Docter, 2009) that summer had truly cemented the studio’s 
already solid reputation for quality family entertainment, building on the 
achievements of Ratatouille and WALL-E (Andrew Stanton, 2008). Pixar had often 
been the subject of effusive critical praise in the past, but these three movies were 
seen to exemplify everything that the brand stood for in the eyes of critics: cinema 
that was original, creative, daring, and ruled by the pursuit of artistry rather than 
marketing reports. One of John Lasseter’s repeated mantras was that ‘quality is the 
best business plan’, a phrase that could have sounded hollow had Pixar’s output 
fallen below par. It was a brand that was regularly making promises to its audiences, 
but rarely failed to deliver. Even so, prior to Up’s release, a number of stakeholders 
expressed concern that the studio was straying too far from established filmmaking 
conventions. To some reviewers, recent characters and storylines – a rat who 
becomes a gourmet chef, or an elderly widower using balloons to fly his house to 
South America – almost came across as deliberate attempts to dissuade audiences 
from seeing them, with one financial analyst anxiously explaining that ‘each film 
[Pixar] delivers seems to be less commercial than the last.’510  
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These fears were routinely assuaged, as positive reviews and strong word of 
mouth were matched by impressive box office takings around the world. Ego’s 
words again ring true here, with Pixar consistently ‘challenging critics’ 
preconceptions’ by giving them something ‘new’.511 Even a Maclean’s article in 2008 
ominously entitled ‘The Problem With Pixar’ was actually full of praise. Jaime 
Weinman wrote that, ‘lately, its movies have felt more like art films’, and his 
concern was simply that audiences would not reward them with the box office 
revenues they deserved.512 
The Pixar that exists as I write this conclusion in early 2013, however, seems 
far less stable. While the reputation for quality that the studio has been cultivating 
since the mid-1980s will take some time to erode completely, figurative cracks have 
certainly begun to emerge; critics simply do not have as much faith in Pixar as they 
once did. For many observers, films like Cars 2 (John Lasseter and Brad Lewis, 
2011) and Brave (Mark Andrews and Brenda Chapman, 2012) have cast doubt on 
what had previously been one of the most dependable brand names in global 
entertainment. An article in Variety from November 2012 again described ‘the Pixar 
problem’, but this was not the same issue that Weinman had raised four years 
earlier. This time, the eponymous problem was the impact of the Disney takeover, 
with the parent company’s demands for more sequels and increased productivity 
having forced Pixar to alter its previously successful working methods.513  
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The ‘Sequelisation’ of Pixar 
Interestingly, in the wake of the takeover, Disney CEO Bob Iger was quick 
to declare, ‘I’m sensitive to what can happen when a company is bought,’ and he 
stressed the importance of ‘the Pixar culture [being] protected and allowed to 
continue.’514 This creative culture had become a key component of the studio’s 
reputation, particularly in relation to the question of how it had become so adept at 
consistently producing critically lauded box office successes. Disney certainly 
appears to have kept its word in this regard, maintaining the atmosphere of 
playfulness and encouraging collaboration, experimentation and interaction between 
all its employees. However, it does seem as though there may have been orders 
from Disney to shift long term production strategies towards sequels, spin-offs and 
franchises, so as to provide animation that can extend existing narratives and create 
new opportunities for storytelling across a range of media. Whether this is exactly 
what has happened is open to debate, and ultimately impossible to prove without 
being granted access to internal correspondence or conversations between the 
studios.  
Derek Johnson notes that the curious cultural position that media 
franchising finds itself in today, as an industrial strategy that simultaneously 
dominates the North American box office, yet is routinely dismissed, criticised and 
satirised by cultural commentators. As he puts it, ‘as an awkward punchline, 
franchising explains the creative bankruptcy and foregone ecnonomic determination 
of contemporary media industries ... as monstrously homogenised, self-determining, 
and childish’.515 Crucially, Pixar’s reputation has been discursively set in opposition 
to such industrial/creative logic, yet has now reached a point when the distinction is 
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becoming far less clear. Its brand has effectively made creativity into a commodity, 
with the studio name having come to represent not just consistent entertainment, 
but newness and uniqueness. Sequels, franchises and merchandising are, quite 
simply, antithetical to Pixar’s reputation and historical narrative, meaning that such 
industrial activity must somehow be consolidated in relation to incongruous ideas.  
During the period of industrial conflict between Disney and Pixar between 
2001 and 2006 was marked by considerable public sniping from either side, both 
John Lasseter and Steve Jobs made derisive comments about Disney’s willingness to 
compromise quality in exchange for easy cash.516 As David Price describes the 
situation in 2003: 
 
The idea of Disney cranking out Toy Story 3, Finding Nemo 2, and the like 
drove Lasseter to distraction. He regarded the films almost as his children, 
and there was little reason to expect that [then-Disney CEO Michael] Eisner 
would tend them with any sort of care. Disney-made sequels under Eisner, it 
seemed, would be objects of commerce above all else. “These were the 
people who put out Cinderella II,” Lasseter later said mordantly.517 
 
Steve Jobs employed the same example as Lasseter, reflecting that, ‘When 
you see what that company did putting out Cinderella II, you shudder at what 
would have happened’.518 Walter Isaacson’s biography of Jobs, however, goes even 
further than Price in describing Lasseter’s torment, quoting him as saying, ‘I was 
worried about my children, what they would do with the characters we’d created. It 
was like a dagger to my heart. It’s like you have these dear children and you have to 
give them up to be adopted by convicted child molesters’519 These words are 
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516 The fact that Lasseter spoke out against is particularly noteworthy, even shocking, given that his 
interviews and public comments are characterised by an almost hyperactively positive attitude 
towards his work. 
517 David Price, The Pixar Touch: The Making of  a Company (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 
p.232. 
518 Walter Isaacson, Steve Jobs (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011), p.245. 
519 Ibid. 
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significantly stronger than any of the words that emerged publically at that time, and 
thus their effect on post-takeover discourse is a polarising one, not only maintaining 
but increasing the perceived distance between the two studios. Available evidence 
suggests Pixar has decided that taking responsibility for its own films is preferable to 
ceding control of its characters to another company. With Toy Story 3 having been 
released in 2010, however, and Finding Dory (i.e. the sequel to Finding Nemo) 
having been set for release in 2015,520 it is clear that a disparity (or at the very least, a 
tension) has emerged between Pixar’s reputation and its performance.  
However, the truth of this situation is less important than its plausibility, 
and the reason why it became such an attractive narrative was because of the 
respective reputations involved. Disney’s reputation within these discourses hinged 
on its prior association with globalisation and cultural ubiquity, as well as its 
corporate focus on synergy and franchising throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Pixar, 
on the other hand, had mostly resisted producing sequels throughout its string of 
successes. Although the Toy Story trilogy represents a notable exception, critics 
justified this in two key ways: firstly, Toy Story 2 (John Lasseter, 1999) was a rare 
example of a sequel that was deemed to measure up to its predecessor, thus 
vindicating the decision to make it in the first place; secondly, it was later widely 
reported that the production of both sequels had actually been forced on Pixar by 
Disney, who controlled character rights and threatened to make the film themselves 
with or without Pixar’s assistance.521 Reputations and brands thus need to be 
considered from the perspective of narratives, with trajectories and key ‘plot 
elements’ which are constantly in a state of flux. 
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Sociologist William Sewell has, for example, argued that historical ‘events’ 
are not as easily defined as they often seem to be, and come to be recognised only 
when they result in the ‘transformation of structures’.522 Duncan Watts concurs, and 
stresses the problematic process of historicisation more generally. He compares the 
use of artificial ‘endpoints’ to the ending of movies, which impose an ending on 
what in reality would be an ongoing story.523 This argument has important 
implications for this thesis, not only because it is, in part, a historical account of 
how the Pixar brand has developed, but because it is an attempt to document an 
ongoing process. History, as Watts points out, can only be written after something has 
happened, and thus many of the ‘events’ I have chosen to focus my attention on 
could theoretically be deemed insignificant to the ‘meaning’ of the Pixar brand at 
some point in the future. Yet this should not diminish the strength of the arguments 
I have made, since reputation is constantly being mediated in different ways by 
different forces. Thus, journalism and film reviews are, I would argue, the most 
effective way of at least being able to gauge the prevailing zeitgeist – which 
narratives prevail – at any given time. This even applies in instances when writers 
may have interpreted events ‘wrongly’, as exemplified in the case of Toy Story, 
which was seen as a Disney film by most critics despite the demonstrable evidence, 
both then and now, of Pixar’s overwhelming creative control. Such moments may 
even prove to be more revealing than reports that can be verified or corroborated 
through other sources, since the impact and legacy of inaccuracies will inevitably 
stand out as unusual in the face of conflicting information. In other words, it is 
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522 William H. Sewell, Jr., ‘Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution 
at the Bastille’, Theory and Society, 25.6 (December 1996), p.843. 
523 Duncan Watts, Everything Is Obvious* *Once You Know The Answer: How Common Sense 
Fails (London: Atlantic Books, 2011), pp.131-2. For a discussion of endings in Hollywood cinema 
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important to acknowledge that the arguments put forth throughout this thesis are 
necessarily shaped by the point in time that they were written. 
One of my overriding research questions when I began the project was to 
explore the studio’s continued rise, since there was no suggestion that its success 
would end in the near future. Had I written this conclusion during the summer of 
2012, however, following critics’ varied criticisms of Cars 2 (John Lasseter, 2011) 
and Brave (Mark Andrews, Brenda Chapman and Steve Purcell, 2012), I would 
likely have been reflecting on the ‘rise and fall’ of Pixar. As it stands now, in 2013, 
with Disney having purchased Lucasfilm, the narrative almost feels as though it has 
come full circle; Pixar was purchased by Disney to restore quality to its animation 
department, but there are now signs that their respective reputations are beginning 
to converge. What this means is that Pixar now finds itself in the curious position of 
being (seemingly) responsible for the fate of the company it originated from in the 
late-1970s.524  
 
Beyond Animation?: What John Carter might tell us about Pixar  
One of the key developments at Pixar since I began this research has been 
an implied shift away from animation. This shift has to some extent been symbolic 
or referential, as critics have sought to legitimate the studio’s films by elevating 
them above the output of its rivals. In another sense, however, this move away from 
animation has been a literal one, as several Pixar directors have moved into live 
action cinema. For example, prior to joining Pixar and making The Incredibles 
(2004) and Ratatouille (2007), Brad Bird had been responsible for the critically 
lauded animation The Iron Giant (1999). He then became the first of the studio’s 
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524 To be clear, I am not suggesting that Pixar will have any creative input into the forthcoming Star 
Wars series, but that the convergence of  Disney and Pixar’s reputations means that such a narrative is 
becoming more and more of  a possibility.  
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filmmakers to make something elsewhere when he was appointed to direct Mission 
Impossible 4: Ghost Protocol (2011). The impact of his departure was arguably 
lessened as a result of Bird’s own reputation within Pixar, as the critical reception of 
The Incredibles had previously established him as something of a ‘wacky’ outsider. 
After directing two Pixar films, however, his association with the studio was still 
strong, and when it was announced that Andrew Stanton would be directing 
Disney’s live-action blockbuster John Carter, a clear story was emerging of Pixar’s 
key creative workers abandoning the medium they made their names in. 
The ways in which these developments played out in the reception of John 
Carter were intriguing, and as with the legitimating discourses described in Chapters 
4 and 6, reveal a great deal about Pixar’s cultural status. One article in the Guardian, 
for example, wrote in January 2010 (two years before the film’s release), that if John 
Carter became a success, it would prove that Stanton and his colleagues deserve to 
be seen as ‘the greatest film-makers the world has ever known’.525 The article asked 
whether the studio’s ‘Midas touch’ would ‘transfer to live action’,526 while 
Bloomberg Businessweek similarly speculated ‘whether Disney can spread the magic 
of animation powerhouse Pixar … to live-action films’.527  What comments like this 
imply is that critics had in mind a clear narrative trajectory for Pixar that could easily 
have become historicised. Ultimately, this wasn’t to be the case, because the 
overwhelming story of the film became one of catastrophic failure after its $250 
million production budget dwarfed the domestic box office takings of only $73 
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million.528 Significantly, though, the way in which Disney and Pixar were both 
conceptualised within these discourses of failure is telling; A.O Scott’s New York 
Times review only mentioned Pixar once, but only to declare, ‘the Pixar touch is 
evident in the precision of the visual detail and in the wit and energy of Michael 
Giacchino’s score’.529 Michael Cavna’s blog for the Washington Post asked, ‘Who’s 
to blame for Disney’s “$200-million” bomb?’, effectively answering his own 
question, and neglecting to mention Pixar anywhere in the article.530 I have provided 
countless examples of this process of negotiated reputation throughout this thesis, 
but it will be interesting to see how this gradual conflation between Disney and 
Pixar, and between animation and live-action filmmaking continues. Richard Corliss 
might have seen Pixar as ‘standing in’ for all other animation, but this becomes a 
more complex issue as animation itself becomes increasingly difficult to define. As 
CGI, motion capture, video gaming, and other visual effects technologies become 
more capable of mimicking the ‘real’, will this have any impact on Pixar’s reputation 
for quality animation? 
 
Beyond Pixar?: Suggestions for Future Research 
 As I have repeatedly stressed throughout this thesis, many of the arguments 
and theoretical frameworks that I have presented here may certainly be applied to 
the study of other brands, loosely defined. Certainly, Klinger’s approach to 
historical reception studies represents an insightful way of exploring the 
development of reputation over time, as well as in specific moments. While it may 

528 Anon., ‘John Carter’, Box Office Mojo, no date 
<http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=johncarterofmars.htm>, Retrieved 15th April 2013. 
529 A.O. Scott, ‘The Wild, Wild West of  a Certain Red Planet’, New York Times, 8th March 2012 
<http://movies.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/movies/john-carter-with-taylor-kitsch-and-lynn-
collins.html?_r=1&>, Retrieved 15th April 2013. 
530 Michael Cavna, ‘The Rant: John Carter’s Massive Fallout’, Washington Post, 23rd March 2012 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/comic-riffs/post/the-rant-john-carters-massive-fallout-
whos-to-blame-for-disneys-200-million-bomb/2012/03/19/gIQAOKf6VS_blog.html>, Retrieved 
15th April 2013. 
190 
not be enough on its own to explain why certain discourses prevail and others do 
not, it does at least allow for a comprehensive overview of what those discourses 
are, and how they develop. Reputations will inevitably be forged by an enormous 
range of factors, but reception studies as a discipline is well placed to explore the 
spaces where these processes of negotiation take place. 
Following the lead of Arvidsson, seeing brands as units of ‘informational 
capital’ that ‘provide context’ for the consumption of a diverse range of products,531 
my contention is that studies in this area should seek to move away from strictly 
proprietorial definitions of branding. Consumption simply does not take place 
inside a vacuum, and it is imperative that the academy develops ways of studying the 
fluidity with which journalists, audiences, and other consumer groups routinely 
engage with brands. After all, if branding is about ‘providing a context’, then I 
would argue that it is equally important to understand how these contextual 
providers are themselves created, and where they came from. 
One potential approach to the Pixar brand that I was heavily tempted to 
incorporate into my research was an audience study. The primary reason why I 
opted against the idea was because I was keen to trace Pixar’s development over time, 
free from the biases of knowing what would become of the studio. Nevertheless, 
such an approach would undoubtedly help to answer some closely related questions. 
To what extent do critical discourses surrounding the studio match up with 
audience expectations and responses to its films? And are audiences just as invested 
in the distinctions between rival animation studios? Anecdotally, my own experience 
of talking to friends and family about my research has almost always resulted in 
someone asking me, ‘So, was [x] a Pixar film then?’ (where [x] represents the name 
of virtually any high profile computer-animated film made since Shrek). My 
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suspicion is that these distinctions between brands that are so prominent between 
critics, would actually be far less common among audiences more generally, and it 
would be fascinating to test that hypothesis. More work would also be needed to 
prove whether there was a demonstrable link between branded reputation and 
audience consumption practices, a study that would likely be of considerable 
interest to film studios and brand strategists in general.  
 What this all comes back to is the question of how to locate Pixar. Where 
exactly do brands reside, and how can we analyse them in meaningful ways? 
Interbrand’s annual list of the ‘Best Global Brands’, for instance, often features 
Disney near the top, yet calculates brand value from the sum total of all the other 
brands it owns. This is clearly problematic if, as I have shown, Disney is routinely 
derided in relation to companies such as Pixar. Value, in this context, is seen purely 
in terms of monetary flow, and appears to have little correlation with cultural value 
or reputation. Seen in this way, I would argue that in order to discuss what Pixar 
‘means’, studies of Disney’s corporate structure and other industrial information 
needs to be supplemented with research into, say, passing references to Pixar in 
popular sitcom The Office (NBC, 2005-13). What does it mean, for example, that 
protagonist Michael Scott attempts to impress a woman in a bar by saying, ‘Toy 
Story, Finding Nemo, Up, I bawled the entire time! I cannot watch Pixar!’?532 It is 
cultural analysis of this kind that I believe existing studies of brands are lacking, 
treating brands as stories, or texts that can be formally analysed in a multitude of 
potential ways. 
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 Pixar’s position within Disney’s corporate structure will likely remain 
unchanged in the coming years, yet there are clear signs emerging that its reputation 
is at a crucial moment in time. As the studio passes control of its films from its 
original ‘Brain Trust’ of John Lasseter, Andrew Stanton, Pete Docter and Lee 
Unkrich, will this in turn contribute to a sense that Pixar has moved away from 
individual authorial visions, and towards something more corporate and figuratively 
‘faceless’? At what point will ‘bad’ sequels or underperforming blockbusters cease to 
be blamed on Disney, and merge into a sense of Pixar having lost its way? Is there a 
grace period here that can only continue for a finite number of perceived ‘flops’? It 
is difficult to believe that a gradual change could never come, but for the moment, 
Pixar still seems to be in a position where its failures will constantly be discursively 
displaced onto other brands or authors. My suspicion is that even a constant stream 
of critical backlash could be spun positively, further strengthening the reputation of 
the studio’s earlier work in the manner of ‘Classic’ Disney films. It almost feels as 
though this story has already been written. 
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Appendix 
Fig. 1.1 – Pixar logo, 1986-1990. Author’s screengrab. 
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Fig 1.2 – Pixar Image Computer.533  
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Pixar Filmography 
 
FEATURES 
 
A Bug’s Life. Dir. John Lasseter. Co-Dir. Andrew Stanton. Perf. Dave Foley, Kevin 
Spacey, Julia Louis-Dreyfus. USA. Disney/Pixar, 1998.  
 
Brave. Dir. Mark Andrews, Brenda Chapman. Co-Dir. Steve Purcell. Perf. Kelly 
Macdonald, Billy Connolly, Emma Thompson. USA. Disney/Pixar, 2012. 
 
Cars. Dir. John Lasseter. Co-Dir. Joe Ranft. Perf. Owen Wilson, Paul Newman, 
Bonnie Hunt, Larry the Cable Guy. USA. Disney/Pixar, 2006. 
 
Cars 2. Dir. John Lasseter. Co-Dir. Brad Lewis. Perf. Owen Wilson, Larry the Cable 
Guy, Michael Caine, Emily Mortimer. USA. Disney/Pixar, 2011. 
 
Finding Nemo. Dir. Andrew Stanton. Co-Dir. Lee Unkrich. Perf. Albert Brooks, 
Ellen DeGeneres, Alexander Gould. USA. Disney/Pixar, 2003. 
 
The Incredibles. Dir. Brad Bird. Perf. Craig T. Nelson, Holly Hunter, Samuel L. 
Jackson, Jason Lee. 2004. USA. Disney/Pixar, 2005. 
 
Monsters, Inc. Dir. Pete Docter. Co-Dir. David Silverman, Lee Unkrich. Perf. John 
Goodman, Billy Crystal, Mary Gibbs, Steve Buscemi, James Coburn. USA. 
Disney/Pixar, 2001. 
 
Ratatouille. Dir. Brad Bird, Jan Pinkava. Perf. Patton Oswalt, Ian Holm, Lou 
Romano, Peter O’Toole. USA. Disney/Pixar, 2007. 
 
Toy Story. Dir. John Lasseter. Perf. Tom Hanks, Tim Allen, Don Rickles, Jim 
Varney, Wallace Shawn. USA. Disney/Pixar, 1995. 
 
Toy Story 2. Dir. John Lasseter. Co-Dir. Ash Brannon, Lee Unkrich. Perf. Tom 
Hanks, Tim Allen, Joan Cusack, Kelsey Grammer, Wayne Knight. USA. 
Disney/Pixar, 1999. 
 
Toy Story 3. Dir. Lee Unkrich. Perf. Tom Hanks, Tim Allen, Joan Cusack, Ned 
Beatty. USA. Disney/Pixar, 2010. 
 
Up. Dir. Pete Docter. Co-Dir. Bob Peterson. Perf. Edward Asner, Christopher 
Plummer, Jordan Nagai, Bob Peterson. USA. Disney/Pixar, 2009. 
 
WALL-E. Dir. Andrew Stanton. Perf. Ben Burtt, Elissa Knight, Jeff Garlin, Fred 
Willard. USA. Disney/Pixar, 2008. 
 
196 
SHORTS 
 
The Adventures of André and Wally B. Dir. Alvy Ray Smith. Pixar/Lucasfilm Ltd., 
1984.  
 
Boundin’. Dir. Bud Luckey. Co-Dir. Roger Gould. Pixar, 2003.  
 
BURN-E. Dir. Angus MacLane. Disney/Pixar, 2008.  
 
Day & Night. Dir. Teddy Newton. Disney/Pixar, 2010. 
 
Dug’s Special Mission. Dir. Ronnie Del Carmen. Disney/Pixar, 2009. 
 
For the Birds. Dir. Ralph Eggleston. Disney/Pixar, 2000. 
 
George & AJ. Dir. Josh Cooley. Disney/Pixar, 2009. 
 
Geri’s Game. Dir. Jan Pinkava. Pixar, 1997. 
 
Hawaiian Vacation. Dir. Gary Rydstrom. Disney/Pixar, 2011. 
 
Jack-Jack Attack. Dir. Brad Bird. Disney/Pixar, 2005. 
 
Knick Knack. Dir. John Lasseter. Pixar, 1989. 
 
La Luna. Dir. Enrico Casarosa. Disney/Pixar, 2012. 
 
The Legend of Mor’du. Dir. Brian Larsen. Disney/Pixar, 2012. 
 
Lifted. Dir. Gary Rydstrom. Disney/Pixar, 2006. 
 
Luxo Jr. Dir. John Lasseter. Pixar, 1986. 
 
Mater and the Ghostlight. Dir. John Lasseter. Co-Dir. Dan Scanlon. Disney/Pixar, 
2006. 
 
Mike’s New Car. Dir. Pete Docter, Roger Gould. Disney/Pixar, 2002. 
 
One Man Band. Dir. Mark Andrews, Andrew Jimenez. Pixar, 2005. 
 
Partly Cloudy. Dir. Peter Sohn. Disney/Pixar, 2009. 
 
Partysaurus Rex. Dir. Mark Walsh. Disney/Pixar, 2012. 
 
Presto. Dir. Doug Sweetland. Disney/Pixar, 2008. 
 
Red’s Dream. Dir. John Lasseter. Pixar, 1987. 
 
Small Fry. Dir. Angus MacLane. Disney/Pixar, 2011. 
 
The Blue Umbrella. Dir. Saschka Unseld. Disney/Pixar, 2013. 
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Tin Toy. Dir. John Lasseter. Pixar, 1988. 
 
Your Friend the Rat. Dir. Jim Capobianco. Disney/Pixar, 2007. 
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Filmography 
 
Aladdin. Dir. Ron Clements and John Musker. USA. Walt Disney Pictures, 1992. 
 
An American Tale. Dir. Don Bluth. USA. Universal Pictures, 1986. 
 
Armageddon. Dir. Michael Bay. USA. Touchstone Pictures, 1998. 
 
Beauty and the Beast. Dir. Gary Trousdale and Kirk Wise. USA. Walt Disney 
Pictures, 1991. 
 
Bedtime Stories. Dir. Adam Shankman. USA. Walt Disney Pictures, 2008. 
 
Bridesmaids, Dir. Paul Feig. USA. Universal Pictures, 2011. 
 
Brother Bear. Dir. Aaron Blaise and Robert Walker. USA. Walt Disney Pictures, 
2003. 
 
Cassiopéia. Dir. Clóvis Veira. Brazil. NDR Filmes, 1996. 
  
Che. Dir. Steven Soderbergh. Spain/France/USA. Morena Films/Warner 
Bros./IFC Films, 2008. 
 
Chicken Little. Dir. Mark Dindal. USA. Walt Disney Pictures, 2005. 
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The Curious Case of Benjamin Button. Dir. David Fincher. USA. Paramount 
Pictures, 2008. 
 
Dance Flick. Dir. Damien Dante Wayans. USA. Paramount Pictures, 2009. 
 
Dante’s Peak. Dir. Roger Donaldson. USA. Universal Pictures, 1997. 
 
Deep Impact. Dir. Mimi Leder. USA. DreamWorks Pictures, 1998. 
 
District 9. Dir. Neill Blomkamp. USA/New Zealand/Canada/South Africa. TriStar 
Pictures, 2009. 
 
Doubt. Dir. John Patrick Shanley. USA. Miramax Films, 2008. 
 
EDtv. Dir. Ron Howard. USA. Universal Pictures, 1999. 
 
Fanboys. Dir. Kyle Newman. USA. The Weinstein Company/Vivendi 
Entertainment, 2008. 
 
Gomorra. Dir. Matteo Garrone. Italy. IFC Films, 2008. 
 
Gremlins. Dir. Joe Dante. USA. Warner Bros., 1984. 
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2004. 
How to Train Your Dragon. Dir. Chris Sanders, Dean DeBlois. USA. DreamWorks 
Animation, 2010. 
 
The Human Centipede (First Sequence). Dir. Tom Six. Netherlands. Bounty Films, 
2010. 
 
Hunger. Dir. Steve McQueen. UK/Ireland. Icon Film Distribution, 2008. 
 
The Hurt Locker. Dir. Kathryn Bigelow. USA. Summit Entertainment/Universal 
Pictures, 2008. 
 
Ice Age. Dir. Chris Wedge. Co-Dir. Carlos Saldanha. USA. Blue Sky Studios/20th 
Century Fox, 2002. 
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Thurmeier. USA. Blue Sky Studios/20th Century Fox, 2009. 
 
The Iron Giant. Dir. Brad Bird. USA. Warner Bros. Feature Animation, 1999. 
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